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An object is
and only

a simple if and only if

every proper part of that object

if

it

An object is gunk if

has no proper parts.

itself

has a proper part. In

my dissertation,

I

address the following questions.

(1)

What

The concepts of simples and gunk presuppose

the concept of parthood.

the status of this concept? his question itself divides into the following: does

is

the concept of parthood have universal applicability, so that, just as every object

identical, every object has parts? Finally, is the concept

there different notions of parthood, each of which

categories?

I

I

of parthood univocal or are
,

defined on distinct ontological

argue that the concept of parthood has univocal.

some evidence
(2)

is

address the Simple Question, which

it

has no proper parts?”

the Simple Question, such as the

view

I

is

Brutal View, which holds that there

the way,

I

also argue that there

“under what circumstances

is

Simple Question. In

is

that simples are all

no

and only point-sized
objects.

true, finitely expressible,

short, there

is

true

I

objects,

defend the

and informative

no criterion for being a simple. Along

address the question of whether extended simples,

vi

is it

argue against several popular answers to

and the view that simples are maximally continuous material

to the

I

that the concept of parthood has universal applicability.

of some object that

answer

is self-

i.e.,

simples that are

extended in space, are possible.

I

of extended simples

is

possibility

(3)

argue that

I

it

argue that one popular argument against the

unsound.

address the question of whether both simples and gunk are possible.
is

1

metaphysically possible that material objects be composed of gunk.

9

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABSTRACT

vi

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION
1

.

1

A DEFENSE OF COMPOSITIONAL MONISM
1.1

Introduction

1.2 Is

1

1.2.4

2.

Arguments

22

for Radical Pluralism

and Categorical Pluralism
The Case for “x is a part of/’
Parthood and Occupation

.2.2 Persistence

1.2.3

1.3 Is

19

Parthood Univocal?
1.2.1

27
43

49
52
56

Parthood Universal?

A DEFENSE OF THE BRUTAL VIEW OF SIMPLES

68

2.1 Introduction

68

2.2

69

The Simple Question

2.3 Spatial

73

Accounts of Simplicity
General Objections to Spatial Accounts of Simplicity

2.3.1

2.3.2 Special

Problems

2.3.3

MaxCon

2.3.4

The Problem of

for

73

MaxCon

78
78

in a Relativistic Setting

82

Spatial Intrinsics

2.4 Fundamental Accounts of Simplicity

90

2.5 Indivisibility Accounts of Simplicity

103

2.6

Arguments Against the Brutal View of Simples
Unacceptably Fragile Simples?
2.6.2 Unknowable Simples?

2.6.1

2.7 Closing

3.

1

Remarks

A DEFENSE OF EXTENDED SIMPLES
3.1

3.2 Three Puzzles Involving Extended Simples

3.2.2

Puzzle

A

1

12

1

14

124

13°

^
^

^

Second Puzzle

3.2.3 Third Puzzle
3.3

106

124

Extended Simples
3.2.1 First

106

Solution to the Puzzles: the Extrinsic Theory of Shape

viii

135

How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the First Puzzle
How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the Second Puzzle
3.6 How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the Third Puzzle
3.7 Why There Are No Actual Temporally Extended Simples
3.4
3.5

3.8

4.

Concluding Remarks

140
147
153

154
150

MATERIAL ATOMLESS GUNK

1

63

4.1 Preliminaries

CT

4.2

The Case Against

4.3

A Defense of Premise (1)
4.2.2 A Defense of Premise (2)
Should We Reject Simplistic Spacetimes?

164

4.2.1

4.4

What About Material Atomless Gunk?
4.4.1 The Simple Question and the Occupation
4.4.2

Zimmerman's Argument

4.4.3

A Coherent Conception of Material

166
172
185

190
Thesis

Atomless Gunk
Atomless Gunk
4.4.4 Hudson's Argument Against Material Atomless Gunk

BIBLIOGRAPHY

for Material

191

192

205

208

217

IX

INTRODUCTION
An
gunk

if

object

and only

dissertation,

is

if

has no proper parts.

it

every proper part of that object

has a proper

object

part.

is

the status of this concept? Compositional

to the compositional monist, the concept

compositional pluralist disagrees.

categories.

In chapter one,

Second,

I

I

of parthood

One kind of compositional

are different notions of parthood, each of which

is

monism

is

the

view

that

is

univocal.

pluralism holds that there

it

is

“under what circumstances

has no proper parts?”

I

Brutal View, which maintains that there

Simple Question. In

is

that simples are point-sized objects,

the way,

I

extended simples are unsound.

is

no non-mereological

View occupies

I

defend the

and informative
criterion for

chapter two.

address the question of whether extended simples,

extended in space, are possible.

This project

true, finitely expressible,

short, there is

being a simple. The defense of the Brutal

Along

no

I

I

is it

argue against several popular

and the view that simples are maximally continuous material objects.

to the

The

defined on distinct ontological

address the Simple Question, which

answers to the Simple Question, such as the view

that are

In this

defend compositional monism from a series of attacks.

of some material object that

answer

atomless

is

exactly one fundamental parthood relation that answers to this
concept.

According

true

itself

An

concepts of simples and atomless gunk both presuppose
the concept

of parthood. What
is

if

address three questions about simples and atomless gunk.

I

First, the

there

a simple if and only

i.e.,

simples

argue that the standard arguments against

also present reasons to believe that they are possible.

taken up in chapter three.

1

Third,

object

it

is

is

I

address the question of whether material atomless gunk

material atomless gunk just in case

located in spacetime.

material atomless gunk.

1

it

is

it

is

non-gunky regions of spacetime.
of affairs

gunky spacetime

gunky material

No
it

is

is

impossible,

we do

objects. This project

fail.

However,

I

also present a

impossible that spacetime be gunky. If it

it

must be possible

argue that

I

impossible. So, even

is

if

for

we have no

we have good

gunky objects

is

to

reason to think that

reason to think that

not have a reason to reject the possibility of

is

taken up in chapter four.

serious metaphysical inquiry can proceed without presuppositions. Although

impossible to provide an exhaustive

seems reasonable

list

of all of the theses

to at least discuss the

dissertation,

it

the project.

What

follows

what

to say

about parthood, simples, and gunk.

I

An

atomless gunk and every proper part of

argue that these arguments

possible for material objects to be gunky, then

this latter state

possible.

discuss several recent attempts to disprove the possibility of

I

novel argument for the conclusion that

reside in

is

have

The

first set

is

my

attempt to

list

I

take for granted in this

ones that are directly related

those presuppositions that have shaped

of assumptions concern ontological categories.

ontological categories, that

is, I

to

I

believe in

believe that there are fundamental kinds in the world.

Ontological Categories are kinds of things that satisfy the following conditions:

(OC1)

Exhaustiveness-. Every object belongs to at least one ontological

category or decomposes without remainder into objects that
1

belong to exactly one ontological category.

(OC2)

Exclusivity.

No

object belongs to

more than one

ontological

category.

(OC3)

If x

belongs to an ontological category, then every part of x

belongs to that category.

2

(0C4)

If x is

composed of the^s, and each of the^s belongs

C, then x

(OC5)

An

belongs to C.

:

is

is

a

list

what ontological categories there

what distinguishes the categories from one another.
I

we

second constraint. Perhaps

facts

is

how we
we

life that

could

can’t.

we

correct

ontology.

is

not up to us.

enjoy. Admittedly,

know what

The

it

is

the correct ontology

is,

given

But, nonetheless, there are mind-independent

is

correct,

and

we can

Third, the ontological

scheme

that

I

about which ontology

is

is

are and

not dependent on our thoughts, hopes, desires, the

speak, or the form of

extremely difficult to figure out
this

This project

hold that whether a particular ontology

correctness of a particular ontology

kind of language

at the joints;

of ontological categories. One of the basic projects of

to provide principles telling us

Second,

to category

2

Fundamentality Ontological categories carve nature
they are fundamental kinds.

ontological scheme

metaphysics

is

speculate about which ontology

is

the

correct one.

One category

is

spacetime region.

which regions are not reducible

I

favor contains the following categories.

endorse robust spacetime realism, according

to constructions

made

out of their actual or possible

occupants. So, for example, regions are not propositions,

relational structures, or possibilities of location.

spacetime in what follows, and
In chapter three,

I

I

I

to

sets,

ordered ^-tuples,

will freely talk about regions of

take such talk with complete ontological seriousness.

argue that friends of extended simples should also endorse robust

spacetime realism.
Part of my

that are not

commitment

to robust spacetime regions is a

commitment

simultaneous with regions that are present now. That

3

is,

I

to regions

deny presentism

,

the doctrine that to be

time that

is

be present.

is to

now any more

than there

4

is

There

is

nothing ontologically special about the

anything special about the place that

this supposition, the future is as real as the present, just as

real as

Amherst, Massachusetts.

well. If

we were

would have
fully

to

make

My denial

manned

station

on Mars,

here.

Bellingham, Washington

On
is

as

of presentism covers non-present objects as

a complete inventory of

to include past objects,

is

all

of the things that there

are,

we

such as Socrates, and future objects, such as the

as well as present objects. This position

is

first

usually called

Eternalism.

A

in the ontological

second category

scheme

that

favor

I

is

material object.

things that
Material objects are not reducible to spacetime regions. Instead, they are the

we

to bundles of
find located in spacetime regions. Material objects are not reducible

properties. Instead, they are the things that have the properties.

Many

philosophers
6

have attempted

to

reduce the category of material object to these other categories.

I

reject these attempts at reduction.

Some

different reason.
philosophers reject the category material object for a

These philosophers hold
things.

One

that the material

friend of stuff

is

world

Michael Jubien,

the world does not

come

is

who

fundamentally a world of stuff, not ot

writes:

naturally divided into a definite array ol

discrete things. Instead,

it

of this) stuff into things

is

consists of “stuff’ spread

more

or less

... I am taking it
unevenly and more or less densely around space-time.
that the raw material of the
as a fundamental ontological doctrine
that the organization of (some
physical universe is stuff, not things, and

done by

us.

[Jubien (1993): 1-2].

the
of the physical universe need not employ
Jubien claims that a complete description

concept of a thing. [Jubien (1993):

2],

Andrew Cortens

sympathetic description of the stuff ontology:

4

says something similar in his

According

to [the stuff ontology], reality is to be thought of, not as a

collection of objects, but rather, as being

kinds.

.

..

On

this

made up of stuff of various
view, mass terms serve as the best vehicle for

representing reality in a perspicuous way. [Stuff ontologists] will resist
any attempt to recast “stuff-talk” into standard object idioms. Any

attempt to do so, however “elegant” from a purely formal point of view,
they will view as being a move away from, rather than toward, greater

view of this,

seems reasonable to say
ontologist endorses a picture of reality which excludes

perspicuity. In

it

that the stuff-

objects. [Cortens

(1997): 46-47].

I

take

it

that the central doctrine of the stuff ontology is that truths about the

properties and relations of things

-

if

there are any such truths

the truths about the properties and relations had

these truths in a maximally perspicuous way,

by various

we

- always supervene on

stuffs.

If

we wish

to assert

should use sentences employing mass

terms, not count nouns. In a similar vein, Theodore Sider writes:

It is

important to be clear on

how

radical this

genuine alternative to a thing-ontology.
they defend a stuff-ontology,

when

view must

Some

be, if

it is

to be a

philosophers talk as

if

they really just believe in things in

stuffs clothing: ‘The world consists of quantities of stuff;

we can

decide

to interpret thing-quantifiers as ranging over any of the quantities of stuff
we choose. One could use thing-quantifiers to range only over small bits

of stuff, in which case the nihilist is right. Or one could use the thingquantifiers to range over all the quantities of stuff, in which case there
exists scattered objects.’ In fact, this view assumes that the world is a

world of things: quantities of stuff. ... A genuine no-conflict stuff
ontologist must claim that a truly fundamental description of the world
must completely eschew a thing-language. This requires completely
the backbone of
eschewing the usual quantifiers and variables
be developed.
must
contemporary logic. ... A whole new language

—

must be introduced without slipping
express all the
into talk of things; somehow language must be invented to
into thingfacts about the world we take there to be, while not slipping

Somehow,

‘quantifiers’ over stuff

language in disguise. [Sider (2001):

I

xvii-xviii],

things or reduce talk about
reject the stuff ontologist’ s attempts to eliminate

things to talk about stuff. In fact,

I

properties and relations stuffs bear

assume something

-

if

stronger.

there are any such truths

5

The

truths about the

- supervene on more

fundamental truths about the properties and relations had by things.
assumption: the world

is

stuff.)

This doesn’t

mean

that

we must eschew mass

inappropriate response to the claim that the world

less.”

“Some water

water

is

is

terms. That

some

wet” and “More mashed potatoes

mashed potatoes than
mashed potatoes
Suppose

is

fourth

is

is

a

entirely

We are still

always better than

facts about things.

portions of water are wet suffices to ensure the truth of “Some

wet”; likewise, the fact that

is

my

would be an

a world of things.

But the truth-values of these sentences are determined by

Specifically, that

is

a world of things, not stuff. (And, moreover, every world

world of things, not

allowed to say,

This

it is

always better

to receive a larger portion

a smaller portion entails the proposition expressed by

always better than

that the properties

of

“More

less.”

and relations instantiated by mereologically complex

objects supervene on the properties and relations instantiated by mereological simples.

That

suppose

is,

simples,

that,

we have

once we fixed the properties and relations of all of the material

fixed the properties of and relations of every complex object. If this

the case, and the world

is

a world of things, then there

and relations of the simples supervene on. There
“constitutes” or

“makes up” these simples, and

relations of the simple objects supervenes

This

is

is

spacetime, property, or even

stuff.

It is

is

nothing else that the properties

no “fundamental

(ii) is

stuff’ that

(i)

such that the properties and

on the properties and

one metaphysical consequence of the doctrine

So the category material object

is

is

that the

relations of this stuff.

world

is

a world of things.

not to be replaced by the categories region of

a fundamental category.

6

The next
there

Nor
“x

is

is

of presuppositions

I

will discuss

a relation of classical identity. Identity

identity irreducibly temporally relative

identical

is

set

8
.

is

concern

identity.

I

assume

that

not irreducibly relative to a sortal

On the

7
.

contrary, sentences of the form

with/’ are well formed and require no additional context

express a determinate proposition. Sentences of the form “x

is

in order to

identical withy,” if true,

are true at all times.

Moreover, the predicate
That

is,

“is identical

any sentence of the form “x

is

with”

identical

is

neither vague nor ambiguous.

withy”

substituted for the variables are neither vague nor

in

which the singular terms

ambiguous

is

a sentence that

is

determinately true or determinate/ false and contains no semantic ambiguity. Finally,
the predicate “is identical with”

is

not category-restricted. That

is,

when we

say of two

regions of spacetime that they are identical, or of two material objects that they are

identical, or

same

relation

exactly the

The
there

is

other.

It is

x

is

assert in each case that the

instantiated. Entities of all kinds are identical with themselves in

same way.
third set

of presuppositions

true that objects can

connected

And,

spatially

y,

is

we

I

will discuss concern parthood.

I

assume

that

exactly one fundamental parthood relation that material objects can bear to each

spatially

etc.

of two properties that they are identical,

have

all

sorts

of parts. For example, objects can have

parts, causally integrated parts, functional parts,

for each kind

of part, there

connected part ofy, x

an immediate part ofy.

is

is

immediate

a corresponding parthood relation,

a causally integrated part of y, x

is

But none of these parthood relations

7

e.g.,

parts,

x

is

a

a functional part of

is

fundamental.

y

Each of them

is

definable in terms of the fundamental notion of
parthood and other

concepts. For example,

x

is

is

is

define these relations as follows:

is

is functional

is

part of

=df. x

=df. x

is

is

ofy and each of x’s

a part

some

a part of y and x plays

state

Each of these definitions presupposes

z,

some

functional

of y.

an immediate proper part ofy =df. x

no other proper part of y,

that there

a part of y and each of x's

causally related to every other part of x.

role in the production of

x

is

connected to some other part of x.

a causally integrated part of

parts

x

we can

a spatially connected part of =df. x
y

parts

x

y

such that x

is

is

a proper part of y and there

is

a proper part of z.

the basic notion of a part simpliciter.

I

assume

exactly one such basic notion of parthood that applies to material objects.

is

Several philosophers have denied this presupposition. Chapter one contains an

examination of two attempts to argue against
attempts

fail.

A

lot rides

on

this presupposition.

this presupposition.

In chapter two,

I

I

argue that both

discuss the Simple

Question, which asks, “Under what circumstances does a material object have no proper

parts?” If there

is

more than one fundamental parthood

can bear to each other, then presumably there
can be a simple.

An

object could

fail to

is

relation that material objects

more than one way

in

which an object

have one kind of proper part but perhaps have

proper parts of another kind. If this could occur, then

we

really

need to ask a variety of

“simple questions.”

This

other

is

the

is

not to say that the parthood relation that material objects bear to each

same parthood

relation that objects of other ontological categories bear to

8

each other. Whether this

presuppose that

I

it is

assume

If x is

the case will be

the case; nor do

I

examined

It is

in chapter one.

presuppose that

that the mereological structure

feature of that object.

object.

is

it

is

a part of y, then this

is

do not

not.

of an object

not up to us whether an object

I

is

is

a mind-independent

a simple or a composite

a fact about x and j' that

is

metaphysically

independent of our hopes, dreams, desires, conventions, language, thought, or
form of
life.

Some

philosophers have denied this assumption.

him, Kant was one such philosopher. Let us say that
or relation just in case

it is

persons. According to

my

possible that

P

P

is

instantiated

is

On my way

of interpreting

a mind-independent property

and there are no human

interpretation, transcendental idealism is the

view

that

we

have no knowledge of the mind-independent properties of things and that our ignorance
of the mind-independent properties of things

is

have synthetic a priori knowledge of these things

do know
part

-

that

some

objects have parts

9
.

it

related to our ability to

Since everyone should grant that

for example,

then, given transcendental idealism,

mind-dependent

I

know

that

I

have a

follows that the relation x

is

left

arm

we

as a

a part ofy

is

10
.

Kant’s view that parthood

at

-

some way

in

is

mind-dependent plays a central role

providing a solution of the second antinomy

11
.

According

mind-independent relation, then a contradiction must be
that if parthood is

true.

in his

attempt

to Kant, if parthood

Specifically,

is

a

Kant argues

mind-independent, then the physical universe both does and does not

decompose without remainder

into mereological atoms.

9

Kant’s argument for

this

claim

is

interesting

and complex.

respond to

I

it

elsewhere

12
.

Here,

I

simply assume that

it

fails.

So
of another.

I

assume

A

that there

is

always a

related assumption

parthood relation

is like.

The

is that

fact

there

of the matter whether one object
is

also a fact of the matter about

t.

The perdurandist denies

relation defined

that there is a

a part

what

this

endurantist typically holds that the fundamental parthood

relation that material objects bear to each other is a three-place relation,

at

is

this

and instead holds

on material objects

mind-independent

is

fact

that the

apart ofy

is

fundamental parthood

a two-place relation, x

of the matter about

x

who

is

is

a part ofy.

I

assume

right in this debate.

My fourth set of assumptions concern the nature of predication.

I

reject so-

called adverbalist theories of temporal predication. Adverbalist theories of predication

are almost

always offered as a response

to the

problem of temporary

intrinsics.

Many

philosophers have argued from the conjunction of eternalism and the claim that objects

persist
13

parts

.

through time and undergo change to the conclusion that objects have temporal

Suppose

that Bill

is

square

Monday

night and circular Tuesday morning.

the assumption that shape properties are intrinsic properties

- an assumption

I

On

challenge

in chapter three but provisionally accept here in order to faithfully represent the

standard argument from temporally intrinsics - Bill must have undergone a change in

his intrinsic properties.

Since eternalism

more importantly, so

is true,

Monday

are the facts about

night

If a predicate

just as real as

Tuesday Morning, and,

what occurs on these days. So how

Tuesday Morning (when Tuesday Morning
Bill is simpliciter.

is

is

present)

is

not to be identified with

F stands for an intrinsic property, then any

10

Bill is

on

how

substitution-instance of the

schema Fx with a non-empty name

complete sentence. Since shape properties are

yields a semantically

intrinsic properties, straightforward

ascriptions of these properties to Bill are semantically complete.

But then
is

seems

What

impossible.

The

it

to

that

we

should say that Bill

is

both circular and square, which

do?

relationalist responds that shape properties are not intrinsic properties but

are instead relations to times. Strictly speaking, to say that Bill

say that Bill

or

it is

time.

is

circular

now

to say nothing at all.

or at

some

To have

The perdurantist claims

a shape

is

to bear the is

that the things that

Monday and

Allegedly, the adverbalist theory

temporary intrinsics than both the

it

is

circular

is

either to

other time supplied by the context of utterance,

ultimately not Bill, but temporal parts of Bill. Bill

a temporal part that exists at

is

have these
is

some

relation to

intrinsic properties are

square on

Monday because

he has

square.

is

is

shaped at

a different response to the

relationalist

problem of

and the perdurantist solution. However,

not clear in what respects the metaphysics of the adverbalist solution differs from

the metaphysics of the relationalist solution.

As

I

understand adverbalism, the difference

while the adverbalist rejects, a view

I

call the

begin by explicitly stating an assumption
the adverbalist alike,

According

to

DTQ,

which

I

call the

is

that the relationalist accepts,

Doctrine of Timeless Predication.

commonly made by both

will

I

the relationalist and

Doctrine of Tenseless Quantification (DTQ).

serious existential claims have no temporal import; tenseless

quantifiers, the use of

which

domain of quantification

is

free

from the assumption

that the

members of the

are either located in the present or temporally located at

11

all.

are the quantifiers to be used

when providing

a putatively complete ontology. Serious

quantification, the kind of quantification that metaphysicians do
and should

when

stating their preferred theories of the structure

Given DTQ,

tenseless quantification.

it

makes sense

and content of the actual world,
to

more

equivalent to

quantifier.

some proposition

that

employs a tensed quantifier

expressible by a sentence that does not

is

DTQ,

necessarily

employ a tensed

15
.

when

In ordinary language, verbs almost invariably are tensed

employed; the word

‘exists’

contexts,

when we make

example,

when

I

is,

existential claims,

say “there

is

and future-tensed

they are

unfortunately, no exception. Frequently, in ordinary

we make them

using tensed quantifiers. For

nutritional yeast in the fridge,”

claim as meaning that there

past-

Moreover,

DTQ holds that the truth-makers of tensed claims are supervenient upon the

truth-makers of tenseless claims

my

14
.

basic than their tensed counterparts. According to

any proposition expressed by a sentence

is

speak of objects that exist but do

not presently exist, or even of objects that exist but do not exist in time
tenseless quantifiers are

employ

is

it

is

nutritional yeast in the fridge

existential claims, e.g., “there

was

reasonable to interpret

now.

We

make

also

nutritional yeast in the fridge

yesterday” and “there will be rain tomorrow.” However, there are some semi-ordinary

contexts

(i.e.,

contexts outside the philosophy room) in which

it

is

not implausible to

claim that tenseless quantifiers are being employed. For example, the quantifiers

employed by mathematicians when conducting
tenseless quantifiers. Similarly,

when

their business are plausibly construed as

a physicist claims that

spacetime have more curvature than others, the quantifier she

some
is

employing

tenseless quantifier that ranges over the entire spacetime manifold.

12

portions of

is

a

There are properties and objects
this

that

have the properties. What

having? Every perdurantist, and every endurantist

solution, takes the fundamental instantiation relation

properties to be a two-place relation: x exemplifies

who

is

the nature of

accepts the relationalist

between an object and

F simpliciter. 16

its

call this

I

intrinsic

view the

Doctrine of Timeless Predication (DTP). According to DTP, just as serious
existential
claims have no temporal import, serious predication has no temporal import; not
only
are the existential claims concerning

what properties

implications, so too are the claims concerning

objects.

According

to

DTP,

let

us assume that the

does not occupy time, just as

literally

what properties are

any temporal

instantiated

by what

serious claims concerning instantiation are timeless.

For ease of exposition,

it

exist stripped of

it

literally

number two

is

an atemporal

does not occupy space.

Still,

entity:

we

can

claim truly that the number two has certain properties, such as the property of being
prime.

A certain relation obtains between the number two and the property of being

prime. This relation
This

is

prime.’

is

the relation that

I

the relation of instantiation or
,

is

‘is’

the having relation.

in the sentence, ‘the

number two

is

will call this usage of the copula timeless predication.

This

is

not to say that, according to

time-indexed copulas, for

situations,

it

any proposition

time-indexed copula

that

represented by the

more simply,

is

is

obvious that

that

we

DTP, we cannot make claims using

we

tensed or

frequently do. However, in these

express with a sentence that employs a tensed or

necessarily equivalent to a proposition expressible by a sentence

does not employ a tensed or time-indexed copula.

The

adverbalist avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics by rejecting

What does denying DTP involve? One way

to

13

be an adverbalist

is

DTP.

to claim that the

instantiation relation that links objects to their intrinsic
properties

place relation between an object, a property, and a time.

property P

to

is

some time

t,

where the value of t

is

no time

at

which

it

property at every time; the

Perhaps a better
are

many

there

entities,

have

not that the

It is

in

number two has

There

is

to hold that there

no single relation of instantiation;

is

which an object can have a property. Some

their properties in a temporally relative kind

such as numbers, have their properties

the

the property.

implement the adverbalist strategy

distinct instantiation relations.

as enduring objects,

temporally located but nonetheless

number two simply has
to

A problem with

has the property of being prime. But

It

has this property.

way

more than one way

is

say that an object has a

fixed by the context of utterance.

have properties. Consider the number two.
is

actually a three-

shorthand for saying that the instantiation links the object
and the property

this strategy is that there are entities that are not

there

To

is

in

objects, such

of way; other

an atemporal way. Both of these

kinds of instantiation relation will need to be taken as irreducible, since

it is

clear that

the adverbalist cannot analyze talk of instantiation-at-a-time in terms of ‘just plain

instantiation’,

parthood and location. So, on

relation instantiates-at-t.

this view, for

Roughly speaking,

equally legitimate copulas; there

is

this

each time

there

t,

is

a

involves embracing a plurality of

more than one way of tying an

intrinsic property to

an object.

My main complaint with this view is that
grasp more than one instantiation relation.

As

I

I

do not understand

it.

I

simply cannot

see things, there are entities of various

kinds, such as material objects, spatiotemporal regions, properties, sets, propositions,

etc.

Each of these can have properties and stand

14

in relations.

There

is

one

metaphysically basic linking relation between objects and
their properties: instantiation.

An

object either has a property, or

come

does not. Instantiation, unlike ice cream, does not

it

in different flavors.

A
affairs.

third

way of cashing

out the metaphysics of adverbalism appeals to states
of

States of affairs (henceforth:

somehow made up of objects and
then, according to the friend of

composed of this object and

SOAs), understood robustly, are complexes

their properties.

SOAs,

there
18

this property.

is

If

an object has an

an entity, an

Conversely,

SOA,

SOAs

intrinsic property,

that is in

some way

exist only if their

constituent objects and properties exist and the objects instantiate the properties.

According

to this third

sentences of the form ‘x

affairs in

which x

is

is

way of dealing with

F at f

F exists at

t.

in

which

As

E.J.

F is

the

problem of temporary

intrinsics,

an intrinsic property assert that a

Lowe

puts

it

in his discussion

state

of

of this variant of

adverbalism:

a's having a bent shape obtains at

obtains at

t’.

t

while a’s having a straight shape

a thing’s being shaped itself stands in relation to times,

...

not that a thing’s being shaped
in relations to times.

is

partly a matter of that thing

[Lowe (1988):

In order to get this version off of the ground,

states

of affairs are troublesome

without them.
Let

19

Accordingly,

me summarize

I

entities.

reject this version

the picture that

we need

believe that

I

I

's

standing

75].

states

of affairs. But

we have good

reason to do

of adverbalism as well.

have sketched: the material world

is

a world

of things that occupy certain regions of spacetime. Both the things and the regions they

occupy enjoy determinate, non-sortal
themselves.

Some of these

relative,

and non-temporally

relative identity with

things are parts of other things, and there

independent non-conventional fact of the matter whether

15

is

always a mind-

this is the case.

There

is

only

one fundamental parthood relation

that material things bear to

each other. Things have

properties and stand in various relations to one another, but
there

which a thing can have properties or stand
This metaphysical picture has

in relations,

many

namely by

from which

only one

It is

to begin an investigation into the natures

16

way

in

instantiating them.

controversial elements. But

and commonsensical picture of the nature of the physical world.
starting point

is

it is

a plausible

a reasonable

of simples and gunk.

Notes
1

The second clause is necessary if we allow
composed of objects from different ontological

for

composite objects

that are
categories. If we restrict composition
in

*

hat PreVen ‘ S ‘ heSe ° bjeCtS from being
g enerate d,

we do

clause
2

Note

that

OC4

follows from

not need the second

OC1-OC3.

For a detailed defense of substantivalism, see Nerlich
(1994).
4

On presentism,

see Sider (2001) and

Zimmerman

(1998).

For a more adequate statement of Etemalism, see Sider
(2001): 11-12.

5

6

For an earlier attempt at such a reduction, see McDaniel
(2001). For worries
about these strategies, see Hawthorne (2002).
7

8

9

For a defense of this kind of relative

identity, see

Geach (1980).

For a defense of this view, see Gallois (1998).

See McDaniel (unpublished

10

Compositional

mereological simple

-

nihilists

will

-

a).

those philosophers

who

of course deny the claim that

I

hold that everything

have proper

parts.

is

a

But

although they will deny this claim, they shouldn’t.
11

12

13

14

See Kant (1998): 476-483.
See McDaniel (unpublished

See Lewis (1986a): 202-205, 210, Lewis (2002), and Sider (2000).

However,

DTQ does not imply that there are such objects.

for the presentist to accept
Iy

b).

DTQ. On

this issue, see

So
Markosian (1994).

it is

This ontological thesis should be distinguished from the linguistic thesis that

tensed claims can be paraphrased without loss of meaning in tenseless terms.
16

possible

A fuller discussion of perdurantism can be found in chapter one.

17

8

The advocate of this

strategy should probably introduce polyadic

instantiation-at-t relations as well, since enduring objects
can, I assume, stand in
relations to other enduring objects at various times as well
as have-at-a-time various
intrinsic properties. Alternatively, the advocate of this
strategy could embrace a
multigrade instantiation-at-a-time relation.
1

For defenses of

states

of affairs, see Armstrong (1997). Mellor embraces

strategy in Mellor (1998).
19

For worries about

states

of affairs, see Lewis (2002) and Lewis (1986b).

18

this

CHAPTER

1

A DEFENSE OF COMPOSITIONAL MONISM
1

.

Introduction

1

An

object

gunk or gunky
object

is

if

is

a simple

and only

partially

if

gunky just

if

and only

if

it

has no proper parts.

every proper part of that object
in case

it

has

some gunky

An

itself

parts

object

is

has a proper

and some simple

atomless

part.

An

parts.

The

concepts of a simple and a gunky object both presuppose the
concept of parthood}

Compositional monism

is

the

view

that there is exactly

one fundamental

parthood relation. According to the compositional monist, the concept
of parthood
univocal.

The compositional pluralist

disagrees.

One kind of compositional

holds that there are different notions of parthood, each of which

is

is

pluralism

defined on distinct

ontological categories. Let us call this kind of compositional pluralism categorical

pluralism.

A more radical

kind of compositional pluralism holds that there

is

more than

one fundamental parthood relation defined on the category of material objects. Let us
kind of pluralism radical pluralism.

call this

There are also several ways

to

be a compositional monist. The debate between

advocates of the different versions of compositional

monism

turns on the issue of the

scope of the parthood relation. One view - universalist compositional monism - holds
that the

fundamental parthood relation

According

opposed

to this view, the

is

defined on every ontological category.

parthood relation enjoys universal applicability.

to universalist compositional

monism

is

restrictivist

according to which the fundamental parthood relation

19

is

A view

compositional monism

defined only for material

,

objects, events,

and regions of spacetime. The fundamental parthood

relation does not

enjoy universal applicability on this view.

The question of compositional pluralism
First,

many

to identity.

varieties

view

is

important for the following reasons.

philosophers are attracted to the thesis that parthood

is

strongly analogous

A radical version of this view holds that composition is identity.

Both

of compositional pluralism threaten the moderate and radical
versions of the

that

composition

Second, there

is identity.

is

reason to think that

many

important philosophical concepts can

be analyzed partly by appealing to mereological concepts. For example, consider
David

Lewis’s analysis of intrinsic property a property
:

between duplicates; two things are duplicates just

between

is intrinsic

just in case

it

never differs

in case there is a 1-1 correspondence

their parts that preserves perfectly natural properties

and

relations.

[Lewis

(1986a): 61-62]. This analysis of intrinsic property appeals to the notion of part.

However, the analysis attempts

to

be fully general, since entities of all ontological

categories can have intrinsic properties. However, if compositional pluralism

is true,

then whether an analysis of this sort can be fully general must be questioned.

Third,

some metaphysicians endorse

a metaphysic according to which

some

material objects constitute other material objects. According to this metaphysic, the

golden statue
Instead, the

is

not identical with the lump of gold with which

lump of gold

it

shares

its

location.

constitutes the statue. Advocates of constitution typically

explicate the notion of constitution partly by appealing to the notion of parthood. But if

there

is

more than one fundamental parthood

20

relation defined

on material

objects, the

possibility arises that

one of these parthood

relations

is

the

one

in

which the notion of

constitution should be explicated.

Fourth, one of the questions concerning
the metaphysics of material
objects that

has occupied metaphysician's attention

is

the special composition question

under what circumstances some objects compose
a whole.

If there is

,

which asks

more than one

fundamental parthood relation defined on the category
of material objects, then
speaking there
there

is

more than one

special composition question.

no guarantee that the answers

is

Finally,

in this dissertation is the simple question

which asks under what circumstances an object

objects, then strictly speaking there

there

is

no guarantee

is

if this is the case,

to these questions are extensionally
equivalent.

one of the questions addressed

more than one fundamental parthood

And

strictly

fails to

relation defined

have proper

parts.

If there is

on the category of material

more than one simple

question. And, as before,

that the objects that are simple with respect to

one parthood

relation are also simple with respect to a different parthood relation.

I

is

note that the

last three

worries are primarily worries for the radical pluralist.

not obvious that the categorical pluralist faces those worries. Accordingly,

focus (for the most part) on radical pluralism. In what follows,
questions of whether parthood

is

univocal and universal.

several arguments for compositional pluralism.

accepting compositional pluralism

fail.

21

I

I

I

I

will

attempt to clarify the

then critically examine

argue that the reasons discussed for

It

.

1

.2

Is

As

Parthood Univocal?
I

noted in the introduction,

believe in ontological categories, that

I

believe that there are fundamental kinds in the world.
Perhaps the
ontological

scheme

is

composed of the following

(1)

material objects

(2)

times

(3)

regions of space

(4)

events

(5)

properties and relations

(6)

possibilities

One fundamental

project of metaphysics

is, I

common-sense

categories:

is

ontology, which

is

the attempt to

discover a complete and correct inventory of ontological categories. Another

fundamental project of metaphysics

is

to provide the principles that tell us

circumstances an element of an ontological category

what circumstances
entity.

It is

it

is

is

simple or complex,

under what

i.e.,

under

appropriate to attribute part-whole structure to a particular

important to note that the concept of part-whole structure does not appear to

apply only to material objects like tables and chairs, for each of the following
attributions of part/whole structure

(1)

The

(2)

12:30

(3)

This part of space

(4)

The

(5)

The weakest

first

measure

is

makes

perfect sense:

a part of the song.

PM is a part of the interval ranging from

third inning

is

was

12:00

PM to

1:00

PM.

curved.

the

part of his

most boring

argument

22

is

part of the baseball

game.

where he confuses types and tokens.

Part of what he did

(6)

when he

killed the butler

was

hit

him with

a

candlestick.

(1) ascribes part/whole structure to abstract types;
(2) ascribes part/whole

structure to intervals of time;
(3) ascribes part/whole structure to regions of space;
(4)

ascribes part/whole structure to events;
(5) ascribes part/whole structure to arguments;

and

(6) ascribes part/whole structure to actions.

each of these might be

view

that

(i)

there

is

perfectly intelligible;

is

2

true.

However, we should not
compositional monism

Each of these

is true.

infer

from the

intelligibility

of (l)-(6) that universalist

Recall that universalist compositional

monism

exactly one fundamental part-whole relation and

(ii) this

is

the

relation

applies to elements of every ontological category. According
to the universalist

compositional monist, parthood
Just as there

identity.

is

importantly similar in this respect to the relation of

only one fundamental identity relation that applies to any entity

is

regardless of what ontological category

it

belongs

to,

there

is

only one fundamental

parthood relation.

The mereologist,

i.e.,

the person

who

believes that the axioms of standard

mereology adequately characterise the topic-neutral part-whole
•

*3

•

compositional monist.

According

parthood relation and one

namely mereological

to the mereologist, there is exactly

way of generating complex

more than one

disagrees.

According

ontological category, there

irreducible parthood relation. There are, of course,

pluralism.

entities out

one fundamental

of simple ones,

fusion.

The compositional pluralist
just as there is

relation, is a

One way of being

is

compositional

pluralist,

more than one fundamental

many forms of compositional

a compositional pluralist

23

to the

is

to

claim that each ontological

category has

its

own

pluralist, the relation

the

I

same

parthood relation. According

of part

to

whole

relation as the relation

called this

to this

way of being

a compositional

that obtains between, e.g„
regions of space is not

of part

to

whole

that obtains

between material

form of compositional pluralism categorical
pluralism

objects.

in the previous

section.

According

to categorical pluralism,

composed of objects from
relation that links objects

made

out of

my

it

makes no sense

to say that there

distinct ontological categories, since
there is

from different categories. So,

car and the region of space that

it

a whole

no part-whole

example, there

for

is

is

no object

exactly occupies, contrary to the

claims of the mereologist. 4 Given categorical pluralism,
the following principle

governs ontological categories:

Strong Exhciustivity. Every object belongs

to exactly

Moreover, conditions (OC3) and (OC4) become completely
relation has a restricted

entities

trivial,

is in

tension with the doctrine that there are states of

“unmereologically composed” of objects and properties, where these

belong to distinct ontological kinds. 5 According to

this doctrine, objects

properties can fuse into a distinct kind of whole, a state of affairs.

literally

since each parthood

domain.

Categorical pluralism

affairs that are

one ontological category.

has these entities as some kind of constituent.

As

I

A

state

and

of affairs

see things, there are three

reasonable responses to this worry available to the advocate of categorical pluralism.

The

first

response

is to

give up states of affairs. This

indicated in the Introduction.

6

The second response

is

is

the response that

to give

I

favour, as

up the claim

I

that states

of affairs are unmereologically composed of objects and properties, and instead merely

24

say that,

e.g., necessarily, the state

third response is to

of affairs that a

allow that there

members of distinct

is

F

is

exists if

and only

if

a

is F.

The

a distinct kind of composition that can
unite

ontological kinds but

still

have some categorically

restricted

composition relations.
Similarly, categorical pluralism
are

is

in tension

with the claim that sets or classes

wholes that are made of their members. According

kind of composition.

to this view, class formation is

Since, for example, there are classes that contain regions
of

spacetime, material objects, and propositions, on this view, there are
wholes

of regions of spacetime, material objects, and propositions. In
response for the categorical pluralist
that class

formation

One of the
that

determine

is

a relation

is

this case, the best

not a parthood relation.

is

to provide principles

a fundamental parthood relation

compositional pluralist must provide a

R

is

challenges facing compositional pluralists

when

way of filling

in the

7
.

In other

only

if

words, the

following schema:

a fundamental parthood relation defined on ontological category

is

out

not to deny that classes exist, but instead to deny

a kind of composition. Membership

is

made

C if and

.

This strikes

me

as being a very difficult project.

It is

clear that there are

necessary conditions on being a parthood relation. For example, no relation deserves to

be called a (fundamental) parthood relation unless

it

is

reflexive, transitive,

and non-

o

symmetrical.

classical

(One could even say

that every

mereology when the quantifiers

parthood relation obeys the axioms of

in those

axioms are

restricted to each

respective ontological category.) However, these structural conditions are clearly not

sufficient.

What

other conditions are there?
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In a recent paper in

which he defends the claim

that

composition

is

strongly

analogous to identity, Theodore Sider discusses
two other salient features of the concept

of parthood. [Sider (unpublished): 3,9],

First, there is

a necessary connection between

the intrinsic properties of a part of an
object and the intrinsic properties of the
object.

Suppose

that

x

is

a part of

and

that

x has

intrinsic property F.

It

follows from this

supposition that y has an intrinsic property, specifically,
having a part that has F.

And

in

general the intrinsic properties of an object’s parts
partially fix the intrinsic nature of the

whole

that they

relation

R

We

compose.

can extract a necessary condition from these remarks:
a

a parthood relation only if (i) if x bears

R

to

property F, then y has the intrinsic property bearing

R

to

is

the intrinsic properties

to

ofy

are partially fixed

by the

y and x has an

intrinsic

something that

intrinsic properties

is

an

F and (ii)

of those objects

which y bears R.

A similar constraint is that any parthood relation should be preserved by
intrinsic duplication.

an intrinsic duplicate

and

w

bears

A

R

If

R

of_y,

is

a parthood relation, and x bears

then there

is

some w such

that

w

R

is

to y, then for

any

an intrinsic duplicate of x

to z.

second salient feature

spatial locations

from

that Sider discusses is that

their parts.

If the xs

compose y, and

wholes seem

to inherit their

the xs are collectively

located in spacetime region R, then y exactly occupies R. [Sider (unpublished):

Of course

this

second salient feature has no clear application

categories. For example, regions of spacetime

More

z, if z is

pressing,

it

is

to other ontological

do not have locations; they are

not obvious that classes have spatial location.

they don’t. So, if classes have parts,

it

is trivially

26

3, 10].

I

am

locations.

inclined to think

true that classes inherit their locations

from

their parts.

from the whole

it

But
is

also trivially true that a part of a
class inherits

it is

a part

of.

In neither case

Mereological essentialism
essentially.

must be

If

is true,

have locations

whole has

we have

then

its

to inherit.

xs that

necessarily

compose y

parts

R

is

to y, then, necessarily, if x exists, then

really are y, then, just as

composed of the xs. [Merricks

mereological essentialism.

composition as identity

a parthood

x bears R

bears

R

It is

not clear to

me

999)]

.

However, many people

x and y

shows

this

y

is

resist

that the doctrine of

10

a parthood relation unless

is

to y, then both

1

to

is identity.

necessarily identical to y,

is

seems absurd. Perhaps

also problematic.

is

Third, no relation

It

(

y

9

another constraint that

satisfied in order for a relation to count as
a parthood relation:

R

location

Mereological essentialism seems supported by the claim
that composition

If the

if x

entities

the doctrine that every

is

mereological essentialism

relation only if for all x, if x bears

y.

do the

its

it

is

existence entailing. That

is,

exist.

whether these constraints are sufficient

to determine

whether

a particular relation counts as a parthood relation.

Arguments

for Radical Pluralism

Some

philosophers have claimed that there are multiple fundamental parthood

on the category material

relations that are defined

pluralism. Radical pluralism seems to

me

to

be a

object.

much

less plausible

categorical pluralism. In fact, one of my presuppositions

compositional pluralism

is false.

whether there are reasons

to

Nevertheless,

abandon

it

will be

this presupposition.
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called this

I

view radical
view than

that this kind

is

worthwhile

I

to

of

examine

will argue that there are

1

not.

will

I

now

discuss

two arguments

for this kind

of compositional pluralism, one
due

Charles Krecz and the other due to Ariel
Meirav.
In a paper titled “Parts

and Pieces,” Charles Krecz defends a
version of

compositional pluralism. [Krecz (1986)]. The
version of compositional pluralism
he

defends has the following interesting features.
pluralism (henceforth

KCP)

First,

Krecz’s version of compositional

implies that there are two distinct part-whole
relations that

material objects can bear to one another. Second,
not only do these two kinds of

parthood relation apply to objects of the same category,
they apply objects of other
ontological categories as well.

1

I

ignore this second feature of his view in what

follows.

In his paper,
“

x

is

is

Krecz argues

that (1) the relation “x

is

a part of y” and the relation

a Piece of y” are distinct relations, (2) the distinction between
these two relations

non-arbitrary,

and

(3) both relations generate

fundamental ways of dividing up

material objects into components. Although Krecz does not claim that both
relations
are “parthood” relations,

it is

fair to characterize his

view as a kind of compositional

pluralism. Krecz begins his paper with the following slogan: parts are not pieces.
In order to present Krecz’s claims and

we

will

responses to them in a neutral way,

need to be careful with our terminology. Presumably, Krecz

that both parts

and pieces are components of objects,

things

compose wholes. Once you have

other,

you have the whole

and

my

their interrelations to

object.

all

since, in

some

is

willing to grant

sense, both kinds of

the pieces and the interrelations to each

Likewise, once you have

all

of the parts of the object

each other, you have the whole object. Objects are made up

of their parts and they are made up of their pieces. But, according
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to Krecz, the relation

between pieces of a whole

to the

whole and

parts

of a whole

to the

whole are

fundamentally different.
Accordingly,
contexts in which

let

us employ the word “component”
instead of “part” in those

we wish

to

remain neutral with respect to KCP.

We can now say that,

according to Krecz, objects have two different
kinds of components, and there are
two

fundamentally different ways of generating wholes
out of material objects. This

KCP

is

a kind of compositional pluralism. (In what
follows,

mean “proper component,”
Krecz denies
applied to every

i.e.,

that the

component not

a

word

“part” as

component of material

it

is

when

I

is

why

say “component,”

I

identical with the whole.)

used

in ordinary

English

is

properly

Some components of material

objects.

objects

are not parts of the object but are instead pieces of
the object. According to Krecz,

parts of objects have the following features that pieces of objects
lack:
(1

)

(2)

Parts of objects are

non-arbitrary

;

pieces of objects are arbitrary.

12

Parts of objects are not “indifferent with respect to remainder”;
pieces of

objects are indifferent.

(3)

Parts are always parts of “unified wholes” and are never parts of “mere

heaps”. Pieces can be pieces of unified holes, but can also pieces of

mere heaps.
(4)

The phrase “x

is

a part of y”

analysis of this phrase
is

(It is

a part of y.” “x

not entirely clear

Krecz also claims

if

is

is

is

semantically incomplete. The proper

“x bears

a piece of y”

Krecz intends

R to
is

A, B, C, and so on, and thereby x

semantically complete.

(l)-(4) to stand for completely distinct criteria.)

that the part/piece distinction

is

relevant to understanding “coming-

to-being” and “passing away,” and can shed light on the ontological schemes of our
philosophical predecessors. [Krecz (1986): 397-400].

and focus on (1) -

(4).
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I

will ignore these contentions

In defense

of (1), Krecz writes:

There

something arbitrary about a piece of a
whole, something
nonarbitrary about a part of it. This is
made evident upon considering
the ways in which a whole may be
divided or thought of as divided
To
obtain one sort of division, one may
start nearly anywhere;
the locus of
the ™t is arbitrary. A piece of a
pie is such regardless of the
original cut
or the locus from which it is taken.
[Krecz (1986): 382.]
is

n the other hand, the division of parts

in a

whole

is

neither arbitrary

with regard to cut, nor indifferent with
regard to remainder. The cut of a
part in a whole is locus-specific and
therefore non-arbitrary. Cut in the
wrong place and you have failed to distinguish the
part. Instead you
will end up with a piece. [Krecz
(1986): 383.]

Consider a bicycle.
of the bicycle include
parts

is

It

has

its tires, its

many

easily identifiable parts. For example,
the parts

spokes,

chain,

its

its

handlebar,

etc.

Each of these

reasonably well demarcated. Moreover, each of these
parts serves a specific

function such that, if that function were not served well,
then the bicycle either would
not function as well or

would not function

The pieces of the bicycle
chunks of the bicycle.

at all.

They

are not like this.

We do not typically have names

have occasion to refer to them. But

we can

if

we

like.

are arbitrary, undetached

for

them

for

we do

not usually

Some examples of pieces

of the

bike include the chunk of metal right below the water-bottle holder, the lump
of wornout rubber near the rim of the front

The

distinction

between

tire,

and the

arbitrary

bit

of plastic

in the right toe-clip.

components and non-arbitrary components

does seem to line up with our intuitions about many typical cases.
other cases in

which the

distinction does not

seem

to cut

However,

any metaphysical

there are

ice.

Consider a heap of sand, which was randomly formed by desert winds. Consider the
left

half of this heap of sand. Presumably, Krecz would say this

of the heap of sand and not a part of it. Let us
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now

left

half

is

a mere piece

consider a second heap of sand,

which

intrinsically indiscernible

is

from our

second heap was created by an

artist

into contact with

The

its

and claims

Castle

right half.

that

it

who

heap. Suppose, however, that
this

first

painstakingly brought the

left

half of the heap

has dubbed his creation “The Love
Sand

artist

represents the obtaining of true love.

The

left

half of the heap

represents one of the lovers; the right half of the
heap represents the other lover; and the

love they feel

It

heap

is

represented by the fact that they these two halves
are touching.

is

seems

to

me

that in the

second case

a part of the heap and not a

mere

it is

piece.

natural to say that the left half of the

The

left

representational role in this art object and accordingly

express what the

artist

is

half plays an important

necessary

if

the art object

intends to express via this work. (Recall that the

represents one of the lovers;

it is

left

is

to

half

the left half that has this representational property, not

the concept of the left half.)

However, the two heaps

So the

relation

x

is

parthood relation.

a piece ofy

what our

it

it

seems

interests are.

left

tribe

of Fargo

considering are intrinsic duplicates.

has a part that occupies

instead has a

mere

that the arbitrariness

who

left

shoulder

is

its left side.

of a component
like a

to

The

other heap

is

man.

partly determined by

We think that the

an arbitrary component. But someone

holds that the soul resides in the part of the body near the

shoulder might not think that the component of the statue

component corresponds

on being a fundamental

piece.

Imagine a bronze statue shaped

patch of bronze in the statue’s

from the

we have been

violates one of the constraints

One of the heaps

does not have a part there;
In general,

that

an area

in the

human body

significant.
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is

arbitrary.

That

that he holds to be highly

In defense

of (2), Krecz writes:

Another mark of a piece is that the status of
a piece is retained regardless
o what relationships obtain or fail to
obtain between that piece and the
whole from which it is taken and regardless of
what changes take place
in the whole.

The remainder may be further divided, the
remaining
be further arranged, taken away, or even
destroyed. Yet in
such circumstances, the slice of a pie remains
what it is. To characterize
something as a piece is to allow an unrestricted range
of alteration in the
slices

may

whole from which

it is

taken.

[Krecz (1986): 382],

Further, unlike pieces, parts

whole and

its

must stand in a certain definite relation to a
other parts, a relation that admits alteration
only within

restricted parameters.

Krecz’ s idea seems to be

x and place

it

on a dinner

plate.

Suppose

this.

Then we would

a particular piej;.

[Krecz (1986): 383],

also say that x

status as a piece

relation

pie

is

it

of pie

bears to the pie from which

a piece of the pie from

On the

other hand,

“part.” Prior to

its

pie pan.

which

we do

say of some x that

filling

it

a piece of pie. Suppose

it

it

we would
is

came.

in fact

We

still

say that x

is

a piece of

we remove

is

but

a piece of pie.

completely independent of any

would even say

that the piece

of a

came.

not have a similar convention governing the word

division and eventual consumption, the crust

Suppose we dump the

of the pie onto a dinner

a part of the pie.

is

plate, leaving

only the crust in the

We would certainly not say that the crust is now a part of the pie. And we

would not say
to

unchanged and

is

is

we

We then proceed to consume the rest of the pie,

leave x completely untouched. Afterwards,

Its

that

that the crust

be a part of the

is

a “part of pie”. At most,

say that the crust used

pie.

This shows that the relation x

relation exist.

we would

is

a piece ofy does not imply

Something can be a piece of another thing

32

at a time,

that the relata of this

even

if the thing

of

which

is

it

a piece does not exist

at that time.

This violates another constraint on
being

a fundamental parthood relation.

Moreover, these

how we

facts about

use the terms “piece” and “part” in
ordinary

language seem to be of no metaphysical significance.
Although
still

say of something that

cannot see

how this

piece of the pie,

we

a former piece of a pie that

is

could be considered important.

we

liked, coin a similar phrase

satisfies this

second thing

not

is

or

was

first

a pie, and the

that there

is

The

we have

what happens

crust

is

a

We could,

came from.

where a

is

if

pair of things

thing

still

fact that

has certain relevant characteristics,

we have

not done this

shows

we

that

differently in ordinary English, but

does

it

a fundamental metaphysical difference between parts and pieces.

Moreover, once
as indifferent to

say that something

I

thing used to be a part of the second thing, the

first

The

etc.

the thing

a part* of (the pie) y,”

words “part” and “piece” somewhat

show

pie are.

is

phrase just in case the

such as being visible, edible,
treat the

“x

we would

a piece of the pie now.

it is

When we

we know where

say this because

true that

it is

coined this phrase,

wholes

to the

a part of the pie;

longer a part of the pie. But

it

is

we

that they

separate

it

a part* of the pie.

part* of the pie regardless of what

we do

we can

were formerly

from the

filling,

And moreover,

the rest of the pie.

respect to what happens to the remainder” does not

see that parts* of the pie are

seem

to

parts as pieces of

and

it

now

will

it is

no

remain a

So “indifference with
be a significant

metaphysical feature.
In support of (3)

and

(4),

Krecz writes:

Parts are sensitive to a
the whole.

The

whole and

to other parts in that they are as

one

in

actual division of the parts in a whole, unlike an actual

division into pieces, precludes neither the unity nor the singularity of the

whole. In

fact, as

we

shall see, the
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manner of division of the

parts in a

whole IS responsible to a considerable extent for the
Since

being as one”

is

trom the many pieces,

it is

[Krecz (1986): 386],

The sentence “A
related to B, C,

Krecz appears

to

is

unity of the whole

what ultimately distinguishes the many

parts

our task to analyze this difficult
notion

W"

a part of

and so on, and

is elliptical.

is

Its proper analysis is
“A is
thereby part of W.” [Krecz (1986):
387],

be saying that the parts of an object are
integrated

in a

way

that

the pieces of an object are not. In order
for a collection of objects to form
an

integrated unit,” the collection needs to be
systematically related in

hard work, apparently, to bring about true unity.
collection of objects can be pieces of
this further thing is a

Moreover,

all

some

To be

a piece

is

further thing without

mere heap, and not an

integrated whole.

some way.

much

easier.

It

takes

A

much work. However,

Heaps come cheap.

ascriptions of part-whole structure to a pair of objects
are

semantically incomplete; a semantically complete ascription of
part-whole structure to a
pair also mentions the relation that the part stands in to other
parts in virtue

each of them

is

apart of the whole. However, sentences of the form “x

are not semantically incomplete or elliptical.

is

just to say that

it is

To

say that an object

me

as deeply problematic.

exactly one component. (Recall that by “component”,

no object can have exactly one

no reason

is

a piece of/’

a piece of another

a piece of another. This claim that sentences of the form “x

part of y” are elliptical strikes

claim that there

is

is

of which

some y such

to think that the

part.

So the claim

that

is

claim “A

y

is

not

that

A and y

a part of

elliptical.
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W

is

is

I

A

I

is

a

grant that no object can have

mean “proper component.”) So
is

a part of

W does imply the

a part of W. But this fact provides

semantically incomplete or

Similarly,

is

some

relation

instantiate R.

we

could grant that some objects are
parts of some whole only

R such

Still,

we

that these objects

compose a whole

should not infer from

this

in virtue

of the

if there

fact that they

claim that talk about parthood

is

semantically incomplete.

Accordingly,

let

us focus on claim

Krecz writes:

(3).

Consider the parts of an ordinary object, say, an
apple with its skin,
flesh, and core. When the core of an
apple is indeed part of it, it receives
a determination it would not otherwise have.
To be a core it must yield
prerogatives. Simply, it goes where the whole
apple goes and nowhere
else. Were the core to gain new prerogatives
and were it able to go
elsewhere, it would lose its status as part; to be the
part that it is, viz., a
core, it must remain inside the apple, enveloped
by flesh and skin. But
the skin of an apple is part of it as well. To
be the part that it
is, viz.,

skin,

it

must envelope

flesh

and core. Further,

the

can achieve this only
because there is flesh and core. Now such claims about the
parts of an
apple are hardly remarkable. Further, they reveal little of
the superb
complexity and subtlety of other relations of codetermination
which
it

actually obtain between the various parts of an apple. But
they do
illustrate codetermination directly and simply; the
determination of the
prerogatives of the core, flesh, and skin of an apple obtains in
virtue of
the relations between these parts. Such determination is requisite
of the
apple to be a whole. Similar determination may be attributed to any of

the parts of any whole. [Krecz (1986): 387-388],

The idea expressed here seems

to

be

this:

when an x

is

a part of an object,

it

acquires certain relational characteristics. Moreover, the other parts of an object acquire
relational properties as well in virtue

of x’s being a part of the same object. And, unless

these objects had these relational properties, the composite object

would not be an

integrated whole.

The

relevant relational properties in the passage Krecz discusses

that guarantee that the parts

of an object

move

as a unit.

core of an apple are part of the same apple, then

when

If the skin

the apple

is

to be ones

of an apple and the

moved

too are the skin and the core. And, were the skin of the apple not to
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seem

ten feet, so

move when

the

apple moves, then the skin would cease to
be a part of an apple. Finally,
the apple or the core of the apple

them must not be a

were

to

move independently of each

that

I

skin of

other, then

one of

part of the apple.

Krecz’s claims with respect to apples and their
parts have a

But

if the

lot

of plausibility.

m not clear how this helps us draw the distinction between parts and

would cut any metaphysical

ice.

For similar claims with respect

pieces in

to pies

and

way

their

pieces have equal plausibility. Consider a pie and
a large chunk of the pie in the

middle. If we remove that chunk of pie from the pie -if
they no longer
as

one - then that chunk of pie

chunk

is still

apiece ofpie -

And

relevant.

fact doesn’t

it

is

it

true that the

seem relevant

is

no longer a component of the

is

even a piece of the pie

chunk

a piece that

It is

together

true that the

but these facts don’t seem

came from

the pie but again, that
,

to establishing that the parts/pieces distinction is

metaphysically fundamental. So
that the parts/pieces distinction

I

is

--

pie.

move

is

I

have a hard time seeing

how

(3) supports the claim

metaphysically fundamental.

have addressed each of the distinctions

that

Krecz alleges underlies the

difference in usage of the terms “part” and “piece” in ordinary English and have argued
that

each of the associated claims about these distinctions

these worries aside and

now

attend to what

I

is

problematic. Let us class

take to be the fundamental worry about

Krecz’s position.

Once we have

the concept of a component of an object,

should not take the fact that

to support

we

in

seems

clear that

we

distinguish between parts and pieces in ordinary English

compositional pluralism. For, once

can define these two notions

it

we have

the concept of a component,

we

terms of the concept of a component and the distinctions
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y

that

Krecz claims underlies the difference

And,
is

we

if

is

is

no reason

a piece ofy are metaphysically

to think that the relations

x

basic.

easy to see what the definitions should look

It is

and

usage of the terms “part” and “piece.”

can give such definitions, then there

apart ofy and x

(2),

in

like,

given that

we

accept (1)

13

(3):

x

is

x
y,

— df. (1) x is a component ofy, (2) x is a non-arbitrary component
not indifferent with respect to remainder and, (4) v is a
“unified

a part of

ofy, (3) x
whole.”

is

a piece ofy =df. (1 ) x is a component of y, (2) x
and (3) x is indifferent with respect to remainder.

is

In fact,

we can

see that

it is

is

an arbitrary component of

possible to think of intermediate kinds of

components, which are neither parts nor pieces. Such components might be nonarbitrary

components

We

that nevertheless are indifferent with respect to remainder.

could, if we liked, call these components “partlike pieces.” Similarly,

we

can think of

possible components that are arbitrary but not indifferent with respect to remainder.

We

could, if we liked, call these components “piecelike parts.” However, our exercise in

conceptual generation would not give us any reason to think that there are four

fundamental

part- whole relations defined

on the category of material

conclude that Krecz has not provided us with a reason

fundamental part-whole relations defined on

object.

So

to believe that there are

I

two

this category.

Another advocate of compositional pluralism within the ontological category
material object

is

Ariel Meirav,

who

defends the view in an intriguing paper

“Non-Unique Composition.” [Mierav

(2000)].

titled

Mierav’s version of compositional

pluralism has the following interesting features. First, according to Mierav’s view

(henceforth:

MCP), although

there

is

only one fundamental parthood relation defined on
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the category material object there are

two metaphysically basic composition

,

MCP provides a successful account of how two objects

Second, Mierav argues that

be composed of exactly the same parts
identical.

Clearly, Mierav’s

at the

view deserves

same time

possible for two things to be

made

how

it

is

possible

14
.

first

out of exactly the

Mierav assumes throughout the paper

but nonetheless be non-

concerns whether

same

that this is possible

There

parts at the

it

really

same

is

time.

and accordingly accepts

in this fashion, for other

philosophers have elsewhere argued that this

Mierav

However,

I

program

I

am my

many

to this research

to say that the

moved by

situation with the following:

solve the problem of evil

fact

possible.

might imply that the

is

it

his

program.

I

is

simply trying to

allegiance.

lump of clay

body, and you are yours. Since

not in any position to be

my

is

which he has sworn

do not belong

considerations that lead

statue.

to

that

certainly nothing improper about Mierav

is

simply assuming that material objects can be superposed

further the research

can

further examination.

Several issues need to be addressed. The

he must explain

relations.

reject

I

is

am unmoved by

the

not identical with the

Mierav’s starting point,

I

am

argument for compositional pluralism. Compare

might be that the best way for the committed

theist to

for her to endorse a libertarian account of free agency. This

theist has a reason to

be a

libertarian.

But

it

certainly does not

give the atheist a reason to endorse libertarianism.

Let us table this issue.

non-unique composition
claim: even if

you grant

is

I

will grant for the sake of the

possible. Instead,

that

I

that

will argue for the following conditional

non-unique composition
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argument the claim

is

possible,

you should

reject

MCP.

I

will

now present

argument against

1 ].

that there is only

Given

this,

composition relations, for

of the ys

1

in

it

one parthood

seems hard

to see

how

relation,

x

is

a pan ofy. [Mierav

there can be a plurality of

standard mereology, the multigrade relation
x

composed

is

defined in terms of parthood. The standard
procedure for defining

is

composition

D

will present an

I

MCP.

Mierav assumes
(2000):330-33

an exposition of MCP. Afterwards,

:

D2:

is

as follows. First,

we

define overlap and sum:

x overlaps y =df. for some

y

is

the

z,

z

is

a part of x and z

is

a part of y.

sum of the xs =df (i) each of the xs is a part of and
y
y if and only if z overlaps one of the xs.

(ii)

for

all z,

z overlaps

Both of these concepts are defined using only
parthood.

logical vocabulary

The standard notion of composition can now be

D3

:

the xs

compose y

=df.

y

is

and the concept of

introduced:

sum of the xs.

a

Since the concept of composition can be defined in this way,

it

is

hard to see

how

there

can be room for a plurality of fundamental composition relations, given that there

is

only one fundamental part-whole relation.

Mierav’s strategy
composition. Instead,

composition.

is

to argue that

D3 emerges

According

D3 does

not capture the intuitive notion of

as a special case of a

to Mierav, there are

two

more general notion of

different species of this

more general

notion of composition. Mierav claims that the more general notion of composition

is

captured by the following definition:

D4:

the xs

compose y

at

t

=df.

(i)

each of the xs

is

a part of y at

t

and

existence of all of the xs and their having the features they do
sufficient condition for the existence
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ofy

at

t.

at

(ii)

the

t is

a

[Mierav (2000): 332].

Mierav notes

that the conjunction

of D4 and the following assumption

is

equivalent to D3:

Al:

a sum 0f the
at ' if and onl if
y
(0 each of the xs is a part of y (at
and (n) the existence of all of the xs and their
having the features
they do (at t) is a sufficient condition for
the existence of v (at tl
[Mierav (2000): 333],
is

^
t)

'

Accordingly, Mierav denies Al. In

A2:

If y is a

and

(ii)

(at t) is

its

place,

Mierav recommends:

sum

of the xs at t, then (i) each of the xs is a part
of y (at t)
the existence of all of the xs and their having
the features they do
a sufficient condition for the existence of
y (at t). [Mierav (2000)

-

Mierav claims

He

that the general notion of

composition

is

then introduces two species of composition, each of which

captured by

falls

under

D4

this

and A2.

more

general notion:

D5:

The xs compose] y

compose y (at t) and (ii)
of the same sort asy (at f), then
for any zs such that the zs compose u (at f), u is a sum of the
zs (at f).

necessarily, for

D6:

(at t) =df. (i) the

all u,

xs

(for all f), if u is

The xs compose 2 y (at t) =df. (i) the xs compose y (at t) and (ii) possibly,
for some u, (for some f ), u is of the same sort as
y (at f ), and for some zs,
the zs compose u (at f), and u is not a sum of the zs (at f). [Mierav
(2000): 335].

Next, Mierav notes that the conjunction of D5 and

A2

is

equivalent to the

following:

A3:

the xs

compose] y

(at t) =df.

y

is

the

sum of the xs

(at

t).

[Mierav

(2000): 336],

Accordingly, the standard definition of composition emerges as a special case of

composition given Mierav’s account.

Mierav claims

that

MCP can help answer what he calls the question of non-

unique composition, which

is:
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What difference between the respective features
of the two wholes is
consistent with the assumption that they
are superposed, that is,
composed of precisely the same parts? I shall call
this “the question of
non-unique composition”. [Mierav (2000):
323],
One answer
right

away,

properties.

is

to the question

that the

of non-unique composition, which Mierav
dismisses

superposed objects differ with respect to their
temporal or modal

Mierav writes:

The

familiar answer tells us that continuants
superposed at

world might

differ

from one another

in respect

t

in the actual

of features current

at

another time or in another possible world. It is silent,
however, on the
question whether, and how, such continuants might also
differ from one
another in respect of features current at t and in the actual
world. The
latter question, however, is an obvious corollary
to the question of nonunique composition, and should be addressed in any account
that aims to
be satisfactory.

who upholds the familiar answer is committed
an answer to the corollary as well, unless he or she is

Indeed, someone
to providing

prepared to assume that distinct continuants can be indiscernible
times in which they are superposed). This assumption, however,

(at
is

highly paradoxical. [Mierav (2000): 325],
In other words, differences in the

grounded

when

in the

modal or temporal properties of objects must be

non-modal or non-temporal properties of objects. Mierav argues

that

objects are superposed, the non-modal/non-temporal difference between the two

superposed objects

is

the

way

in

which they are composed of their

parts.

My main objection to MCP is that D4 does not capture our intuitive conception
of composition. There are cases
side of the biconditional

since

it is

supposed

to

is

in

which composition

not satisfied.

D4

clearly occurs, but the right-hand

plays a central role in Mierav’s theory,

be a general account of composition, from which composition]

and composition emerge as special cases. So,
Recall D4:
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if

D4

goes, then

MCP goes as well.

6

D4:

will present

I

human

the xs compose
y at t =df. (i) each of the xs is a part of v at , and fin
the
existence of all of the xs and their
having the features they do at
t is a
sufficient condition for the existence
ofy at r. 15

person.

two counter-examples

Human

to

D4. First counter-example-.
Sally

persons are material objects and hence
are

made

is

a

out of

fundamental particles. Call the class of
fundamental particles that compose Sally
on her
1

6

birthday the Sally Class. Sally’s

th

birthday occurs on 7-30-2004.

1

So,

at

7-30-

2004, the elements of the Sally Class compose Sally.
Let us consider another possible world
Sally Class exists.

and certainly don
to

However,
t

compose nothing

particles

precise

who

is

compose

at

w at which each of the elements

7-30-1988 these elements compose nothing
interesting

newborn baby. The elements of the

a

Sally Class continue

particularly interesting until 7-30-2004. Prior
to this date, the

have been scattered widely

moment on 7-30-2004,

apart.

But now, due

to

chance or divine plan,

in the

same

No human
coalesced.

An

much empty

spatial

and causal relations

each other in

w

as they actually do.

outside observer employing a very powerful telescope would see a pretty

area followed by the sudden appearance of a human-shaped thing. But the

At the very

existence in this way.

compose

some xs

to

in

w

least, Sally is

It is

is

not Sally. Plausibly, Sally has her origins

not the kind of thing that could

even doubtful whether the thing

person. But presumably Sally

possible for

to

intrinsic properties

being was even remotely near the region where these particles

thing that these particles

essentially.

at a

the particles coalesce into the shape of human person

an intrinsic duplicate of Sally. These particles have the same

and stand

of the

is

essentially either a

compose ay

at

w

is

human being

a time and yet for
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in

it

a

come

into

human being

or a person. So

not be the case that the

or a

it

is

existence of all of the xs and their having
the features they do at

condition for the existence

ofy

at

Second counter-example

:

t is

a sufficient

/.

suppose that

at

t,

a collection of bricks

compose

a

house. Let’s call the class of bricks that
compose the house, the Brick Class. The house

would have existed had

W

whlch

at

a11

contained one less brick in the chimney. Let
us go to a world

it

of the bricks

in the Brick Class are

arranged in exactly the same

way

as

they actually are, save for a missing brick. Let
us call the class of bricks that compose
the house at this world, the Brick

Class compose the house. But,
Class do not

same

compose

relations as they

Minus

at the actual

in w.

We

at

t,

all

of its members exist and stand

So the existence of all of the bricks

Class and their having the features they do
existence of the house

world, the elements of the Brick Minus

the house, even though

do

At w, the elements of the Brick Minus

Class.

at

t

is

in the

in the

Brick Minus

not a sufficient condition for the

even though the bricks do compose the house

at

t

at

world w.

have a second counter-example.
Since

D4

of composition,

I

is

central to Mierav’s project, and since

conclude that Mierav has failed

to

D4

is

not an adequate analysis

demonstrate that there are two

fundamental kinds of composition.
Persistence and Categorical Pluralism

An

interesting

categorical pluralism

argument

- can be developed based on

time by enduring. Here,

It is

for a different kind compositional pluralism

I

the claim that objects persist through

discuss this argument and attempt to undercut

uncontroversial that objects persist through time.

enjoyed 27 years of life;

I

hope

to enjoy at least twice as
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-

I

many

it.

believe that

I

have

years more. Neither

my

belief nor

my

hope would be warranted

interesting question is

Here

more

is

how

The

objects persist through time.

I

will introduce a

precise account of the positions discussed.
Perdurantists hold that objects persist

way

perdurantist, just as an object

is

did not persist through time.

a rough characterization of the territory; in a
moment,

through time in the same

too

if objects

that objects extend through space.

is

extended in space

in virtue

According

of having spatial

an object extended in time in virtue of having temporal parts.

the analogy

between persistence through time and extension

that objects persist

through space by being wholly present

to

parts, so

Endurantists deny

in space.

Endurantists hold

at different times.

In short,

persisting objects enjoy multiple locations in spacetime without having
proper parts

corresponding to these locations.

Perdurantism and endurantism are contrary positions. But they do not exhaust
logical space.

I

will argue that there are intermediate positions that are available for

consideration once

we

distinguish several questions

distinguish the question of what parthood relation

16
.

is

Specifically,

we

should

defined on material objects from

the question of what sort of regions of spacetime material objects can reside

address the former question here.

Is

in.

I

the fundamental parthood relation defined on

material objects a two-place atemporal parthood relation x

is

a part ofyl Or

is

the

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects a three place time-indexed
parthood relation x

is

part ofy at

fl

The

perdurantist holds that the fundamental

parthood relation defined on material objects
hand, the endurantist asserts that

it

is

is

an atemporal relation.

a three-place relation.
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On

the other

The reason
presuppositions

is

the endurantist does this
that eternalism

is true.

is

straightforward. Recall that one
of

Roughly speaking, eternalism

that all times (and their contents)
are ontologically

same sense

in just the

eternalism

-

is

constantism,

the object

relation

is

x

is

is

if

as present times exist

committed

to

Suppose

apart ofy.

one time, then

at

that the

Since this

is

off.

accordingly,

we have

If

is

exist

endurantism - given

According

has that part

at

to mereological

every time that

is

the two-place

a non-temporally indexed parthood relation
and

an object has a part

at

a time,

it

on ascription of parts

it

to an object

has that part simpliciter. And.

mereological constantism. Nothing ever changes parts

Mereological constantism
there

it

18

is that

the doctrine

and future times

fundamental part-whole relation

the parthood relation, the temporal relativizations

simply drop

par; past

The worry

mereological constantism.

an object has a part

present.

17
.

on a

is

my

is

often viewed as being wildly counter-intuitive. So

pressure to reject one of the premises in the argument that leads to mereological

constantism. There

endurantists

aim

is

a wide range of potential targets. But the target that most

at is the

assumption

applies to material objects

endurantists opt for the

material objects

is

is

view

that the

fundamental part-whole relation that

an atemporal part- whole
that the

relation.

Instead,

most

fundamental part-whole relation that applies

a temporally indexed part-whole relation: x

is

a part ofy

at

to

20
t

Actually, though, there are good reasons for the endurantist to take the

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects to be a spatiotemporally
indexed parthood relation, not merely a temporally indexed parthood

relation.

That

is,

instead of taking the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects to be x

45

is

apart ofy

at

the endurantist should take

t,

region of space-time

it

to be

x

is

a part ofy at R, where R

the endurantist should take the
fundamental parthood relation

defined on material objects to be indexed
to space-time regions and not
to times
22

Given special

.

as times, or at least, there are

be a time

a

.

The main reason

special relativity

is

21

relativity, strictly speaking, there
are

no things

that perfectly

is

no such things

match our concept of what

it

is to

23

Instead, there are equivalence classes of
regions of space-time that

.

may

be

thought of as times according to an inertial
frame of reference. Since the three-place
relation

x

is

simultaneous with y relative

F is a maximal

time relative to

Of course,

other relative to F.

relation defined

to frame

F is well-defined, we can

class of spacetime points pair-wise simultaneous
to each

the endurantist could say that the fundamental
parthood

on material objects

is

indexed both to a time and a frame of reference.

But these times (and frames of references) are hardly fundamental
paradigmatic instances of logical constructions - and so

fundamental relation to
world.

A

far

more

entities that are clearly not

natural

say that a

move

it

to

are

index a

fundamental constituents of the

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects

is

- they

would be strange

for the three dimensionalist to

indexed and then analyse the parthood relation x

entities

to

make

is

to take the

be spatiotemporally

a part of y at

t

at

frame

F in terms

of

24
it .

Fortunately,

to

be x

is

a part

ofy

we

can do

at R,

this.

where R

is

We begin

by taking our primitive parthood

a region of spacetime. If we wish,

we

can

relation

restrict

the candidate regions to those that are maximally continuous three-dimensional slices of

spacetime,

i.e.,

hyper-planes. Three-dimensional slices of spacetime are the sorts of

46

things that enduring objects can be wholly
present

axiom: x

is

ofy

a part

at

R only

if

at,

allowing us to adopt the following

both x and y are wholly present

introduce the notion of being a time at a reference
frame: times
fusions of spacetime points such that each point

reference frame. Finally,

relation:

and R

is

x

t

is

at

Note

a part

ofy

at

we
/

is

at

next

reference frames are

simultaneous with the others

at that

introduce a defined time and frame indexed
parthood

at

F if and only if there

an

is

R such

that

x

is

ofy

a part

R

at

F 25
that this sort

of definition will also be available for use

which a two-place notion of absolute simultaneity
fundamental spatiotemporal

we can

We

at R.

identify times with

entities are

is

well defined.

in

spacetimes

As above,

in

the

spacetime points. However, in these spacetimes

maximal fusions of simultaneous spacetimes

which

points,

are simply hyper-planes of simultaneity.

So the endurantist should hold
material objects

is

this section turns

on

this complication,

have good reason

relation defined

on material objects

to

is

I

will ignore

it

on material objects

the endurantist

who

is

for

commit themselves

now. The important point

is

it is

that the fundamental parthood

a three-placed relation x

is

a part ofy at

t.

takes this route also be a compositional pluralist? There are

undeniable that part-whole structure applies to these

deniable

is

to the claim that the parthood

powerful reasons to say that she must. For the endurantist believes

And

in

a three-place relation.

have argued that the endurantist should claim

relation defined

Must

fundamental parthood relation defined on

spatiotemporally indexed. However, since nothing that follows

that endurantists

I

that the

- and what ought

to be denied

-

is
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that the

in intervals

entities.

of times.

However, what

fundamental part-whole relation

that

defined on temporal intervals

is

is

the relation x

is

a part of y at

fundamental parthood relation defined on temporal
intervals

that the

indexed parthood relation, but in case an argument
for

seems

It

t.

clear

a non-temporally

is

this is required, consider the

following. Suppose that the fundamental parthood
relation defined on temporal
intervals is x is a part

12:00 and ending at

at

time

/

1

ofy

at

t.

At what time

12:30 a part of the interval beginning

is

:00? Given the principle that an object x

only ifx and y are both wholly present

at

t,

there

is

could reasonably be said to be a part of the interval
(12:00,
this interval is

not wholly present at 12:30 and

(ii)

12:30

is

part of another object^

is

no time

1

:00).

at

which 12:30

This

of y

at

is

in

because

(i)

at itself.

that the

the temporally indexed parthood relation x

is

a part

t.

So the endurantist should believe
on

is

only wholly present

So the advocate of three dimensionalism and Eternalism should not say
parthood relation defined on times

at

intervals

of times

is

that the

fundamental parthood relation defined

the non-temporally indexed relation x

is

a part ofy. However,

order to avoid mereological constantism, the three dimensionalist should believe that

the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects

relativized relation

x

is

a part ofy at

t.

It

whereas x

be a compositional

is

a part ofy at

t

is

the temporally

should be clear that these two parthood

relations are not identical, since their adicity differs; x

relation,

is

is

a part ofy

is

a two-place

a three-place relation. So the endurantist should

pluralist.

So the endurantist should say

that the

There are two ontological categories such

concept of parthood

that the

is

not uni vocal.

parthood relations defined on those

categories are not identical. Endurantists should endorse compositional pluralism.
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for “x is a part of y”

The Case
I

now

will

relation defined

The argument
Theodore

is

present an argument for the claim that the fundamental parthood

on material objects

is

a two-place atemporal relation x

not terribly original; the bulk of the argument

first

premise

is

that the best

way

to solve the

based on the work of

problems of temporary

material coincidence, conventional identity, and vagueness

The second premise

is

relation x is

on material objects

is

is

is

to

temporal

acceptable only

if

a two-place atemporal

a part ofy. Given these two premises, we should believe

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects

x

by appealing

is

that the ontology of temporal parts

the fundamental parthood relation defined

relation

a part ofy.

Sider.

The

parts.

is

is

that the

a two-place atemporal

a part ofy.

is

Since Theodore Sider has already provided an extended defense of the

premise - he devotes two chapters of Sider (2001)

to this task

-

I

first

will concentrate

on

the second premise.

Two

preliminary points are in order.

the fundamental parthood relation

is

First,

even the advocate of the claim

that

a three-placed temporally relativized relation can

can be stated in terms of
believe in temporal parts. For the doctrine of temporal parts
this relation in the

X
x

is
is

following way:

but only at,
an instantaneous temporal part ofyatt =df. (1) x exists at,
ofy at t.
part
a
is
a part ofy at t, and (3) x overlaps at t everything that

(DTP1): For any object x and time
instantaneous temporal part at

t.

t

such that x exists

[Sider (2001): 59].
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at t,x

has an

t,

(2)

It

will be useful to

have a

slightly stronger version

of DTP available as well. Let us

introduce the notion of an extended temporal
part'.

Xisjm extended temporal part ofy at interval T=df.
(1) * exists
in T and at no instant not in T,
(2) for each rin T, x is a part
overlaps everything that

of y

is

a part

ofy

at

note that

DTP2

DTP1,

entails

I

will focus

Second,
relation

x

is

if the

on

that

DTP2

in

may

t

x persists through

but that the converse does not hold unless

universal fusion of temporal parts, which
endurantist.

at

every instant

and x

t.

(DTP2): For any object x and interval T such
extended temporal part at T 26
I

at

T

x has an

we assume

be regarded as unintelligible by the

what follows.

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects

is

the

a part ofy, we can and should introduce a defined temporally-relativized

parthood predicate x

is

a part ofy at

t.

The

definition

is

simple, given that there are

temporal parts:
(PatT): x is

a part ofy

temporal part

at

t

is

at

t

a part

=df.

of/s

x and y each

exist at

t,

and x’s instantaneous

instantaneous temporal part

at

t.

[Sider (2001V

57].

Since the doctrine of temporal parts can be stated using a three-place parthood
predicate, the endurantist can believe that objects have temporal parts.

perdurantist can understand this three-place parthood predicate, there

her to balk at this formulation of

DTP. (Although,

perspective of the perdurantist, this formulation

is

And

is

as Sider points out,

since the

no reason

for

from the

not maximally perspicuous. See Sider

(2001): 57.)

However, although an endurantist can accept temporal

parts,

doing so requires

her to accept the possibility of total mereological coincidence as well.

Two

material

objects suffer from total mereological coincidence given endurantism just in case there

50

is

a time or times at

generally,

which both objects have exactly

two objects

suffer

from

total

the

same proper

parts.

More

mereological coincidence just in case
the

fundamental parthood relation defined on material
objects relates these two nonidentical objects to the

To

see this,

let

same

collection of parts.

us turn to one kind of problem for which
temporal parts provide

the solution, specifically, the problem of vague
persistence. Suppose that

indeterminate whether Fred persists from

whether Fred exists

at t4,

although

tl

to t4.

This

is

because

it is

it is

indeterminate

determinate that Fred persists from

it is

tl

to t3.

The

friend of temporal parts diagnoses this situation as a
case of semantic indeterminacy.

There

is

an object that determinately persists from

determinately persists from

tl to t3.

the former object. In this situation,

This

it is

latter

friend

say that, during

tl

It is

through

t3, there are

to the

is

is

another object that

an extended temporal part of

not indeterminate what things exist.

of endurantism can help herself to

fundamental part-whole relation

The

object

There

indeterminate whether “Fred” refers to the

temporally longer object or the shorter object.

The

tl to t4.

this solution.

two non-identical objects

But

it

requires her to

that are related via the

same group of objects.

perdurantist also helps herself to the temporal parts solution, but without

paying the price of genuine coincidence. Since the three-place part-whole relation

is

a

defined parthood relation on the perdurantist view, that the perdurantist accepts

temporal parts does not imply that she must also accept
for the

total

mereological coincidence,

fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects

relation.

And

is

a two-place

nothing in this application of temporal parts to our problem involves

holding that two non-identical objects are related to the same collection of parts via
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this

relation.

Since total mereological coincidence

temporal parts

is

material objects

acceptable only

is

if the

is

to be avoided, the ontology
of

fundamental parthood relation defined on

a two-place atemporal relation x

is

a part ofy
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Parthood and Occupation

The

typical endurantist says that the fundamental
parthood relation

place relation and that objects are wholly present
at

more than one

perdurantist responds that the fundamental parthood
relation
that objects are

never wholly present

at

more than one

is

time.

a three-

is

The

typical

a two-place relation and

time. Since the typical

endurantist (or perdurantist) claims about occupation and
parthood are not necessarily
equivalent, there

is

room

for other

views on the question of how objects persist through

time.

In order to address these questions carefully,

I

vocabulary. In what follows,

I

defined on material objects

the atemporal relation x

is

assume

will

that the

need

to introduce

some

technical

fundamental parthood relation
is

a part ofy. Recall

that the

ontology endorsed in the Introduction contains regions of spacetime and material
occupants of those regions. The primitive relation that material objects bear to regions

of spacetime

is

the occupation relation.

that object is located in spacetime.

It is

A region occupied
where the object

of occupation” should help the reader grasp the relevant
occupies a region of spacetime

Example:

I

r,

if x

is at.

my

fact, this typically will
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where

If

some

an object x
part of

r.

hand occupies a subregion

occupies a region of spacetime

occupies a proper subregion of r. In

is

The following “axioms

relation.

then every part of x occupies

occupy a particular region of spacetime and

of this region. However,

by a material object

r, it

does not follow that x

not be the case; instead, in

the typical case, a proper part

of* occupies a proper subregion of r.
Example:

the

current temporal part of my desk occupies
a three-dimensional subregion of
spacetime.
It

does not occupy the subregion (of that region)
that

temporal part of the leg of that desk.

If

is

occupied by the current

an object occupies two disjoint regions,

it

does

not follow that the object occupies the fusion
of these regions. (In such a case, the
object enjoys multi-location.

putative one: a universal

It is

is

Examples of this case

instantiated at

are not obvious, but here

by an object

at

Rl and a

is

a

different object at R2.

not instantiated by the fusion of these objects. Presumably,
then, the universal

occupies R1 and

R2

but does not occupy their union.)

The following

definitions will also be helpful:

x fills region R =df. Either (i) there is some R such that R is a part of R'
and x occupies R or (ii) there is a region R and there are regions, the rs,
such that R is the fusion of the rs, x occupies each of the rs, and R is a
’

’

’

’

part of R\

x

lies

within

R

=df. There

some region R such
'

is

that

R’

is

a part of R

and x occupies R\

R

is

that

empty
x

lies

=df. There

is

no x such

that

x

fills

R and

there

is

no x such

within R.

X exactly occupies R =df. x occupies R and no region other than R.
x

is

multi-located =df. There are regions

identical with

x dominates

and

R just

(ii)

R and

X such that

(i)

R

is

not

x occupies R and x occupies R\

in case (i)

x occupies R,

occupies some proper sub-region of R, and

(ii) it is

(iii)

not the case that x

no proper

part of x

occupies a proper part of R.

The
parthood

made by

is

typical endurantist endorses one claim about parthood, specifically that

a three-place relation, and two claims about occupation. The second claim

the typical endurantist

is

that

it

is

possible for objects to enjoy multi-location.
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For example, on the typical endurantist
picture, a point-particle persists
hy successively

occupying disjoint regions of spacetime. The
third claim
region of spacetime that

The

is

that

is

no object occupies a

extended in the temporal dimension.

typical perdurantist endorses a claim about
parthood, specifically that

it is

a

two-place relation, and two claims about occupation.
The second claim made by the
typical perdurantist is that objects

do not enjoy multi-location. Every object
exactly

occupies some region of spacetime. The third claim

is

that

many

objects occupy

regions of spacetime that are extended in the temporal
dimension.

However, there are some points of agreement between

the typical endurantist

and the typical perdurantist. Suppose a point

particle

one-dimensional spatiotemporal region that

persists through R.

it

p persists from

endurantist and the typical perdurantist will grant that
p

fills

R.

tl

to t2.

Both the

And

Call the

typical

both the typical

endurantist and the typical perdurantist will grant that
p does not dominate R.

So

far then

we have

Typical Endurautism

(

1

the following positions:

:

)

Necessarily, parthood

some

is

a three-place relation.

(2)

Possibly,

(3)

Necessarily, no object occupies a temporally extended region of
•

spacetime.

(4)

objects enjoy multi-location.
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Necessarily, no object dominates a temporally extended region of

spacetime.

Typical Perdurautism:

(5)

Necessarily, parthood

is
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a two-place relation.

(

6)

Necessarily, no object enjoys multi-location.

Some

objects occupy temporally extended region
of spacetime.

Necessarily, no object dominates a temporally
extended region of

(8)

spacetime.

Typical Endurantism and Typical Perdurantism are contraries.
They do not

exhaust the possible positions on
there are

many

material objects

is

As

it

But

turns out,

I

it

should be clear

now that

endorse a following position

with both typical endurantism and typical perdurantism. 29

the typical perdurantist,

(5).

objects persist.

other positions available.

that is inconsistent

accept

how

I

accept that the fundamental parthood relation defined on

a two-place relation;

Second,

First, like

I

argued for

like the typical endurantist,

present at multiple regions of spacetime;

I

I

defend

this

claim in

II.5.

So

I

reject (1) but

accept that objects can be wholly

this

view

in chapter 3.

On

one

conception of extended simples - the Parsonian Conception - extended simples are
objects that

fill

an extended region of spacetime via enjoying multi-location. 30

However, although

I

accept that Parsonian simples are possible,

doubting that they are actual in chapter

3.

(The argument

in

II.

I

provide reasons for

5 also provides

reason to think that temporal Parsonian extended simples are not actual.) So

I

some
accept

(2) but reject (6).

Finally, unlike both the typical endurantist and the typical perdurantist,

willing to countenance the possibility that

all

On

am

extended regions of spacetime are

possibly dominated by material objects. In chapter

extended simples are possible.

I

3,

1

argue that spatiotemporally

another conception of extended simples, extended

simples dominate the regions they occupy. Once you accept that some extended regions
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of spacetime can be dominated,

it is

hard to see

extended region of spacetime could not be.

question of what sort of compositional

parthood

Is

.3

I

is

could argue that some

reject (4)

have defended compositional monism from

I

1

So

how you

and

attack.

monism we should

I

(8).

it

applies to everything

is self-identical.

self-identical

is

Another example of a universal concept

is

A concept is weakly universal just in case there is no

being such that 2+2=4.

ontological category such that the concept applies to no

now

investigate whether “has parts”

By
category

accept that

Parthood Universal?

universal, since everything

will

we

universal?

There are universal concepts. For example, the concept being

is.

turn to the

adopt. Should

A concept is strongly universal just in case, necessarily,
there

now

will

it

“everything”

belongs

to.

I

is

members of that

category.

We

strongly or weakly universal.

mean anything whatsoever,

regardless of what ontological

Mountains, which belong to the category material object are
,

self-identical; propositions

about mountains are also self-identical, even though they

concept of parthood

is

strongly universal, then, necessarily, everything has parts. If the concept of parthood

is

belong to a different ontological category than mountains.

strongly universal, then

parts,

numbers have

parts, classes

have

If the

parts, material objects

have

immaterial objects have parts, and so forth.

Even
universal.

if the

The

concept of parthood

state

is

not uni vocal,

of affairs would obtain

if,

parthood relations, each ontological category
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it

might nonetheless be strongly

for example, although there are multiple

is

such that

(i)

there

is

a parthood relation

defined on that ontological category and
to

some

every object bears some parthood relation

object.

There

is

a danger of the debate between the universalist
and her opponent being

Some

trivialized.

itself.

(ii)

Given

philosophers stipulate that every object

this stipulation,

since identity

is

universal.

And

itself as a part!

it

is trivially

is

to

be counted as a part of

true that the concept of parthood

The number two

definitely has parts, since

is

universal,

at least

it

so forth for objects of other ontological categories.

has

We need to

avoid this danger.

we

If

stipulate that every entity

introduce a technical term that applies
identical to that whole.

circumstance.

It is

We could

is

to count as a part

when an

object

is

of itself,

a part of

is

it

useful to

some whole but

not

standard to use the term proper part in this sort of

avoid the danger of trivialization by asking whether the

concept of proper parthood

is

universal. But this question, although interesting,

is

not

the intended question.

We should distinguish the following questions:
Q

1

:

Does every

entity

have proper parts?

Q2: Does every ontological category have

at least

one member

that has a proper

part?

Q1 and Q2
to

answer “no”

questions,

it

to

are not the

Q1 and “yes”

will be helpful to

familiar and well developed,

We

can then see

same
to

question; moreover,

it

might be that

Q2. In order to see that Q1 and

Q2

assume a background ontology. Since

let

it is

correct

are different

it

is

reasonably

us pretend to accept David Lewis’s ontological scheme.

how Q1 and Q2

differ given this

simpliciter.
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background, and hence differ

Lewis’s ontological scheme
class.

is

composed of two

categories: material object and

Properties are identified with classes; propositions
are identified with classes of

possible worlds; possible worlds are in turn identified
with mereological fusions of

spatiotemporally related objects; events are reduced to properties.
[Lewis (1986a): 6980.]

Lewis

entities,”

is

also a mereologist. Since he

which

According

to

are

composed of material

Lewis, there

is

material objects and classes.

classes.

Some

For example,

are mereological simples.

shows

that these

objects and classes. [Lewis (1991): 72-80.]

'yes' to

some

Q2.

to

Ql. According to Lewis, some

in Parts

entities don't

of Classes Lewis argues that singleton classes
.

Since different answers to Ql and

two questions

that applies to both

material objects have proper parts; so do

But Lewis would answer “no”
parts.

a mereologist, he believes in “mixed

one fundamental parthood relation

So Lewis would answer

have proper

is

Q2

are possible, this

are distinct.

Let us consider a third question:

Q3: Let
parts.

Q3
we

is

C

be an ontological category such that some member of C has proper

Does every member of C have proper
not the

same question

as

Ql

or Q2.

parts?

We can

see that this

is

the case if

construct scenarios in which one could reasonable answer these questions

differently.

Consider McLewis. McLewis shares Lewis’s basic ontology, which

consists of material objects and classes.

But McLewis disagrees with Lewis about whether classes have proper

McLewis

is

parts.

a compositional restrictivist; he believes that the fundamental parthood

relation is defined only

on material

objects.

According
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to

McLewis,

either Lewis’s

claim that some classes have proper parts amounts
to nothing more than a stipulation
like

let

now

us

call the subclasses

meaningless in the same

way

some accounts meaningless,

of a class

its

that a claim like

or

it is

‘proper parts’,” or the claim

“The number 2

is in

my

is

on

cellar” is

just plain false because the parthood relation
does

not apply to classes.

McLewis

is

happy

although he worries that
that

doing

since he

is

this cuts

to let

it

Lewis

might be misleading

any metaphysical

new

stipulate a

ice.

to

do

McLewis

inclined to think that the sentence “The

is

making a substantive

so,

is

suspicious of the second option,

is

reasons,

gunk. That

is,

in

my

to

cellar”

is

false but

understand that

claim.

his

view do not belong

some elements of that category have proper

McLewis answers

McLewis

is

supposed

So McLewis answers Q2 with a “no”. Classes on
category in which

and he certainly does not think

number 2

not meaningless. So he favors the third option, if he

Lewis

sense of “proper part,”

question

Q1 with a

parts.

For similar

“no”.

also believes in that, necessarily, every material object

he endorses the claim

that, as a

to a

is

atomless

matter of necessity, every material object

has proper parts. Since he also holds that only material objects have proper parts, he

answers

Q3

with a “yes”.

McLewis’s metaphysical views might be

incorrect, but they are not

unreasonable. And, given McLewis’s metaphysical views, he must distinguish

Q1 and Q2. Given Lewis’s metaphysics, he must
and

Q3

are each distinct questions.
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distinguish

Q3 from

Q1 and Q2. So Ql, Q2,

Which question should we
our question being
correctly

trivial,

then

we

concentrate on? If we want to avoid the worry about

should concentrate on question Q2.

answered by a “yes”, then

I

will say that parthood

is

Q2

If

universal.

Q2

is

captures

the intended question.

There

some

is

linguistic evidence that

universal. Recall the sentences

(1)

The

first

(2) 12:30

I

This part of space

(4)

The

(5)

The weakest

noted

is

mentioned

take the concept of parthood to be

earlier:

a part of the song.

PM is a part of the interval ranging from

(3)

third inning

12:00

earlier,

PM to

1:00

PM.

curved.

is

was

the

most boring

part of his argument

part of the baseball

game.

where he confuses types and tokens.

is

of what he did when he killed the butler was

(6) Part

As

measure

I

we

hit

him with

each sentence seems plausible, even though they seem

a candlestick.

to ascribe

mereological structure to objects of various ontological categories. However, some
putative ontological categories

their

seem

to resist the attribution

members. For example, suppose

that

of part-whole structure

to

numbers form an ontological category.

There are no commonsensical attributions of part-whole structure to numbers. The
a part of 3.33” sounds

sentence “.33

is

possibilities.

The sentence

possibility that

Ben wins

course, does not

that there are

show

silly.

Or consider

“the possibility that

Ben wins

the chess

match

is

part of the

the chess tournament” sounds extremely strained. This, of

that the concept of parthood

composites made out of numbers and

possibilities are

the putative category

composite objects. Or

it

may
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is

not universal.

It

might be the case

possibilities, or that

numbers and

be that neither numbers nor possibilities

form genuine ontological categories. But the case
be stronger

if

we

for parthood being universal

would

could produce plausible sounding attributions of mereological

structure to entities of every putative ontological category.

However, even
to

have some reason

McLewis. For
(7) attributes

could

it

if

we do

not have an airtight case for universalism,

to reject the kind

seems

still

seem

of compositional restrictivism endorsed by

of (l)-(7) could be true and

that each

we

it

seems

that

each of (1)-

part-whole structure to entities of various ontological categories.

How

McLewis respond?

One

strategy available to

McLewis

is to

offending sentences. For example, sentence

provide paraphrases of each of the

(1),

which appears

to attribute

mereological structure to types, could be paraphrased as follows:

(1 *)

Necessarily, every instance of the song has a part that

is

an instance of

the first measure.
In other words, talk about the mereological structure of types

can be cashed out

of necessity and the mereological structure of tokens of the types. This

is

in

terms

the strategy

advocated by Alex Oliver:

We also talk of types of geometrical objects as having parts, so that we
can say that a type of a particular hyperbola has two separate parts. But
would construe this talk as mere metaphor: the type has metaphorical

I

[Oliver (1993):
parts because any token of the type has real spatial parts.

217]
Likewise, with respect to

(7),

Oliver

recommends

treating

it

as a metaphor.

parts, although the
Classes do not literally have their proper subclasses as proper

metaphor
relation

that they

do

is

appropriate.

The metaphor

is

appropriate because the subclass

and the parthood relation have similar formal properties.

uncontroversial that both relations are transitive.
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For example,

it

is

Oliver also notes that, on some theories of types,
such as Lewis’s theory of
properties,

structure

even

we

if

types have mereological structure, they do not
have the mereological

expect them to have. 32 For example, according to
Lewis’s theory,

properties are classes of actual and possible instances of
the property.

types are a kind of property.) So a type of song
instances.

According

is

the class of

to Lewis, the parts of a class are all

any subclass of a class of songs

is itself

a class of songs.

of that song. So, on Lewis’s theory, a sentence like
(1)

So even someone

like

of these sentences

at

face value.

we

His argument has

we

this sort

one

should not take some

seems amenable

(5) also

is

to

where he confuses

could say:

many

premises. In one of his premises, he confuses

types and tokens. This premise

And

subclasses. But

that there is just

paraphrase. Instead of saying “the weakest part of his argument
types and tokens,”

its

not a class of proper parts

this relation is universal,

For another example,

that

is false.

David Lewis, who believes

fundamental parthood relation and that

assume

actual and possible

its

and only
It is

(I

is

the weakest premise of his argument.

of paraphrase might be reasonable or even mandatory depending on what

take arguments to be. If we take arguments to be sequences of sentences, as

introductory logic textbooks do, then the premises of an argument are not

many

literal parts

of

the argument. Instead, they are “elements” of the sequences.

So the
see

linguistic evidence for compositional universalism

what additional considerations could motivate us

to hold that

seems weak. Let us
composition

is

universal.

One might appeal

to the thesis that

composition

is

identity.

Many

feel a strong

attraction to the hard to adequately characterize but nonetheless alluring thesis that
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composition

is

this table just

It

identity

Consider a table and

are the table. The table just

composition

parthood.

33
.

And even

to identity, a case

is identity,

if

parts.

is

In

some

sense, the parts of

top and legs.

then, since identity

composition

might be made

is its

its

is

universal, then so too

is

not literally identity but instead merely
analogous

that parthood is universal.

For the more analogies

between composition and identity we discover, the more analogies
between them we
should expect to discover.

How analogous
is:

is

not very analogous at

there

is

parthood to identity given typical endurantism? The answer

all.

There are

at least

two fundamental kinds of parthood;

only one kind of identity. The parthood relation defined on material objects

temporally relative; the identity relation does not obtain relative to times
object

is

always identical

identical with the zs that

composition

So

if

is

we

is

however, the xs that compose

compose y

alt’.

The

ay

at

t

Every

need not be

typical endurantist should

deny

that

identity.

hold that compositional pluralism

defined on times

composition

to itself;

34
.

is

is

is true,

and

that the parthood relation

not the parthood relation defined on material objects, the thesis that

identity

is

problematic and cannot motivate the claim that there are

parthood relations defined on each ontological category.

We

certain ontological categories have parthood relations defined

might wonder why only

on them, but perhaps the

compositional pluralist can provide an explanation: perhaps only those objects that can

occupy space or time

in

some

intimate way, such as material objects, events, spatial or

temporal regions, can have parts.
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However, the

typical perdurantist

is

not in this position, for she need
not accept

compositional pluralism. Suppose that compositional
pluralism

is false,

and

that the

parthood relation that events bear to each other, that
material objects bear to each other,

and

that regions

would
and

feel

of spacetime bear

some pressure

to

each other,

to think that, for

is

the

same

in

each case. Then we

example, the relationship between classes

their subclasses is also that parthood relation.

For one thing, the subclass relation

is

formally analogous to the parthood relation. Since the parthood
relation appears in four
other ontological categories, the hypothesis that this formal analogy

formal analogy would be very tempting. But clearly

So the

typical endurantist probably has

may have some

universal,

and

not in the

same

have looked

at

position; she

reason to think

may

does not mandate

is

no reason

it

is

not.

hold that parthood

this conclusion.
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it

is

is

not merely a

not required.

to hold that parthood

is

But the typical perdurantist
universal, but the evidence

is

we

Notes
1

I

2

follow the convention that “part” denotes a reflexive
relation.
Peter

On

Simons

stresses this point throughout

Simons (1987).

standard mereology and other interesting variations of it, see
Simons
is, of course, no compositional monist;
Simons (1987) provides

Simons

(1987).

a

powerful defence of compositional pluralism. Peter van Inwagen appears
to endorse
compositional pluralism in van Inwagen (1990a): 18-20. One famous
monist is, of
course, David Lewis. See Lewis (1991): 75-82.
4

One could hold

the stronger view that there are multiple parthood relations
within each particular ontological category. But I can’t see how one could
motivate
such a view. Accordingly, I will not address it in what follows.
5

On the

’unmereological composition’ of states of affairs, see Armstrong

(1986), and Lewis (1986b).

For arguments against
7

This question

is

of affairs, see Lewis (1986b).

clearly related to the question Peter

General Composition Question.
8

states

Of course, we can

On

this question, see

van Inwagen calls the
van Inwagen (1990a): 38-51.

introduce defined parthood relations that, for example, are

not transitive.
9

However,

it

might be

that, for

analogous to inherited location that

members from
10

The problem facing
it

may

For the record,
11

appeal

to.

is

something

For example, classes inherit

the advocate of the thesis that composition of

I

identity.

is

Since (4)

is

latter

solve the former one as well. See Lewis (1971) and Mericks (1999).

distinction to fictional

and

linguistic objects in

something arbitrary about a piece of a whole, something

nonarbitrary about a part of it.” [Krecz (1986): 392].
13

identity

reject mereological essentialism.

Krecz applies the part/piece

“There

is

Counterpart theory can solve the

Krecz (1986): 391-394.
12

their

their subclasses.

analogous to the problem of contingent
problem, so

each ontological category, there

we can

is

arguably incoherent,

I

ignore
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it

in

what follows.

71
8

14

Defenses of constitution can be found

Wasserman (2002), and Wiggins
15

Mierav

in

s not c ear on what the relevant
assume that they are the intrinsic properties of the
and causal relations obtaining between them.
[

Baker (1997), Baker (2000)

(2001).

i

features of the parts are. Let us
parts, plus the various spatiotemporal

I am indebted to the work of cody
Gilmore in what follows. Some of the
remarks made here are similarly to those in Gilmore (forthcoming).

1

For an interesting discussion about etemalism see chapter two of Sider
(2001)

and Markosian (1994).
1

No

Lewis

surprise here, since

is

the author of both arguments

See Lewis

(1986): 202-205.

Sometimes

this relation is called

an atemporal part-whole

relation.

20

Another popular target is eternalism. Many philosophers instead endorse
presentism, which is the doctrine that the only things that exist are those things that
presently exist.

On

presentism, see Bigelow (1996), Markosian (1994), and Sider

(2001).
2

Hud Hudson

more developed account of a view
Hudson (2001): 62-70.

presents a

part- whole relation to regions in

that indexes the

22

Perhaps it is not the only reason. Recently, Hud Hudson has argued that
indexing the part-whole relation to regions of spacetime also solves the pressing

problem of the many. See Hudson (2001): 45-71. Additionally, Theodore Sider has
suggested that the three dimensionalist should index parthood to regions of spacetime

worlds in which time travel into the past

I

24

am

is

possible.

See Sider (2001): 104-105.

heavily indebted to Theodore Sider for what follows here.

See Sider (2001): 84-85. Phillip Bricker has pointed out to me that we can
is a time just in case it is a three dimensional spacelike hyper-

also say that an entity

plane. Let us call the entities that

I

call

times in the body of the text

three dimensional spacelike hyper-planes ‘2-times’.

On

‘

1

-times’ and the

this proposal, 2-times

simply

are certain spatiotemporal regions, specifically, those regions that are fusions of the

elements of some 1-time. Note that on

simply

is

this proposal,

indexing parthood to a time

indexing parthood to a region, since every time
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is

a region of spacetime.

in

This procedure is a modification of a proposal
made by Theodore Sider in
Sider (2001): 84-85. According to Sider’s proposal,
we begin by taking the notion x
overlaps y at spacetime point R as our mereological
primitive. We then introduce a
time-frame indexed notion of parthood as follows:

X overlaps y at

t

at

F - df.

there

is

a spacetime point p in

t

at

F such that x

overlaps y at p.

X

is

a part ofy at

overlaps y at

t

t

at reference frame

F =df.

everything that overlaps x

at

t

at

F

at F.

I prefer my account of part at t at
F over Sider’s account because
ordinary objects cannot be wholly present at spacetime points.

it

seems

clear that

Since the perdurantist believes in an atemporal parthood relation, she
can
provide definitions of these concepts that are (from her perspective) more
perspicuous:

Xis an extended temporal part ofy at
in T and at no instant not in T, (2) x is
is

27

a part ofy' and that exists at

T =df.

(1)

x exists

at

every instant

a part of y, and x overlaps everything that

in T.

For arguments against coincidence, see Sider (2001): 140-208.

28

It

some

t

interval

may be

that

some

endurantists wish to deny this; perhaps they hold that if

object occupies regions rl and r2, then

well. This additional claim

seems

gratuitous,

it

occupies the union of these regions as

and

is

certainly not an essential part of the

view.
29

30

31

This appears to be Lewis’s position as well. See Lewis (1997b): 227.

For a defense of Parsonian extended simples, see Parsons (2000).

Although Lewis

universal, he
T9

33

is

is

willing if need be to admit in his ontology either tropes or

officially neutral

Alex Oliver
Although

it

on whether they

exist.

See Lewis (1997a).

stresses this point throughout Oliver (1993).

is

hard to adequately characterize

this

view,

it is

clear

what some

of its implications are. One clear consequence of this view is that it is impossible for
two non-identical things to be made of the same parts. On composition as identity, see
Lewis (1991): 81-87, Sider (forthcoming), and van Inwagen (1994).
34

is

One way

to save the claim that composition

also temporally relative.

On

is

identity

this view, see Gallois (1998).
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is

to

hold that identity

CHAPTER 2
A DEFENSE OF THE BRUTAL VIEW OF SIMPLES

2.1

Introduction

An object is
just in case

x

is

a simple

and only

if

a part of y but x

if

it

has no proper parts, (x

not identical to y.) This

is

is

is

an object a simple?”

1

a proper part of y

a definition of the

word

The Simple Question asks

“simple,” not a substantive criterion for being a simple.

“under what circumstances

is

is

An

answer

to the

Simple Question

an informative instance of the following schema:
Necessarily, x

is

In other words,

a simple

and only

if

an answer

to the

if

.

Simple Question must provide necessary and

must not employ a mereological term on

sufficient conditions for being a simple,

and

the right-hand side of the biconditional.

An answer to

it

the Simple Question

a

is

substantive criterion for being a simple.

I

will argue that there is

the Simple Question. There

this

is

no

correct, finitely stateable,

no non-mereological

and non-circular answer

criterion for being a simple.

to

call

I

view the Brutal View.

My argument for the Brutal View is indirect and hence somewhat shaky.
that every reasonable

answer

Consequently, the Brutal

the quest to

to the

View

is

the only view left standing. In section 2.2,

answers. In sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5,

1

argue

Simple Question faces serious objections.

answer the Simple Question and

Brutal View. In section 2.6,

I

1

briefly describe the space

1

motivate

of possible

present arguments against the competitors of the

respond to arguments against the Brutal View.
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The Simple Question

2.2

Why care

about the Simple Question?

First, issues

involving the nature of

simplicity are not independent of other concerns in the metaphysics of material objects.

Philosophical puzzles concerning material constitution have received a deserved share

of the attention of contemporary philosophers;

much of it focused on what

Inwagen has dubbed the Special Composition Question, which

what

is:

Peter van

are the

necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that some objects must meet in order to

compose a

single object?

Ned

Markosian, the philosopher to

whom we owe

gratitude

Simple Question, notes the connection between these two questions

for raising the

in the

following passage:

simples are the basic building blocks

make up

all

other objects.

Thus

that,

when combined

natural to think that

it is

nature of simples will have considerable bearing on what

in various ways,

what we say about

we

the

say in response to

the Special Composition Question. [Markosian (1998a): 214].

To

see that Markosian

is

correct, let us consider a radical

Composition Question called Nihilism

is

a

3

Nihilism

is

composite object. Nihilism obviously conflicts with

what objects
tables, rocks,

with

exist, since

one consequence of Nihilism

and living human organisms.

common

4

view that,

common

is that

to the Special

necessarily, nothing

sense concerning

there are no such things as

But the advocate of Nihilism

at least agrees

sense that there are material objects. However, given Nihilism, these must

be mereological simples.

If

it

turns out that nothing could satisfy

simple, or even if nothing in fact does satisfy what

is

the

answer

refuted.
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it

what

it

takes to be a

takes to be a simple, then Nihilism

That the Special Composition Question

by the

fact that so

many

Question could shed
in

it

is

an interesting question

metaphysicians are interested

on

light

in

it.

is

established

Since answering the Simple

the Special Composition Question,

we

should be interested

as well.

Second, an answer to the Simple Question could help us decide whether
atomless gunk

parts.

is

possible.

An

object

is

gunk just

in case every part

There are longstanding debates about whether gunk

the possibility of gunk

recently,

is

is

of it has proper

possible.

The question of

also relevant to answering the special composition question;

Theodore Sider has argued

that certain

answers to the Special Composition

Question are false because they rule out the possibility of gunk. [Sider (1993)].

Dean Zimmerman has argued

Additionally,

that certain theories about the nature of

masses are ruled out given the possibility of atomless gunk. [Zimmerman (1995)].

gunk

is

impossible, then these arguments have no force.

Question

may

An answer to

is

the extended simple.

An object

is

extended simples

is

Scala presents evidence that Isaac

5

in case

Newton believed
6

string theory, the physicist Brian

that the

share

it is

article,

Mark

fundamental objects of this

And, more

recently, in a popular

Greene seriously entertains the

fundamental physics will imply the existence of extended simples:
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its

Speculation about the

parts.

not confined to philosophy. In a recent

world are extended simples. [Scala (2002): 394].

book on

that has attracted

an extended simple just

extended in space (or spacetime) and yet lacks proper
possibility of

the Simple

help us assess these arguments.

Another strange and putatively possible kind of object
of defenders

If

possibility that

What

are strings

made

of? There are two possible answers to this question. First,

strings are truly fundamental- they are "atoms", uncuttable constituents, in the truest

sense of the ancient Greeks.

As the absolute smallest constituents of everything, they
.. From this perspective, even though strings have spatial
composition is without any content. Were strings to be

represent the end of the line.
extent, the question of their

made of something
If we

had an answer

smaller, they

to the

would not be fundamental. [Greene (1999):

Simple Question,

this

141],

presumably would help us determine

whether extended simples are possible. (In chapter

three,

I

provide an extended defense

of the possibility of extended simples.)

So we should agree with Markosian
is

that

an examination of the Simple Question

relevant to an examination of the Special Composition Question. Moreover,

interesting question in

I

its

own right. Markosian

will argue that there is

no

should be

commended

correct, finitely stateable, non-trivial

for raising

answer

an

it is

it.

to the

•y

Simple Question.

It is

I

call this

view the Brutal View of Simples.

not part of the Brutal

View

conditions on being a simple. In fact,

I

that there are

no informative necessary

believe that there are. But there are no

informative conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for being a simple.

distinguish the Brutal

is

View from

the claim that, for any simple S,

We can call the latter view the Brutal

a simple.

it is

I

a brute fact that

View of Facts about Simplicity

(BFS). If there are informative sufficient conditions for being a simple, then

BFS

is

false.

the
But, as long as these sufficient conditions are not necessary conditions, then

Brutal

View
It is

is

unthreatened by the falsity of BFS.

also not part of the Brutal

View

contingently correlated with being a simple.

they are,

it

is

up

to empirical science

8

that there are

It is

no features

my hope that there

and not a priori philosopy
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S

that are

are.

But, whatever

to discover them.

Still, it is

light

unfortunate that the Brutal

View

on the question of whether atomless gunk

Simple Question appear

And

to.

the Brutal

is

is true.

For the Brutal View sheds no

possible, whereas other answers to the

View provides

us with no help with the

question of whether extended simples are possible, whereas other answers to the Simple

Question have something to say about the possibility of extended simples. The Brutal

View does
not

tell

not

tell

us that atomless gunk or extended simples are possible, and

it

does

us that they are impossible.

Although the Brutal View of Simples
Question for these reasons,
competitors to the Brutal

I

What

believe that there

View

If this is the case, the Brutal

is

a dissatisfying answer to the Simple

is

a compelling reason to embrace

face problems serious

View

is

the only

game

are the competitors to the Brutal

in

enough
town.

View? As

I

see things, the other main

spatial accounts

(1 )

(2)

(b)

(4)

(c)

The Pointy View of Simples (PV)
The Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon)

fundamentality accounts

(3)

The Instance of a Fundamental Property View of Simples (Instance)
The Independence View of Simples (Independence)

indivisibility

(5)
(6)

accounts

The Physically Indivisible View of Simples (PIV)
The Revised Metaphysically Indivisible View of Simples (MIV)
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the

to warrant rejecting them.

players are the following:

(a)

it:

1

In section 2.3,

1

present and argue against the spatial accounts

9

present and argue against the fundamentality accounts. In section 2.5,

In section 2.4,

1

present and

argue against the indivisibility accounts.

Accounts of Simplicity

2.3

Spatial

2.3.1

General Objections to the Spatial Accounts of Simplicity

As

the

name

suggests, spatial accounts of simplicity appeal to spatial features to

provide a criterion of simplicity. The two most promising spatial accounts

The Pointy View

of Simples (PV): necessarily, x

is

are:

a simple if and only if x

is

a point-

sized object.

The Maximally Continuous View
and only

if x is

a maximally continuous object.

According

you want

to

of Simples (MaxCon): necessarily, x

make

The Pointy View

to the Pointy

View, simples

are all

and only point-sized

a simple, create a point-sized object. (Don’t ask

is

is

a simple if

10

objects. If

me how to

do

that!)

probably the traditional view of the nature of simples.

The Pointy View has two

interesting features. First, if material objects without

point-sized parts are possible, then the Pointy

View

implies that gunk

is

possible.

[Markosian (1998a): 216], Second, the Pointy View clearly implies that extended
simples are impossible.

MaxCon

is

not for traditionalists! Given

material simple, here

you want the simple

is

the recipe

you should

MaxCon,

you want

to exactly occupy. Let us call that region “R”. If

a continuous region of space, completely

fill

start again.

R with matter; make

subregion of R where matter cannot be found. Finally,
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to

make

a

follow. First, pick the region of space that

region of space, then proceed to the next step. Otherwise,

is

if

make

R is a continuous
Assuming

sure that there

sure that

R

that

R is not part

is

no

of

some

now

larger continuous region of space that

is

also filled with matter. If

it

is

R

not, then

contains a material simple.

Presumably,

R can be any size or any shape; the only constraint on R is that

occupiable by a material object. Given

shape or size

MaxCon

11
.

What about gunk?

If

MaxCon,

MaxCon

it

be

there can be extended simples of any

is true,

then gunk

impossible

is

12
.

a stunningly unorthodox answer to the Simple Question.

is

Note

that spatial accounts of simplicity at

most provide an account of when

objects that can have spatial properties, such as material objects or regions of space, are

we seem

But, as noted in chapter one,

simples.

objects as well.

to ascribe parts to other kinds of

We ascribe part-whole structure to events

part of the baseball

game;

to

:

the third inning

arguments the weakest part of the argument
:

was

is

the best

where he

confuses numerical and qualitative identity; to intervals of time: this morning was the
best part of the day. Moreover,

it

immaterial objects. For example,

simple.

It

seems

seems as though

many theists

we

can conceive of simple

believe that

God

is

immaterial and

that this position is coherent. Similarly, Descartes argued that he

is

an

immaterial substance without parts.

If

one accepts that the concept of parthood

might hope for a unified account of what

it

is to

is

univocal and universal, then one

be a simple, one that simples from

every ontological category could meet. Although

it

would be nice

to

have a non-

disjunctive account of simplicity that could apply to entities from every ontological

category,

I

parthood

is

suspect that this

is

too

much

to

hope

univocal and universal. The Pointy

space or spacetime are simples, in addition to
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for,

even given

View could

why some

that the concept

explain

why some

of

regions ol

material objects are simples,

8

possibly

it

could also explain

no clear application

why

certain events are simples.

to other categories.

MaxCon

as to apply to events.

So, for now,

when

At

we

a material object

best,

MaxCon provides

restrict the

is

hopeless as an account of the

is

simplicity of spatial or spatiotemporal regions, and

But the Pointy View has

it

implausible

is

if

it is

expanded so

a criterion of physical simplicity. 14

scope of our inquiry. Let us focus on the question of

a simple. If

some answer

to the

Simple Question seems

capable of providing a non-disjunctive account of simplicity simpliciter

we

,

will note

that.

The main argument

against spatial accounts of simplicity

possibility of co-located point-sized objects.

exactly occupy the

same region of space

15

Two

(at the

is

based on the

objects are co-located if they

same

time).

16

The argument

is

as

follows: (1) co-located point-sized objects are possible; (2) if co-located point-sized
objects are possible, then mereologically complex point-sized objects are also possible.
i

But then both the Pointy View and

MaxCon are

n

false.

There are several ways someone could motivate the premises of this argument.
First, there is the

argument from speculative ontology: one might claim

sized objects have their properties as parts.

that

even point-

D.M. Armstrong distinguishes two

conceptions of particulars: a “thin” conception, according to which a particular
“bare”, and a “thick” conception of particulars, according to

which

is

particulars are

“clothed.” [Armstrong (1997): 60, 94-96]. According to the thick conception of

particulars, particulars literally

have

their properties as constituents.

of particulars, even point-sized thick particulars have

75

1

parts.

On

this

conception

Armstrong’s views on particulars and properties are controversial, and

want

to rest

my case on them.

premise one, which

is

Accordingly,

let

1

don’t

us consider a second reason to believe

We can form a clear and

the argument from conceivability.

of co-located material objects; they are conceivable. This gives us a

distinct conception

reason to believe that they are possible.

19

For example,

we

can imagine two different

kinds of matter that are capable of interpenetrating.

We need not base the

case for the conceivability of co-located objects on the

strange thought experiments of a philosopher. There

is

an interesting debate

in the

philosophy of quantum mechanics about whether bosons a kind of fundamental
,

counter-examples to the Identity of Indiscemibles.

particle, are

counterexamples to

same

this

law only

20

two or more of them can be

if

time. Peter Simons, in a recent paper

Bosons

at the

are

same place

at the

on the bundle theory of objects, makes the

point nicely:

Fermions, which include electrons, are characterized by [properties] which obey the
Pauli Exclusion Principle no two fermions can be
:

reason that a helium atom

may have two

in exactly the

electrons in

its

same

state.

innermost shell

is

Thus

the

that their

(maybe a second-order
The other sort of particles are bosons. They do not
obey the Pauli Principle, and so two or more bosons can be in the same state at the
same time, in particular they can be in the same place at once and not differ in any
spins are in opposite directions, so they differ in one [property]
[property]: spin -direction).

...

[property] at all. If electrons were bosons, they could all three occupy the same space
around a lithium nucleus. The most familiar bosons are photons, and it is their
superposability in large numbers that makes lasers possible. [Simons (1994): 37921

380].

I

here.

shows

am no

But

is

I

am

expert on

quantum

physics, so

I

am

unable to evaluate Simons’s claim

not trying to argue that co-located objects are actual.

that co-located material objects are conceivable,

physical theories.

And

this

What

and even play a

this

example

role in certain

provides a reason to think that they are metaphysically
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possible.

It

may be

that at the

located material objects.

priori.

It

end of the day speculative physics

seems

to

me

we

that

will postulate co-

should not disregard this possibility a

That both spatial accounts of simplicity do eliminate

this possibility

a priori

is

problematic.

Finally, there is the

argument from systematic modal metaphysics: the mere

metaphysical possibility of co-located objects follows from familiar

Humean

principles

involving the denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. Suppose two
point-particles are approaching each other at a rapid clip. If co-located material objects

are impossible, then they

must swerve out of each other’s way. Or they must stop dead

Or one of them must spontaneously disintegrate. Some event must

in their tracks.

occur in each world that prohibits them from occupying the same space. There

re necessary repulsion

of co-located objects

high.

between these two

is

objects.

The

a de

price of denying the possibility

accepting brute de re modal facts like these. The price

is

too

22

The

state

(at t) is distinct

(at the

same

of affairs

from the

time).

in

state

From

which an object x occupies

a particular region of space

R

of affairs in which an object y occupies the same region

the fact that the first state of affairs obtains,

we

can infer

nothing about the location of y. Both states of affairs obtain contingently.

recombination of distinct, contingent states of affairs yields a genuine

am

is

inclined to hold, then there are possible worlds at

If

any

possibility, as

which both x and y occupy R

I

(at

23
t)

Why believe premise
so are objects

(2),

which says

composed of them? Suppose

that if co-located objects are possible, then

that in

77

some

possible world two point-sized

objects occupy the

thing

made

same region of space. Then

also

it

seems possible

that there

out of those objects. For example, suppose the two objects always

be a

move

together because they are held by a fundamental physical force. Surely there are
possible worlds in which the laws of nature guarantee this sort of interaction. If this

scenario arose,

we would

be tempted to say that the two objects were “joined together,”

“bonded,” or “fused.” In such a case, one would be hard pressed to say that they do not
suspect only the mereological nihilist could resist this pressure.

compose something.

I

But, if the objects do

compose something, then

example

to the spatial accounts

One more remark on
the following

is

of simplicity.

this

composite object

co-location before

I

move

two co-located simples

spatial accounts are

still

MaxCon

is

an interesting view.

inclined to accept that

25

But

that

it is

some

point-sized objects might be

not a necessary condition on being a

composed

the counter-example to the

I

will

It

faces interesting objections over and above

now discuss

a series of these objections.

in a Relativistic Setting

MaxCon was

first

introduced and defended by

Ned Markosian

We should note that when explicating MaxCon,

controversial

am

MaxCon

those facing the Pointy View.

(1998a).

I

simple, despite their being co-located.

Special Problems for

MaxCon

2.3.3

on.

a sufficient condition for being a simple: being point-sized and not co-

simples in virtue of having this property.

2.3.2

a counter-

24

located with any other point-sized object. Given this,

simple. For the

is

view about how objects

roughly, endurantism

is

the

view

in

Markosian

Markosian presupposed

a

that,
persist through time, endurantism. Recall

time
that material objects persist through

78

by being

wholly present

at

each instant

at

which they

exist.

According

to the standard account of

endurantism, the parthood relation has an extra “argument place” for times

Accordingly, given endurantism, the primitive parthood relation

at

y

x

is

is

26
.

a proper part of

t.

But, as

I

argued in chapter one,

strictly

speaking, the endurantist should index

parthood to spacetime regions, not to times, because of considerations stemming from

special relativity.

How does this fact change our evaluation of MaxCon?

The formulation of MaxCon given
a continuous region of space. But

some

in the previous section

scientists

one consequence of the special theory of relativity
conceived simply do not

exist; there is

employs the notion of

and philosophers have argued
is that

space and time as

no enduring manifold of spatial

are space-time points. If these scientists and philosophers are correct,

understand

MaxCon? And

from special
It is

I

are there special difficulties facing the

how

beyond

of MaxCon in a

our world

are

we

to

MaxConist stemming

my

competence

I

to

answer the second question

take to be the two obvious

relativistic setting. Let us

authoritatively.

continuous regions of space according

may be

to

begin by asking what counts as a continuous

may be

a reference frame, where continuous regions

thought of as follows. Relative to some reference frame,

space-time divide into equivalence classes that

is

Here

ways of formulating an analogue

But there
region of space given special relativity. Nothing simpliciter.

simultaneity

at

Strictly

relativity?

present and discuss what

of space

commonly

points.

speaking, there are no times or spatial points; the zero-dimensional entities

that

a three-place relation between

79

may

all

points of

be thought ot as times (since

two events and

a frame of reference).

Any

subset of any of these equivalence classes of space-time points (at

frame)

may be

thought of as a region of space

region of space, relative to frame F,

spacetime, such that every

relative to F.

may

(at that

some

reference frame).

reference

A continuous

then be thought of as any continuous region of

member of the

region

simultaneous with every other,

is

We can now formulate a relativistic version of MaxCon:

SR-MaxCon:
and only

Necessarily, x

is

a simple

at

t

according to reference frame F

a maximally continuous object

if x is

at

t

if

according to reference frame

F.

This formulation of MaxCon seems consistent and available to the MaxConist.

It is

admittedly strange that being a simple (and accordingly, the parthood relation)

relativized to both a time

and a frame of reference, but perhaps

this is

is

merely another

consequence of grafting the endurantist perspective of persistence through time onto
philosophical account of the theory of special relativity.

parthood

is

It is,

however, worrisome

being indexed to “times” and “frames of reference” in

this

that

this fashion, since

both kinds of entity are not fundamental.

The second way

to

modify

MaxCon to accommodate

special relativity

is

to take

spacea maximally continuous object to be one that occupies a continuous region oi

time.

We define what
x

is

it

is

for an object to be

a maximally continuous object

maximally continuous as follows:

— df x

is

a spatiotemporally continuous object

no continuous region of space-time, R, such that (i) the region
within some
occupied by x is a proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls
and there

is

object or other.

We now state the

spatiotemporal analogue of MaxCon:

4DMaxCon:

Necessarily, x

is

a simple if and only if x

continuous object.
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is

a maximally

Although

4DMaxCon

is

accommodate

special relativity,

worries about

4DMaxCon.

spanner

is

the

more

it is

First, let

in

natural

way

MaxConist

for the

some ways more problematic.

me

I

to

have two

introduce the concept of a spanner. Roughly, a

a spatially continuous object that persists through a continuous interval of

time. Less roughly:

An

object x

which x

is

is

a spanner

present

is

= df (i)

for any reference frame F, the set of times at F at

a non-instantaneous continuous interval and

spatially continuous object at every time at

My first worry about 4DMaxCon is that
particles studied

by

it

F

for

may

which x

is

spanners. According to

4DMaxCon,

where the fundamental physical

Assume

spanners are simples.

is

the mereological fusion of the xs.

no room

for

human persons

in

is

a

Even

Even granting such

if they

particles are

for a

generous mereology, such that for any collection of objects, the xs, there

is

x

be that the fundamental physical

physicists, e.g., the electrons, quarks, etc, are spanners.

are not, there clearly are possible worlds

y

(ii)

present.

moment

is

a

ay such

that

a generous mereology, there

worlds in which the fundamental physical particles are

spanners and have lifetimes relevantly similar to those in the actual world. There are
only particles and fusions of particles; there are no particle
(spatio)temporal parts of particles, to

relevantly similar to

human ones

compose

slices, i.e.,

shorter-lived

proper

human persons

or persons

in these worlds, since the temporally extended

fundamental particles are simples. Since some of the close possible worlds containing
spanners (perhaps including the actual world) also clearly contain

4DMaxCon must be
Here

is

my

human

persons,

false.

second worry about 4DMaxCon. Let us pick an

frame F according to which there are times

tl
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and

t2.

Imagine that

arbitrary reference

at

time

tl

two

homogenous portions of the same kind of matter
regions.

The two portions of matter move

spatial regions

fill

continuous non-overlapping

spatial

closer together until at t2 the union of the

occupied by the portions of matter

is spatially

continuous. After

portions of matter go their separate ways, never to intersect again.

Surely

t2, the

we would

describe a possible world in which this occurred as one that contained (at least) two

However,

objects.

if

4DMaxCon

is

correct then there

is

only one object in the story,

since the spatiotemporal region occupied by the portions of matter in the story

continuous. Since this seems false, there

correct account of what a simple

that

I

will raise concerning

relativistic

•

cousin.

2.3.4

I

is

not the

MaxCon,

I

SR-MaxCon
for

to

SR-MaxCon

4DMaxCon. However,
over and above the worries

will henceforth ignore the

more complicated

formulations of MaxCon and instead address their simpler and more intuitive

28

The Problem of Spatial

As
that

to prefer

do not see any serious worries

I

4DMaxCon

is.

These worries are reasons
given that

reason to worry that

is

is

I

see things, the

call the

simples,

Intrinsics

main philosophical objection facing MaxCon

Problem of Spatial

A and B,

A and B have the

A and B

which

I

two extended

same volume.

properties or relations such that

property,

that there are

an argument

such that they both occupy non-overlapping cubical regions of space.

Let us say that a property P

instantiated.

Suppose

Intrinsics.

is

P

is fundamental

is

just in case there are

instantiated in virtue

are not qualitative duplicates, for

will call redness , whereas

B

82

no other

of those properties being

A has a fundamental

intrinsic

has a different fundamental intrinsic

property,

time

by

t

which

they

I

come

A and B

will call blueness.

Suppose

into perfect contact

29
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a continuous region. (Suppose also that this region

is

new

destroyed, and a

Why do

I

simple, which

to claim that

A, B, and

C

each exist

MaxCon,
What

at

they

C

is

now

like?

transitivity

at

t

but that

have an

What

at

at

of identity.

C

time

t,

A and B are

comes

into being.

survive, then the survivor

A and B

survive for their doing so

It

would be highly

does not have

arbitrary for the

Could the MaxConist claim

other.

t

not a subregion of a

A or B

If either

A and B as parts?

(and

is

This seems

not identical to C), then

TO

infinity

of parts.

are C’s properties? There

some subregion R and red at a

this,

way?

A or B exists at

if either

then

is true,

is

will unimaginatively call “C”,

one survives and not the

highly implausible. First,

given

MaxCon

not the case that both

It is

would imply a denial of the

that

I

describe the case this

identical with C.

MaxConist

A and B move closer together until

Now the union of the regions of space occupied

larger, continuous, matter-filled region.) If

must be

that

distinct region,

R*

It

is

C

pressure to say that

seems reasonable

is

blue

to talk like

provided that the spatial indexes on the instantiations of blueness and redness are

reducible. That

is,

we

could

make

sense of the idea of an object having a property

at

a

C

is

region if we could analyze this as follows:

X has F at R just in case there is some y such that y is a part of X, y
exactly occupies R, and y has F.

But

this analysis is not available to the advocate

qualitatively heterogeneous extended simple.

instead,

it is

just blue there.

It

of MaxCon. In the case just
does not have a part where

told,

it is

How then should we understand the claim that C

R?
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is

blue;

a

blue

at

This

temporal

is

the problem of spatial intrinsicis.

It is

analogous to the problem of

Objects can enjoy different intrinsic properties

intrinsics.

at different times;

they enjoy temporal qualitative variation. Similarly, objects can enjoy spatial
qualitative variation

space.

They

simpliciter.

by having different

typically

do

this

by having

intrinsic properties at different regions

different spatial parts that

But an extended simple does not have

Markosian argues

that the

of

have these properties

spatial parts.

MaxConist should claim

that,

even though no object

survives in the contact case just mentioned, persisting matter or stuff does survive, and
this stuff instantiates these intrinsic properties.

Markosian argues

that the

needs to appeal to stuff anyways, in order to accommodate other intuitions
Recall that,

when two maximally continuous

must be destroyed. This seems

strange.

objects

come

into contact,

MaxConist

we

have.

one of them

Markosian writes:

the matter that constitutes each of the original [maximally continuous
objects] does not go out of existence simply because the

have bumped up against each

MaxConist

the

appeal to the

other.

to distinguish talk

Thus

here.

.

.

it

two

[objects]

will be important for

of objects from talk of matter, and

latter in satisfying certain intuitions that

cannot otherwise

be reconciled with them. [Markosian (1998a): 226].

However,

MaxCon,

I

not only

am
is it

suspicious about certain applications of this strategy. Given

possible that there be simples of strange shapes and sizes

(imagine a planet-sized simple), but there can be simples of terrific complexity as well.

Not mereological complexity,
rule out the possibility

since simples have no proper parts, but

of a simple exactly occupying a region

filled

MaxCon

does not

with a vast

multitude of stuffs of various kinds. Consider: although persons are not constituted by

continuous

stuffs, surely

such persons are possible provided the arrangement

84

ol the

matter that

fills

the regions occupied by such persons

MaxCon,

functionally integrated. Thus, given

are mereologically simple.

Given our

Suppose

we

earlier discussion,

destroyed (perhaps both are).

by contact

to

it is

safely shake

not clear to

my intuition that

one of these persons

is

at

R just

and y

is

F or

is

that,

their last good-byes.

in case either

(ii)

there

this analysis will

However,

is

(i)

some

R and

in

stuff,

terms of the properties of this

x has a

part, y,

such that y

stuff that constitutes

it is

is

same region of space. What

is

stuff:

located at

R

is F.

allow the MaxConist to avoid the problem of spatial

in a very strict sense, the spatially indexed properties had

object exactly occupies

we

x and some portion of

extended simples are had in virtue of properties had by no things at all?

An

So

31

given a commitment to irreducible

F at region R

that stuff is located at

Adopting

surely, these persons could

appeal to matter or stuff help with responding to the problem of

F

is

is

not destroyed. Perhaps the two persons

appealing to matter or stuff always helps.

can analyze claims of the form x

x

into contact.

not satisfied with the claim that the matter that

Markosian holds

spatial intrinsics?

who

such persons are not destroyed

hands and say ‘good bye’ without also saying

How might an

intrinsics.

at least

what has been a heated philosophical debate;

me that

complex and

two of these simple people come

formerly filled the regions occupied by them
are concluding

suitably

possible that there be persons

should believe that

find that

I

be so strong that

that

it is

is

some region of space. Some matter

the relationship between the matter that

the object that occupies that region?
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by

1

exactly

fills

fills

that

a region and

say that the object just

I

this issue, see

thing-like,

the matter that exactly

McDaniel (2003a).) Matter

can

it

is

fall

as

fills

the region

Markosian conceives

occupies.

it

seems

it

thing-like portions. In order for talk about matter to

we need

to do,

be very

under different kinds, instantiate properties, change position

space, persist through time, and undergo change; moreover, matter always

it

to

do the work

that

(On

comes

in

in

Markosian wants

the resources of quantification over portions of matter.

Why don’t they

count as things ?

However, a thing/stuff dualism
to endorse.

matter

is

is

exactly what the

MaxConist seems compelled

We have seen that the MaxConist is committed to claiming that talk about

not always translatable into talk about things.
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But, if the truth-value of

statements about the persistence through time of matter can vary independently from the
truth-value of statements about the persistence through time of the objects that exactly

occupy the same region
about matter

is

filled

by the matter, then

it

must be

not translatable into talk about things

is

that the reason that talk

that matter

and thing

are

independent ontological categories, irreducible to each other.

It is

this

kind of dualism that was rejected in the introduction. The world

world of things, not a world of stuff and things. So

problem of spatial

One
relation

first

find this

way of dealing

a

with the

intrinsics unacceptable.

However, there are other possible responses
spatial intrinsics.

I

is

Let us

possibility

between an

now turn to

is to

to dealing with the

problem of

them.

claim that the instantiation relation

object, a property,

is

and a place. This strategy

kind of adverbalist strategy discussed and rejected
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actually a three-place

is

analogous

in the introduction.

I

to the

reject

it

as

A better way to

well.

implement

instantiation relations.

one way

in

There

is

this strategy is to

no single

which an object can have a

hold that there are

many

relation of instantiation; there

property.

Some

is

distinct

more than

objects, such as extended

simples, have their properties in a spatial kind of way; other entities,
such as numbers,

have

an aspatial way. Both of these kinds of instantiation relation

their properties in

will

need to be taken as irreducible, since

talk

of instantiation-at-a-region in terms of

location.

So,

on

this view, for

clear that the

it is

MaxConist cannot analyze

‘just plain instantiation’,

each region of space R, there

is

parthood and

a relation instantiates-at-

R? 4
This

is

analogous to the second way of being an adverbalist. And, as before,

main complaint with

this

Fortunately, there

view
is

is that

another

I

do not understand

way

to

could take this claim to be an attribution to

stand

in the

F relation

to R.

Alternatively,

place relation, Fness obtains between
,

a property to C, but

it is

C

mentioning the property that

I

reject this claim as well.

C

understand the claim that

C

is

F

R.

at

We

of a relational property, being such as

we

to

could take this claim to assert that a two-

and R.

On the

On the

a relational property.

that a relation, not a property, obtains

it.

my

first

address the latter option in what follows, although

I

we

are attributing

second account, we are claiming

between C and R.

we mentioned when we

account,

On either account, we are not

said that, at

don’t think

tl,

A has F.

much

turns

I

on

will

this

choice.

Recall our example.

perfect contact.

They

A is red at tl, B

is

blue at

are destroyed at t2 and replaced
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tl

,

and

at t2,

by C. At

t2,

A and B come
nothing

is

into

blue and

nothing

red.

is

relation to R2.

But

C

and

exists,

it

bears the red-at relation to R1 and the
blue-at

35

One worry about
identical to the property

this strategy is that, since the relation

of being

red,

we might worry whether

allowed to give them such similar sounding names.
calling the blue-at relation

by

name, when

that

it is

of being red-at

is

the relationalist

not

is

Why is the relationalist justified

in

not identical to the property of being

blue?

I

do not think

that this is a

major problem for the view.

at plays a role in the laws of nature that

is

property being red, then the relationalist

names. For example, suppose

If the relation

similar to the role that is played by the

justified in giving

is

them similar-sounding

whenever we see a red object

that,

being red

in conditions S,

we

have a particular kind of perceptual experience E. Moreover, whenever we see an
object that

(And

this is

If enough

gives

is

red-at a region while in conditions similar to S,

what explains why

of these similarities

them

C

looks like

exist,

then

similar- sounding names.

it

The

a token of E.

has a red part, even though

it

is

we have

it

does not.)

not unreasonable that the relationalist

relation

and the property behave

in very

similar ways.

The

relationalist’ s strategy is coherent.

understand instantiation, and

objects.

So

I

I

I

think

I

understand

have no problem understanding

relationalist’s strategy requires.

MaxCon from

it

works, since

believe in relations, regions of space, and material

how there

could be relations between a

material object and a region that figure in the laws of nature in the

not save

how

the worry

way

that the

My main worry is that the relationalist’ s
I

raised at the beginning of this section.
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story does

I

Let us distinguish those intrinsic properties that are
qualitative from those that
are,

broadly speaking, geometrical.

An example of a qualitative

property

is

charge an
;

example of a geometrical property

is

being shaped

like

On the

a box.

assumption that

the shape properties of material objects are intrinsic
properties, then there

some

is

change of intrinsic properties whenever two objects come into contact,
since when
occurs, different shape properties

must be some change
instantiated

when two

in

become

which fundamental

objects

come

37

instantiated

.

it is

not obvious that there

qualitative intrinsic properties are

in contact.

Imagine a possible world in which two objects
fundamental qualitative

But

intrinsic properties

that differ with respect to their

approach each other

perfect contact. Let us consider intrinsic properties

A and B

until they stand in

which

are such that

nomologically impossible that they are instantiated by the same object.

I

that

You

described a scenario in which this occurs at the beginning of this section.

it is

can do

this;

Now

consider a possible world in which the laws of nature are such that merely bringing two
objects into perfect contact with one another

instantiation

of a

new fundamental

of a fundamental qualitative

that

you can do

this as well. But, if

Given MaxCon, the

not sufficient to bring about either the

qualitative intrinsic property or the non-instantiation

intrinsic property that

For when the things bearing

A or B.

is

MaxCon

is

was previously

correct, there is

instantiated.

I

think

no such world.

A and B come into contact, there is nothing to bear

original objects that bore

A and B

no longer

exist, since

they have been destroyed by coming into contact with each other. The resultant object

cannot instantiate both of these properties, since, by hypothesis, they are nomologically
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And

incompatible.

these properties cannot be instantiated
without being instantiated by

something!

My intuition that there are possible worlds of the
out by

MaxCon - is

occurs, relations

not satisfied by the claim

that, in the

between objects and regions -

sort just described

relations that figure in laws similar to

none of those worlds
Since

2.4

MaxCon

is

the one that

implies that

are suddenly

not,

it is

was imagining, and

I

I

reject

it is

it

does.
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But

also a possible world.

MaxCon.

Fundamental Accounts of Simplicity
Both of the views

feature of objects.

They

that

I

wish

to discuss here tie simplicity to

some

ultimate

are:

The Instance of a Fundamental Property View of Simples
if

-

grant that this could happen; there are worlds in
which

I

ruled

worlds in which contact

those that governed the properties that are dissipated
by contact
instantiated.

- and

(Instance): x

is

a simple

and only if* instantiates a perfectly natural property. 39

Th-e Independence View of Simples (Independence): x
metaphysically possible that

I

some

will

jc

is

examine Instance

first.

40
.

instantiate the

It is

a simple if and only if it

In order to properly state Instance,

controversial metaphysical machinery.

properties

is

I

I

need

to

if

two things

perfectly natural property, then they are objectively similar in that

respect; duplicates are objects such that there

is

a 1-1 correspondence between their

parts that preserves perfectly natural properties (and perfectly natural relations).

Whether two things

invoke

assume the existence of perfectly natural

these properties that ground objective similarity,

same

is

the only material object that exists.

are objectively similar

interests, desires, beliefs, or classificatory

is

metaphysically independent of our

schemes.

90
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Once we have

the concept of a natural property,

we

can define other useful

concepts. [Lewis (1986): 62-63]. Intrinsic
properties are properties that never
differ

between duplicates;

if

A and B

are duplicates and

A has

intrinsic property F, then so

does B. External relations do not supervene on the
qualitative character of their

however, they do supervene on the qualitative character
of the fusion of the

relata;

relata.

External relations should be contrasted with extrinsic
relations, which do not even

supervene on the qualitative character of the fusion of their
extrinsic relation is ownership.

character of the

owner and

the

An example

Ownership does not supervene simply on the

owned;

instead,

it

of an

qualitative

supervenes on that character taken

along with the various social facts that accompany

The

relata.

it.

perfectly natural properties (and relations) are those that are both
required

and jointly suffice to provide a complete description of the world. [Lewis
(1986):

The

distribution of every other property supervenes

60],

on the distribution of the perfectly

properties (and relations); the perfectly natural properties (and relations) are the minimal

supervenience base of every world.
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Instance ties together the concepts of simplicity and naturalness. According to
Instance, an object is a simple if and only if

There
Recent work

is

an

in the

initial

it

instantiates a perfectly natural property.

worry about Instance

that

want

to

mention and then ignore.

metaphysics of properties has caused a revival of interest

called bundle theories of particulars, according to

properties.

I

There are two natural ways

which

to understand the

in so-

particulars are bundles of

bundling relation:

we

can

identify bundles with sets of properties or with mereological fusions of properties. If

the bundle theory of particulars

is true,

then fundamental particles are not simples.
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Instead, they

have properties as

parts.

The

are the fundamental properties themselves

Instance, but, as

I

said,

I

want

best candidates for being simple on
this view
43

.

This

to table this worry.

is

an interesting worry about

For

we would need

to resolve a long-

standing debate between advocates of the bundle theory of
particulars and defenders of
the substance-attribute

view of particulars

be a task too large for this chapter
Instance

is

in order to address this

for

is

is:

care to include in our ontology,

it

is

also in principle

under what

an entity (of any ontological category) a simple? As

we

This would

45

a theory about the nature of material simples that

any category of entity

44
.

.

capable of answering the fully general Simple question, which

circumstance

worry

I

discussed

makes sense

earlier,

to divide

the entities in that category into those that are simple and those that are complex.

Accordingly,

it

would be

nice to have a unified and fully general account of what

it is

to

be a simple simpliciter. Theories that characterize simples in terms of spatial (or
spatiotemporal) concepts cannot provide a unified account of the nature of all simples.

This

is

because not every entity has

spatial or spatiotemporal features. Similar

remarks

apply to accounts that characterize simples in terms of indivisibility.

However, the concept of having a

natural property

necessarily applies only to material objects, for

it

is

is

not a concept that

possible that there are natural

properties that are had by non-physical objects. For example, certain psychological

properties might be perfectly natural. (In fact,

spirits,

which

are paradigmatic

I

hold that

this is the case.) Cartesian

examples of non-physical objects, could have these

properties. Accordingly, Instance

is

in a better position to
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provide a unified account of

simplicity than spatially based accounts. In this
respect, Instance

based accounts like the Pointy

The main case

View

for Instance

is

or

MaxCon,

obvious,

and the

e.g.,

some

following principle

is

on the properties and

complex material object

spatial relations obtaining

intuition that this kind

or divisibility accounts.

properties of wholes, that there

the shape of a

between those

way of formally

is

parts.

of dependence holds for every
a

superior to spatially

based on the intuition had by many that the

properties of wholes are strongly dependent

proper parts. For

is

is this

relations of their

kind of dependence

is

fixed by the shapes of its parts

But some people have the

intrinsic property

stating this kind

of a whole. The

of dependence:

(PWD): For every object* and all objects ys such that* is the fusion of theys,
all worlds wl and w2, if each of theys has the same intrinsic properties
in wl as it has in w2, and the ys stand in the same relations to each other in wl
as
and for

they do in w2, then * has intrinsic property

PWD,

In other words, given

F in wl

if

and only

if *

has

F in w2 46

a whole cannot enjoy intrinsic variation across possible

worlds unless either one of its proper parts enjoys intrinsic variation across possible
worlds or

its

proper parts change with respect to the relations that they bear to each

other.

I

will

now

My first premise

argue

is

a

that, if you like

Humean principle

PWD,

you have some reason

to the effect that there are

to like Instance.

no necessary

connections between the instantiations of the perfectly natural properties of contingent
47

beings.

y

For example,

if (1)

*

is

not identical withy, (2) * has

are contingently existing material objects

properties, then there

F and y does not have

is

and

(4)

F and y has G,

(3)* and

F and G are perfectly natural

a possible world in which both * and y exist, but in which * has

G.

More

generally, the instantiation of any perfectly natural
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property or relation by contingently
existing beings
instantiation of

is

metaphysically independent of
the

any perfectly natural property or relation
by other contingent beings.

Suppose

that there is a

natural property F.

Because

complex material object x

F is perfectly natural,

its

instantiation

instantiation of other perfectly natural
properties (for the

there

is

a possible world in

properties and stand in the

instantiate F.

proper parts

Since

all

which

same

all

So there

independent of the

reason just given). So

perfectly natural relations, but in

which x does not

F is perfectly natural, F is also an intrinsic property.

have the same perfectly natural properties and stand

intrinsic properties

which x

Humean

is

ofx’s proper parts have the same perfectly
natural

perfectly natural relations to each other,

properties.

that instantiates a perfectly

is

all

differs intrinsically.

in the

same

natural property has led us to the conclusion that

is

all

that a

do

in the actual world, but in

complex object has a

perfectly

PWD is false.

an argument from

instantiating a perfectly natural property

same

ofx’s proper parts have the same

relations as they

So our assumption

So, at the very least, there

in the

ofx’s parts have the same intrinsic

a possible world in which

and stand

Since x’s

is sufficient

PWD for the claim that

for being a simple.

One can

produce an argument for the claim that having a perfectly natural property

is

also

necessary

for being a simple. Its premises are straightforward. First, every object, whether simple

or complex,

must have some

intrinsic property P. Either

intrinsic properties.

P is

itself

Suppose

that a simple

a perfectly natural property, or

it

x has an

supervenes on

the perfectly natural properties and relations had by objects that are not identical with x,

or

P supervenes

on the perfectly natural properties had by x.

If the first disjunct

then x has a perfectly natural property. The second disjunct cannot be true, for
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is true,

if

it

were, then

P would

not be an intrinsic property;

This leaves the third disjunct. Obviously,

P would

if the third disjunct is true,

perfectly natural property. So, if every material
object
properties, then having a perfectly natural
property

we

conjoin these two results,

we

be an extrinsic property. 48

is

then x has a

must have some

intrinsic

necessary for being a simple.

arrive at Instance: an object

is

a simple

if

If

and only

if

it

instantiates a perfectly natural property.

So an
principle

interesting case can be

employed

reason for rejecting

I

think that

in the

am

I

I

I

think this because

I

think that

complex material object who

main

Moreover,

my

some mereologically
Specifically,

I

think

instantiates perfectly natural

hold that certain mental properties, such as having a blue sensation or

perfectly natural properties had

The argument

that

by complex

or, at the

very

least,

a zombie world.

supervene on

objects.

some phenomenal

properties are perfectly natural

reasonably straightforward, but, of course, very controversial. The

is

reject the

PWD.

reject

instantiate perfectly natural properties.

being in pain, are perfectly natural properties,

there

I

possible for mereologically complex objects to instantiate

is

it

a mereologically

properties.

However,

PWD is also a reason for rejecting Instance.

complex objects actually
I

for Instance.

arguments above. Specifically,

perfectly natural properties.

that

made

first

is

premise

is that

A zombie world is a possible world that satisfies the following

conditions: (1) every fundamental particle that exists in the actual world exists in the

zombie world,

(2)

no fundamental

in the actual world, (3)

the actual world as

it

particle exists in the

zombie world

that

does not exist

every fundamental particle has the same intrinsic properties

has in the zombie world, (4) the fundamental particles stand
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in

in the

same external
and

(5)

relations to each other in the

zombie world as they do

nothing experiences episodes of phenomenal
consciousness, such as having a

blue sensation or feeling pain, in the zombie
world
I

seem able

level, but in

to

49
I

which no one enjoys

qualitative experiences.

is

The second premise

know how to

is

argue for this claim;

seems

it

some controversy about whether

These two premises imply

that

intuitive to

it is

true.

PWD is false.

Instance has been undercut. Moreover,

phenomenal properties

just alike at the microscopic

also note that

I

am

are intrinsic properties.

me, although

I

I

do

acknowledge

50

If they are true, the case for

when supplemented with

provide a reason to reject Instance. The third premise
possible, and

(I

premise, because

spirits.)

phenomenal properties

that

is

first

a mereological simple and that there are

no non-physical mereological simples such as Cartesian

that there is

accept the

conceive of a situation in which everything

presupposing that every fundamental particle

not

in the actual world,

is this: if

a third premise, they

zombie worlds

are intrinsic properties, then

are

phenomenal

properties are perfectly natural properties or supervene on perfectly natural properties

had by mereologically complex objects. Since phenomenal properties are had by

complex wholes, these three premises imply

Why believe the third premise?

the falsity of Instance.

Recall that the distribution of every qualitative

property supervenes on the distribution of the perfectly natural properties and relations.

So there can’t be two worlds

some

that differ qualitatively without differing with respect to

perfectly natural property or relation.

qualitatively

from our world. So

property or relation. But

it

it

must

A zombie world is a world that differs

differ

with respect to some perfectly natural

does not differ with respect to any of the perfectly natural
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properties or relations that are instantiated by
the fundamental particles. So
differ with respect to the perfectly natural
properties

So some composite object
is

in the actual

had by some composite

it

must

object.

51

world must have a perfectly natural property

not had by a composite object in the zombie world.

So a composite

actual world has a perfectly natural property. This
state of affairs

is

that

object in the

a counter-example

to Instance.

I

have presupposed that mereologically complex material
objects are the bearers

of phenomenal properties. But one could maintain Instance

The existence of perfectly

natural properties

is

mereological simples that instantiate them. In

if

one rejected

not a problem for Instance

fact,

is

a perfectly natural property, (3) something

if there exist

one could argue for the existence of

simple immaterial substances from the premises that
(1) Instance
pain

this claim.

is in

pain,

and

is true,

(4)

(2) being in

no material simple

instantiates being in pain.

In general, Instance rules out the possibility of genuinely emergent properties.

This

is

a reason to be concerned. Independently of concerns

philosophy of mind,

it

seems

to

me that we

natural properties are instantiated

stemming from

can conceive of situations

by mereologically complex

in

the

which perfectly

Suppose, for

objects.

example, that physicists discover that bodies that appear to be particle-per-particle
duplicates nevertheless behave differently

That

is,

although

present,

in the

presence of a third kind of thing.

A and B have the same sub-atomic structure, when in the presence of a

third object clearly qualitatively different

is

when

whereas effect E2

physicists observe a large

is

from

produced when

A and
B

is

present.

number of instances of this
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B, effect El

is

produced when

Suppose

occurring.

A

that these

From

a microphysical

perspective,

all

of these bodies appear to be duplicates.

something else accounts for the difference
discovered

at the level

reasonable to think that

in their behavior. 52 So, since
nothing yet

of microphysics does, that difference must be a
difference

macrophysical

level.

case, scientists

would be justified

Some

at the

bodies must have a feature that others lack. In
this kind of

macrophysical wholes, not their

A

It is

in postulating natural properties that are

parts. Instance rules this

had by

kind of case out a priori.

second argument against Instance involves the possibility of
co-located

material objects.

The argument

is

as follows: First, as

I

argued in section 2.2, co-

located point-sized material objects are possible. Second, an object

co-located point-sized objects

is itself

composed of two

a point-sized object. This premise

is

obviously

true.

Third, being point-sized

Some

is

a perfectly natural property.

This

is

controversial.

philosophers think of points of space as a kind of logical or mathematical

construction.

On their view,

points of space

may

be identified with sequences of nested

spheres that “approach” them. In other words, on this view, points are limits of regions,
not real parts of space. Accordingly, no material object can exactly occupy them.

this

worry seriously, but

point-sized

is

I

can’t address

it

here.

So

I

will simply

assume

I

take

that being

a possible size for a material object to be and accordingly reject this

reason for denying premise three.

These premises straightforwardly imply
to

have a perfectly natural property. This
Unfortunately,

I

cannot accept

this

that

it

is

possible for a composite object

in turn implies that Instance is false.

argument as

it

stands.

I

will argue in chapter

three that the spatiotemporal properties of material objects are derivative of the
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spatiotemporal properties of the regions of spacetime
they occupy.

being point-sized

is

if this

be rejected,

picture

we

this picture

a perfectly natural property of regions of
spacetime. Objects are

point-sized in virtue of occupying point-sized
regions.

work

On

is

correct.

However, the picture

can comfort ourselves by noting that

The argument just given

itself is controversial,

we have

and

doesn’t

if

it

must

a second argument against

Instance.

A related worry stems from the fact that many, if not all, of the fundamental
properties at the actual world are determinables. 54 For
example, consider mass.

reasonable to think that mass

is

a fundamental property.

body, this table, and the planet have mass. Should

I

However, objects such

conclude then that

all

It is

as

my

of these

things are simples? Clearly not.

Strictly speaking,

I

hold that

it is

the determinates of mass that are the best

candidates for being perfectly natural. So perhaps this worry arises only
all,

of the determinates of mass are perfectly

the fundamental quantities of mass if

are

we

We could call these determinates

natural.

liked.

if some, but not

If the

fundamental quantities of mass

had only by physical simples, whereas the non-perfectly natural determinates of

mass

are

had by complex material

objects, then this particular version

of the objection

would be circumvented.
There are two problems with
are fundamental quantities of

more damaging,

it

seems

mass

this

maneuver.

in this sense.

that this sort of

So

is.

An

electron,

which

is

this

it is

move

not certain whether there

is risky.

maneuver does not work

Consider, for example, charge. Being -1 charged

any

First,

is

in other cases.

a fundamental quantity of charge

arguably a simple, has a charge of -1
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Second, and

.

if

However, consider

.

a negatively charged isotope that has a
charge of -1 because

it

has an extra electron.

It

has a fundamental quantity of charge and
hence instantiates a perfectly natural
property.
This isotope

is

clearly not a simple. 55

way around

Perhaps a
derivatively,

Likewise, in

mass

i.e.,

in virtue

some

sense,

this

problem

is

to claim that the isotope has a charge

of the charge of its parts, and so on for the other

I

inherit the

mass

that

I

have from the mass of my

of-1

quantities.

parts;

my

supervenient upon the mass of these objects, and likewise
for the charge of the

is

We could revise Instance so that

isotope.

Instance*: x

is

a simple

if

it

and only

takes account of this intuition:

if x instantiates

a perfectly natural property

non-derivatively.

However,

to say that

an object has a property derivatively

is

to say that

property in virtue of its parts having that property. So Instance*
violates

there

is

one of the constraints on being an answer
a

way around

this worry, Instance*

would

to the

still

is

it

has the

actually circular;

it

Simple Question. (And, even

if

face the previously discussed

problems.)

Perhaps instead of moving

to Instance*, the friend

of Instance should instead

distinguish the property of having a net charge of -1 from the property of having a

charge of-1

56

An

object has a net charge of -1 just in case the

charge of its proper parts

charge of-1 but

is

it

viable, this kind

that the

is

equal to -1

.

According

sum of the

to this strategy, the isotope has a net

does not have the property of having a charge of-1

of counter-example

quantities of

to Instance fails.

It’s

.

If this strategy

not clear to me, however,

composite object does not have the property of having a charge of -1 as well

as the property of having a net charge of -1

.

So
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I

am

unsure whether

this

move

is

(And even

successful.

if

it is.

Instance

would

face the previously discussed

still

objections.)

This completes

my case

against Instance.

I

will

now

discuss:

The Independence View of Simples (Independence):
x is a simple
metaphysically possible that x is the only material
object that exists.
The idea

that simples

work of D.M. Armstrong

in

can be fully recombined finds

something

(

is

More

a simple, then

that implies that

and only

if itis

clearest statement in the

A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.

Armstrong develops an account of modality
with any other simple.

its

if

In that book,

any simple can coexist

relevantly, the theory developed there implies
that, if

it

is

metaphysically possible for

it

to exist alone.

[Armstrong

1989 ): 37 - 48 61 - 62 ],
,

I

claim

endorse the

that, if

Humean program

something

is

modal metaphysics, so

in

a simple, then

it

material object that exists. However, this

to

all.

Many

is

is

I

will not challenge the

metaphysically possible that

it is

the only

not to say that the claim will be acceptable

philosophers claim that objects have their origins essentially. Suppose that

an electron was created as a result of the big bang. Suppose that the big bang would not

have happened had there not been an

enormous

density. If objects

have

initial singularity, i.e.,

a point-sized object of

their origins essentially, then our electron could not

have existed unless that singularity also existed. But nevertheless the electron

is still

an

excellent candidate for being a simple.

My first worry about Independence is that

it

seems

that

some composite

objects

could satisfy the right hand-side of the biconditional. For consider a composite object

that

could have been a simple.

If this object
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could have been a simple, then

it,

like

other simples, could have been the only material
object in existence. 58 But then
satisfies the right-hand side

Independence

of the biconditional. But, since

it

is

it

not actually a simple.

is false.

The advocate of Independence can avoid

this

worry by revising her view

as

follows:

Independence*: x

is a simple if and only if there is a
possible world w at which
the
only
existing
(1)
material object and (2) x instantiates an intrinsic
property P at the actual world if and only if x instantiates
P at w.

x

is

Independence* avoids the counter-example

that

plagued

its

ancestor. Perhaps a

composite object could have been a simple. But any object has a different

which

character in worlds in

am

I

it

is

a simple than in worlds in which

inclined to think that Independence*

is true.

I

it

is

intrinsic

complex.

think that Independence*

provides necessary and sufficient conditions for being a simple.

My worry is that

Independence* violates the non-circularity requirement on being an answer

Simple Question. Independence* appeals
concept

is

is

to the notion

of an

to the

intrinsic property,

and

this

partly mereological. Recall the definition of “intrinsic property”: a property

intrinsic if

and only

if

it

never differs between duplicates.

Now recall that the

analysis of duplication also appealed to the concept of parthood: x and are duplicates if
y

and only

if there is

natural properties

a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly

and

relations.

So Independence* may provide necessary and

sufficient conditions for being a simple, but

View.

Independence*

59

This completes

my case

against Independence.
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is

consistent with the Brutal

Indivisibility

As

the

indivisibility

name

Accounts of Simplicity

suggests, Indivisibility accounts appeal to
the concept of

when answering

the Simple Question. Markosian
distinguishes

two

accounts, which he calls:

The

Physically Indivisible

View of Simples

physically possible to divide

(PIV): *

is

a simple if and only

if

it is

The (Revised) Metaphysically
and only

if

it

is

Indivisible View of Simples (MIV): x is a simple
not metaphysically possible to divide x without first changing
x’s

intrinsic properties.

not

x.

if

[Markosian (1998a): 220-221]. 60

My first worry about the Indivisibility accounts is that they appear to violate the
non-circularity condition

on being an answer

to the

Simple Question.

It

seems

that the

concept of divisibility cannot be explicated without appealing to mereological
concepts
in the explication.

Consider the following analysis of divisibility.

(Dl): x

is

that (1)

x

and z

discontinuous.

Dl has two

is

composed ofy and

interesting features. First,

proper parts, but

Dl implies

divisible if and only if
is

it

it

(D2): x

is

byy

does not imply that divisible objects have

that divisible objects can survive division.

parts.

Second,

A different account of divisibility

is:

divisible if and only if there are objects

composed of y and z and (2)
by y and z is discontinuous.

D2

possible that there are objects y and z such

does imply that divisible objects possibly have proper

does not have these features

that

it is

z and (2) the union of the regions occupied

it is

y and z such

that (1)

x

is

possible that the union of the regions occupied

implies that divisible objects have proper parts, but

objects can survive division.
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it

does not imply that divisible

Notice that both accounts of divisibility employ mereological
concepts. So any
account of simplicity that employs the concept of divisibility and
then explicates

concept along the lines of D1 or

D2

violates one of the conditions

this

on being an answer

to

the Simple Question by appealing to mereological concepts in the
right-hand side of the

answer.

61

Without a non-circular account of divisibility, the

divisibility accounts are not

competitors to the Brutal View.

Second, the physical

worry stems from the

An

property.

divisible in a

fact that

being physically indivisible seems to be an extrinsic

world with different natural laws. Yet

Suppose
is

that

is

that object

not an extrinsic property.

It is

x and y are duplicates and that x

and yet be physically

may have

the

same

is

provably an

intrinsic

a simple. Since x and y are

a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly

natural properties. But then there

simple.

w

both worlds.

But being a simple

duplicates, there

My primary

account seems to be a non-starter.

object might be physically indivisible in world

intrinsic nature in

property.

divisibility

So simplicity

is

is

a 1-1 correspondence between their parts. So jy

preserved by duplication. So being a simple

is

an

is

a

intrinsic

property.

If

two properties

are necessarily co-extensive, then one of them

property if and only if the other property

extensive.

Then

So

P

Proof, assume

P never differs between duplicates

between duplicates.
duplicates.

is.

if

is intrinsic if

and only

if

Q is intrinsic.
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an

intrinsic

P and Q are necessarily co-

and only

Intrinsic properties are properties that

is

if

Q never differs

never differ between

Since being physically indivisible

an intrinsic property, and since

it

is

an extrinsic property and being a simple

is

impossible for an extrinsic property to be necessarily

co-extensive with an intrinsic property, PIV

I

will

now

Markosian writes

is

is false.

discuss the Revised Metaphysically Indivisible

View of Simples.

about MIV:

this

Unfortunately, [MIV]

is equivalent to the Pointy View of Simples.
For it seems clear
and only pointy objects would satisfy the right-hand side of the biconditional.... Thus the above objections to the Pointy View of Simples
would also

that all

•

apply equally well against this view. [Markosian (1998a): 221],
I

think that this

is

mistaken, although

account of the notion of metaphysical

it

with intuitive grasp of this concept,

I

is

hard to

tell,

we

we do

not have a clear

However, even

divisibility.

think

since

agree that

some

if

we

possible point-sized

objects are metaphysically divisible. Consider a point-sized object that

two other point-sized

objects.

(I

argued that this kind of case

This object seems to be divisible, for

it is

possible for

of space. The Pointy View incorrectly implies that

have

this implication.

MIV

worry

good reasons

in a

for rejecting

to reject

MIV.

second guise. In addition

MIV

I

parts to be in distinct regions

My first worry is that MIV
to appealing to the concept

And this

against

MIV.
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MIV

MIV

is

does not

62

I

think

faces the circularity

of divisibility,

concept

is

MIV

partly

guilty twice-over of

sneaking mereological concepts into the analysis of simplicity.

my case

composed of

possible in section 2.2.)

this object is a simple;

argued in the previous section. So

This completes

is

doesn’t work. Nonetheless,

also appeals to the concept of an intrinsic property.

mereological, as

is

and the Pointy View are not equivalent.

So Markosian’s reason
there are

its

operate only

Arguments Against
I

the Brutal

View of Simp le

have presented a lengthy argument

the fact that

its

for the Brutal

rivals face serious objections. Here,

I

present, discuss, and defeat

arguments against the Brutal View. This will complete
2.6.

View of Simples, based on

my defense of the

Brutal View.

Unacceptably Fragile Simples?

1

In a recent paper titled “Borderline Simple or
Extremely Simple?”, Kathryn

Hawley presents an argument designed
answer

to the Special

Simple Question.

I

to

show

that

anyone who

Composition Question also should

reject a

rejects a

moderate

moderate answer

to the

63

endorse compositional universalism according to which, necessarily,
every

collection of objects

composes a whole. Compositional universalism

answer

to the Special

answer

to the

is

a non-moderate

Composition Question. However, the Brutal View

Simple Question.

If

Hawley’s argument succeeds,

I

will

is

a moderate

have some

reason to abandon one of these views.

Let us say that a moderate answer to the Special Composition Question

answer

to that question that implies that there are situations in

compose a whole and
whole. Similarly,

let

there are situations in

objects are not.

The Brutal View

speaking, the Brutal

right

form

to

some

View

is

is

which some objects do not compose

possible objects are simples and

is

some

a

an answer

possible

a moderate response to the Simple Question; strictly

not an answer to the Simple Question, since

count as an answer. But

possible objects are simples and

an

which some objects

us say that a moderate answer to the Simple Question

to that question that implies that

is

some

it

is

it

is

not of the

nonetheless a view that implies that some

possible objects are not simples.
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64

Many

philosophers reject moderate answers to the
Special Composition

Question because they hold that any such answer will imply
that

it

is

sometimes a vague

matter whether a particular thing exists. Accordingly,
these philosophers endorse an

extreme answer to the Special Composition Question. The
two extreme answers

to the

Special Composition Question are compositional nihilism,
according to which

composition never occurs, and compositional universalism, according
to which any
collection of objects

composes a whole. 65

A third response is to
informative answer.

trivial

answer

deny

According

Composition Question has an

to this response, there is

no

finitely stateable,

Ned Markosian,

is

called the Brutal

[Markosian (1998b)]. The Brutal View of Simples

View of Composition, and was

in fact inspired

by

is

View of Composition.

formally analogous to the Brutal

this latter

view.

In her forthcoming paper, “Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple?”,

argues that anyone

who

rejects a

of concerns about vagueness

moderate answer

in existence

to the

Since

I

should also reject moderate answers to the

View of Composition should

also reject the Brutal

resisted.

is

I

especially worrisome. Fortunately,

will argue first that the

Composition

is

that

anyone who

View of Simples.

accept an extreme answer to the Special Composition Question, namely

compositional universalism, but embrace the Brutal

argument

Hawley

composition question because

Simple Question. [Hawley (forthcoming)]. In a similar vein, she argues
rejects the Brutal

non-

Composition Question. This view, which has been

to the Special

developed and defended by

that the Special

I

View of Simples, Hawley’s

believe that the argument can be

argument presented against the Brutal View of

not persuasive. So, even

if

Hawley
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is

right that

anyone who

rejects the

Brutal

View of Composition

for the reason she gives should also
reject the Brutal

View

of Simples for similar reasons, no one should reject the Brutal
View of Composition

for

these reasons.

The bulk of Hawley’s argument appears

in the following passages:

If simplicity is brute, then there could

be two extremely similar objects
differed in whether or not they had proper parts. If this
seems
objectionable, then, as in the case of composition, it is perhaps

which

because

makes existence seems unbearably
slightly different then
this plurality

its

had been ever so

slightly different, then its

not have existed (other things being equal, that
fragility

it

had been ever so
proper parts just would not have existed, and if
fragile: if this object

is).

sum just would

Prima facie,

this

concern seems to apply symmetrically to brute composition and

to brute simplicity.

[Hawley (forthcoming):

7],

My reconstruction of Hawley’s argument is this:
If the Brutal

(1 )

View of Simples

to be a simple object

is true,

then

it is

and a composite object

possible for there

that are extremely

similar to each other.

It is

(2)

not possible for there to be a simple object and a composite

object that are extremely similar to each other.

So

(3)

the Brutal

Hawley’s argument

The

first

is valid.

issue that arises

View of Simples

is

not true.

Let us turn to the premises.

is that it is

not obvious whether mereological simples

can be extremely similar to mereologically complex objects. The notion of “extreme
similarity” is very fluid. In

some

contexts, one might be willing to say that a rhino

extremely similar to a hippo. In other contexts, one might not be willing

We need

to

understand what standards

we

are to

invoke the notion of extreme similarity.
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is

to say this.

employ when assessing premises

that

1

To

see

how

a mereologically

fluid this notion really can be, consider the
following case. Consider

complex object ol

that is

composed of two mereological

Although the region of space R1 exactly occupied by ol

two proper parts of Ol are very, very close

to

is

simples.

a discontinuous region, the

each other in space. Both parts occupy

open regions of space and are separated by nothing more than a two-dimensional
In short, the distance

space R1 that

Ol

between the two simple

exactly occupies

is

parts of

not continuous.

Ol

is

zero, although the region of

R

is

an almost-spherical region

of space with a radius of one millimeter. Let us say that each of

OFs parts has

of mass and no other interesting features and

Ol

mass

in virtue

of this

Consider

now

region of space R2.

millimeter.

02

02.

R2

is

02

is

has 10 grams of mass and no other perfectly natural properties.

Ol

is

Hawley

it

is

a simple,

think that in

I

are extremely similar.

invoking?

not imply that this case

also does not imply that

views of simples seem

that,

is

two objects

View of Simples does

The Brutal View of Simples

example, MaxCon. Recall

02

a complex object and

willing to say that these

the kind of context that

interestingly, other

case

has 10 grams of

an extended simple that exactly occupies a continuous

Let us note that the Brutal

for

grams

also a spherical region of space with a radius of one

some contexts we would be

impossible.

us also say that

5

fact.

Despite the fact that

Is this

let

plane.

to

imply that

according to

it

possible.

is

is

a simple just in

exactly occupies a maximally continuous matter-filled region of space.

as being extremely similar to each other, the

is

possible. So, if

MaxConist must hold
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More

this case is possible. Consider,

MaxCon, something

implies that the thought experiment just discussed

is

MaxCon

Ol and 02

that

it

is

count

possible for

a simple to be “extremely similar” to a

the

complex

The MaxConist should

object.

argument against the Brutal View of Simples persuasive, since he
must

second premise of the argument,
similarity.

(If

we

if

we

are not invoking the intended notion of extreme similarity,
then

consider the Pointy View according to which an object
,

point-sized. Consider a continuous series of objects,

is

is

enjoys

mass of the objects

millimeter of length, b

1

b,

in the series is a function of

length(x) in millimeters plus 10 A -10.

is

View of Simples,
at least

these positions

is

true of

So premise
at least

(2)

must

Of course,

reject

it is

predecessor,

to

is

a

in

is

point-sized. Let us assume that

length: mass(x) in milligrams

this series.

many of the

=

seems

to

reject

If this is the

premise

(2).

other plausible theories concerning the

be an ineffective weapon against the Brutal
the advocate of MaxCon or the Pointy View.

interpretations of “extreme similarity,” the advocates of

premise (2) as well.

possible that

I

have been employing standards for being

extremely similar that are laxer than those that Hawley employs.

need

it

Accordingly, b enjoys 10 A -10 units of mass.

when wielded by

some reasonable

Let us

such that every object

of the Pointy View of Simples should also

suspect that this

nature of simples.

For on

its

its

extremely similar to some of its predecessors in

case, then the advocate

I

is

(2).

a simple just in case

a

the series is slightly smaller in size and less massive than

extremely small; a

we

is.)

Perhaps the advocates of other theories also should reject premise

Perhaps b

reject the

are invoking the intended notion of extreme

need to be told by Hawley what that standard

the

not find

know what Hawley’s

standards are.
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If this is the case,

we

Why
View must

does Hawley endorse (1)?

say that there

is

some

is

How could rejecting (1)
trouble? Perhaps

she think the friend of the Brutal

pair of possible objects such that, although they are

extremely similar to each other, one

Simples does not imply that (1)

Why does

is

a simple and one

true in

not? The Brutal

is

any straightforward way.

land the friend of the Brutal

Hawley holds

View of Simples

is

the

(ii)

o2

is

the last

(iii)

every element of O

first

member of O,

predecessor in the

is false.

an ordered tuple of

member of O,

ol

LINK

is

O such that:

(i)

Suppose

is true.

is

extremely similar to

its

series.

Suppose the Brutal View of Simples

is true.

We can now derive a contradiction. (We will hold fixed some

“extreme similarity” throughout

true, there are

some

in

the following claim:

(LINK): For any two possible objects ol and o2, there
possible objects

View of

this

argument.) Since the Brutal

possible objects that are simples and

some

Suppose

(1)

interpretation of

View of Simples

is

possible objects that are

complex. Call the possible simple S and the possible complex object C. Given LINK,

there

is

a series of objects beginning with

the series

is

extremely similar to

in the series is a

simple

in the series is a

complex

derived a contradiction.

if

its

and only

S and

terminating with C. Each element in

predecessor. Since

if its

predecessor

object.

But then S

One way

to get out

is

a

is

we

are rejecting (1), an element

a simple. But then every element

complex

of the contradiction
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We have successfully

object.

is

to endorse (1) instead

of rejecting

Perhaps

( 1 ).

this is

Hawley’s rationale

for

(

1 ).

hard to

(It is

tell

from the

text.)

But why endorse LINK? Suppose you have two simples
x and y. x enjoys mass
but has no other perfectly natural properties,

y enjoys

the perfectly natural ninj but has

no other perfectly natural properties. What chain of “extremely similar”
objects could
link

them together?
I

2.6.2

It is

hard to see what

it

could be

like.

conclude that Hawley’s argument against the Brutal View of Simples

fails.

Unknowable Simples?

A commonly told tale
atoms were also atoms

goes something like

in the original sense,

this:

Perhaps there

is

we

Indeed, the history of science
structure.

discovered that atoms are

As Jonathan

We have gone

is

zoo of “elementary

from “the elements”

strings,

particles,” to thinking that

now we

Schaffer writes:

a history of finding ever-deeper
to “the

revealing), to the subatomic electrons, protons,

quarks, and

we

the electrons in the outer-shells surrounding the atom.

further structure yet to be discovered?

is

to think that chemical

mereological simples. But then

i.e.,

discovered that atoms are not mereological simples:

composed of a nucleus and

we used

atoms” (etymology

and neutrons,

hadrons are

to the

of

built out

are sometimes promised that these entities are really

while some hypothesize that the quarks are built out of preons

order to explain

why quarks come

in families).

(in

Should one not expect

the future to be like the past? [Schaffer (2003b): 503].

There are two related worries

View.

First,

might worry

it

seems

that

we

that this picture

seems

to generate for the Brutal

often discover that certain objects are not simple.

that, if the Brutal

View of Simples

is true,

then

we

could not discover

whether these objects were simple. What criterion could we use to rule

is

not a simple if the Brutal

View of Simples

is
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true?

We

that

some

object

Second,

mean
But

it

seems as

if the

search for the fundamental physical
objects, by which

material mereological atoms,

it

is

hard to see

how we

is

one of the large projects

in the history

could hope to succeed in this endeavor

does divide without remainder into mereological atoms -

- even

if the Brutal

I

of physics.

if the

world

View of Simples

is true.

Many answers
consider

actually

Simple Question do not face these worries. For example,

We have discovered that the nucleus of, e.g.,

MaxCon.
some

to the

distance apart from the electron. This

a maximally continuous object.

not a simple. Moreover,

if

we wish

to find out

So MaxCon

MaxCon

that a

hydrogen atom

correctly implies that a hydrogen

can guide us

which objects

means

a hydrogen atom

in

we

not

is

atom

our search for the fundamental

are mereological atoms,

is

is

level:

should find out which

objects are maximally continuous.

Similarly, the Pointy

if

we wish

to find out

which objects

objects are point-sized.

this feature as well.

View can

guide us in our search for the fundamental

are mereological atoms,

Many of the

we

level:

should find out which

other answers to the Simple Question

seem

to

have

Instance, for example, implies that the fundamental physical

objects are also the basic bearers of perfectly natural properties. So, once

those properties on which

all else

supervenes,

we

will

we

discover

have discovered the true atoms of

the world as well.

But
search.

it

seems

How then,

search had

come

that the Brutal

given the Brutal

View of Simples cannot provide any guidance
View of Simples, could we

to a conclusion? Perhaps

the world. But the Brutal

some

know that

our

our

objects really are the true elements of

View of Simples won’t

113

ever

in

tell

us that they are.

How then could

we know

We might be tempted to say that discovering what objects are

that they are?

the actual mereological simples

some

the job of scientists, not philosophers, but
without

idea of what they are looking for,

true that the Brutal

It is

But

is

does not

this

mean

how will

they

View of Simples does

know when

it?

not provide this sort of guidance.

View of Simples

that the Brutal

they have found

is

inconsistent with other

principles that could provide us with aid in our quest to discover the true
atoms of the

world.

As

I

noted in the previous chapter, the Brutal

the existence of necessary conditions

are not both sufficient

View of Simples

on being a simple, provided

and informative. Similarly,

it

is

is

consistent with

that these conditions

consistent with the Brutal

View

of Simples that there are sufficient conditions for being a simple; as long as these
sufficient conditions are not both also necessary

Brutal

View of Simples need
In the next chapter,

I

and informative, the advocate of the

not do without them.

will discuss

one informative necessary condition

for being

a simple: lack of qualitative heterogeneity. This necessary condition eliminates

potential candidates for being simples, but this condition

the Brutal View.

that will aid us

reflect poorly

2,7

It is

possible that

completely consistent with

will be able to discover other conditions as well

with our search. The Brutal View’s failure to do

on

this

work does not

it.

Closing Remarks

The Brutal View
But, if the

why

we

is

they

is

most plausible

fail is that

a

somewhat

unsatisfying answer to the Simple Question.

alternatives to the Brutal

simples per se have no nature.
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View

fail,

a reasonable hypothesis

Many

of the premises employed

rivals are controversial.

And, since the

argument via elimination, the case
I

am aware

chapter

-

that

are not cherished

by

argument

direct

principles

I

View

for the Brutal

is

View

somewhat shaky.

cherish and

is

Specifically

employ throughout

recombination principles conceived in a broadly

an

this

Humean

spirit

-

all.

In the closing

Markosian makes

arguments against the Brutal View’s

for the Brutal

some of the modal

specifically,

in the

remarks of the paper in which he

first

raised the Simple Question,

this observation:

Many of the above reasons in support of MaxCon, as well as the arguments I have
given against MaxCon's rivals, are based on appeals to intuitions about what should
be
said concerning various possible cases. Such "modal intuitions" are notoriously
I understand that many philosophers who read this
paper will not be
arguments, precisely because they do not share my modal intuitions

difficult to defend.

convinced by

my

about the relevant cases. But
of fundamental metaphysical

hope

this

is

common phenomenon,

a

issues,

and

it

especially in discussions

would be a mistake

to expect anything else.

arguments of the paper will nevertheless be valuable even to those who
do not share my modal intuitions. For it can be worthwhile to see what there is to be
I

that the

said for a given view,

and what are the consequences of that view, even

if

one does not

share the intuitions that motivate the view. [Markosian (1998a): 227],

I

do not share Markosian’ s modal

the value of arguments that

them

intuitions.

employ modal

will not persuade those

who do

intuitions.

not share them,

But

I

share his sentiments about

Although arguments employing

it

is

worthwhile

to see

how

far

these views can be pushed.

Second, since the case for the Brutal View

acknowledge the

possibility that

I

have failed

is

an argument via elimination,

I

must

to consider other possible answers to the

Simple Question.

My only defence is that am unable to think of what they might be.

would be happy

someone

Question.

if

I

As Markosian

else

is

able to produce a

new

plausible answer to the Simple

noted, the Simple Question deserves

115

I

more

attention.

Notes

The Simple Question was

first

raised by

Ned Markosian

in

Markosian (1998a).

2

The Special Composition Question was
van Inwagen (1990a).

first

raised by Peter van

The name “Nihilism” was coined by Peter van Inwagen

in

Inwagen

in

van Inwagen (1990)

Strictly speaking, this is a

about the actual world.
etc.,

It is

consequence of Nihilism only given certain facts
a fact about the actual world that, if there are tables, chairs,

then these objects have parts.
5

Friends of extended simples include

McKinnon [McKinnon

(forthcoming)],

Ned Markosian [Markosian (1998a)],
Josh Parsons [Parsons (2000)], Mark Scala

Neil

[Scala (2002)], and Theodore Sider [Sider (forthcoming)].
6

Here

the quote from

Newton’s Opticks that Scala discusses: “It seems
Beginning formed Matter in solid, massy, hard,
impenetrable moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other

probable to

is

me that God

in the

Properties; and in proportion to space, as

most conduced

end for which he formed
them; and as these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any
porous Bodies compounded out of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break in
pieces;

no ordinary Power being able

to divide

to the

what God himself made

in

one

first

creation.”
7

The Brutal View

is

inspired by a related view that answers the Special

Composition Question: the Brutal View of Composition.
see

Markosian (1998b).

I

discuss the Brutal

On this

intriguing position,

View of Composition

in section 2.6.

o
I

9

thank Ben Caplan and Cody Gilmore for helpful discussion on

this point.

Markosian also presents several arguments against the Pointy View

Markosian (1998a): 216-219.
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in

1

MaxCon is the view that Markosian endorses in Markosian
(1998a)
Markosian employs the following definitions in the explication
of his view:
1

Object

.

O

points that

occupies region

lie

R = df R is the

set

containing

all

and only those

within O.

O is spatially continuous iff O occupies a continuous region of space.

2.

3.

R is continuous =d f R is not discontinuous.

4.

R

5.

R and R'

discontinuous

is

of the other

= df R

are separated

is

the union of two non-null separated regions.

= df the

intersection of either

The closure of R — d f the union of R with

6.

R or R'

with the closure

is null.

the set of all

its

boundary

points.

boundary point of R = df every open sphere about p has a non-null
intersection with both R and the complement of R.
a

is

7.

p

8.

R is

an open sphere about p = df the members of R are
some fixed distance from p.

all

and only those

points that are less than

The complement of R = d f the

9.

set

of points in space not in R.

= df x

x

is

a maximally continuous object

there

is

no continuous region of space, R, such

10.

a proper subset of R, and

is

(ii)

is

every point in

a spatially continuous object and
that

(i)

the region occupied by x

R falls within some

object or

other.

Markosian borrows

from [Cartwright 1987], (Richard Cartwright uses
“connected” and “disconnected” instead of “continuous” and “discontinuous.”)
1

More

(2)-(9)

cautiously,

MaxCon does

not imply that there are restrictions on the

shape or size of extended simples. There might be other restrictions on the shape or size

of material objects that are consistent with MaxCon.
12

13

Hudson argues

And

spacetime.
regions are

spacetime
14

this in

Hudson (2001):84-87.

only one of the spatial accounts

is

The Pointy View seems to accurately
simples. MaxCon, on the other hand,

is

continuous,

Markosian

it

is

when applied to regions of
account for when spatiotemporal

plausibly

is

incorrect, for

it

implies that if

one big extended simple.

explicitly states that the question that he is interested in the

question of what makes a

material object a simple. See Markosian (1998a): 214,

footnote 10.
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thank Ryan Wasserman for pressing me on this
point. See [Wasserman
(forthcoming)] where he also discusses this objection.
Markosian acknowledges this
worry, which he credits to Theodore Sider. See Markosian
I

(1998a): 217, footnote 20.

16

Two

points should be stressed. First, co-location in this
sense must be
distinguished from complete mereological overlap. Two
objects completely overlap
each other if and only if the two objects have exactly the same
parts. Second, regions
and material objects form distinct ontological categories. If we drop
this assumption,
the argument from co-location is undercut. There is no way
to make sense of co-located

regions of spacetime.

I

think that this

is

objects to spacetime regions, but others

a reason to reject the reduction of material

may

differ.

thank Carl Matheson for helpful

I

discussion of this point.
17

*

Since

MaxCon

implies that any point-sized material object is a simple, the
possibility of mereologically complex point-sized objects also refutes
MaxCon.
18

For example, David Lewis writes:

Wherever
else

there

is

a charged particle, there the universal of charge, or

one of the topes of charge,

particle itself

universal,
universal.

is.

Indeed,

we can
.

.

.

it

is

is

present.

It is

located there, just as the

part of the particle.

say that the particle

is

...

composed

If there are

partly of

its

several

We can say that the particle consists of its universal

together with something else, something non-recurrent, that gives
particularity.
19

Perhaps

this is a defeasible reason, if conceivability

metaphysical possibility. But, nonetheless,

possibility, see the fine collection

does not

entail

does provide us with (as of yet

it

undefeated) evidence that they are possible.

20

it its

[Lewis (1986a): 64-65].

On

the relation between conceivability and

of papers published in Gendler (2002).

For interesting discussions about

this issue

and the question of whether bosons

violate the Identity of Indiscemibles, see Cortes (1976), Barnette (1978), Ginsberg

(1981), and Teller (1983).
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•

I

Simons

have emphasized the relevant part of the quote;

talks about tropes,

uniformly.

I

whereas

don’t think this

I

also, in the original passage,

have substituted the word “property”

change makes a

difference in this context.
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for “trope”

In response to this argument,

could say that

it is

analytic that

David Robb suggested to me that a Humean
material objects do not interpenetrate;
co-located objects

by definition not material objects. If co-located material
objects are impossible for
this reason, we still need to explain why they
seem to be conceivable. Perhaps what we
are envisioning is what David Robb called phony
matter, non-material objects
are

that

the

same

effects

on our sensory

do material

states as

objects.

I

have

think this suggestion

won’t work, for material object is an ontological category. If
x belongs to an
ontological category C, then x has the intrinsic property being
a C-entity. So every
duplicate of a material object is itself a material object. But our
allegedly co-located
material objects are duplicates of genuine material objects. So they
material objects.

So

it

is

themselves are
not analytic that material objects cannot interpenetrate.

23

F° r defenses of these
148-184, and Lewis (1986).
’

principles, see

Armstrong (1989), Armstrong (1997):

24

Note that, if composition is unrestricted, then we do not need the additional
supposition that the co-located objects are bonded in order to ensure that they form
a
composite object.
25
I

thank Ben Caplan for stressing

I

ignore presentist versions of 3Dism, according to which there

26

index parthood and instantiation to times.

this point.

On presentism

is no need to
and persistence, see Hinchliff

(1996).
27

29

I

owe

I

thank Ted Sider for help with

this suggestion to

Let us assume that both

Hud Hudson.

A and B have a topologically open and a topologically

closed side. Perhaps the open face of A
TO

this section.

comes

into contact with the closed face of B.

•

occupied by A is not a maximally
must have proper parts. Now consider any proper part of A; it also
does not occupy a maximally continuous region, so it also must have proper parts. How
can bringing two simples into contact create an infinity of material objects?

Consider A. Given

continuous region,

31

that the region

it

We might worry that, once the MaxConist accepts arbitrary portions of matter,

the notion of an object
matter. (This

seems

becomes simply an honorific bestowed on

to be

certain portions of

Michael Jubien’s view; see Jubien (1993)

for details.)

So

it is

important to note that the MaxConist holds that matter and material object are different
ontological categories.

A material object, on this view,

that resides in the region

it

occupies.
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is

not identical with the matter

32

SeeMarkosian (1998a): 223-226. Cody Gilmore
argues in Gilmore
(forthcoming) that no plausible account of the nature
of matter can be of use to
MaxConist in solving this problem.
33

the

See Markosian (1998a):225, footnote #27.

34

The advocate of this strategy should probably introduce
polyadic instantiationat-R relations as well, since extended simples can, I
assume, stand in relations to other
objects at various regions as well as have-at-a-region
properties.
Alternatively, the

advocate of this strategy could embrace a multigrade
instantiation-at-a-region relation
This strategy is inspired by Johnston (1987).
35

Recall that, in the case

blueness

I

described, the properties that

are fundamental intrinsic properties.

say that they were really relations

all

along. This

So

it’s

move

every apparent intrinsic property of an extended simple
region. I find this unacceptable.

no

I

called “redness” and

fair for the relationalist to

is

tantamount to saying

is

really just a relation to a

that

36

In fact, I advocate a similar strategy
extended simples from certain objections.
37

Let us say that the shape of an object includes

Accordingly, the size of an object
38
I

which

it

in the next chapter in order to save

am happy

is

all

of its geometrical properties.

a part of its shape.

to grant that there are

worlds in which

this

does happen and

in

happens to extended simples.

39

For the most

part,

I

ignore questions concerning the nature of the properties in

what follows, such as whether the properties
particulars,

i.e.,

tropes.

On the

are repeatable universal or are themselves

issue of tropes vs. universal, see

Lewis (1997b) and

Simons (1994).
40

On naturalness

in

Lewis’s sense, see Lewis (1997a), Lewis (1997b), Lewis

(1986): 60-61, Schaffer (forthcoming), Sider (2001), and Sider (1995).
41

More

generally, since objective similarity also

which a given property
42

is

natural

The fundamental

is

comes

in degrees, the degree to

independent of our beliefs, desires, or

qualitative properties

of the perfectly natural properties.
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I

interests.

discussed in section 2.2 form a subset

43

For arguments that the most plausible versions of the
bundle theory of
which only perfectly properties and relations are
elements

particulars are those in

of the
bundles that constitute particulars, see Armstrong
(1997): 115-1 16 and Lewis (1997b).
A version of the bundle theory that is consistent with Fundamental is develoned in

McDaniel (2001).
44
its

According

to the Substance- Attribute view, there is

properties; there is also the substance in

more to a particular than
which these properties inhere. Ordinary

objects might be identified with the fusions of their properties and
the substances in
which they inhere. Alternatively, one might argue that ordinary objects do
not have
their properties as parts; instead ordinary objects are the substances
that instantiate the
properties.
need not settle this dispute here, for regardless of how

We

it is

need a criterion to determine when a substance
substance. Instance provides this: a substance

is
is

settled,

we

a simple substance or a complex

a simple

if

and only

if

it

instantiates a

fundamental monadic property.
45

For arguments against the bundle theory of particulars, see Armstrong (1997):
96-99 and Hawthorne (2002).
46

47

48

When

I

speak of relations here,

I

mean

external relations.

See Armstrong (1989) and Armstrong (1997).
Since x

is

a simple, any object to which x bears a relation

is

not a proper part

ofx.
49

On

the possibility of zombies, see Chalmers (1996): 94-99.

I

note that the

defender of the irreducibility of phenomenal properties to physical properties need not

embrace a form of panpsychism, according to which
phenomenal properties supervene on proto-psychical properties. For more on this
reject Instance, if she is willing to

Chalmers (1996): 26-127.

interesting issue, see
50

51

respect to
the

On

this issue, see

Merricks (2003) and Sider (2003).

Strictly speaking, there is another alternative: the

some

worlds

may

differ

with

perfectly natural relation instantiated by composite objects, upon which

phenomenal properties supervene. These composite objects would have

to

be parts

of the objects that have the phenomenal properties on pain of these properties being
extrinsic.

Instance.

On

this alternative,

However,

will not be

I

zombie worlds do not provide a counter-example

suspect that

tempted by

anyone who

this alternative.
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to

takes the possibility of zombies seriously

Although perhaps we are not required

An

to think this.

_

explanation

that the laws of nature at this

is

Hardin for bringing

my attention). Of course, we are

this point to

alternative

world are indeterministic.

(I

CL

thank

not required to think

My point is that there are possible situations in which one is justified in

this either.

positing genuinely emergent properties.
53

Suppose the advocate of Instance

the reason just described.

Then

rejects the third

the advocate of Instance

premise of my argument

must hold

that either (1

)

for

no

perfectly natural properties are instantiated or (2) there are extended simples.
If a
perfectly natural property is instantiated in a world without points, then it is

instantiated

by an extended object. Either
parts, then Instance is false.

instantiated,
54

parts, or

it

does not.

If

So, given Instance, if a perfectly natural property

instantiated

it

has

is

by an extended simple.

thank Jonathan Schaffer for the following argument.

1

55

must be

it

extended object has

that

A third worry is that this move seems to violate an intuitive principle

governing determinates and determinables:
determinable only
56
I

57

owe

if

p

p and q are determinates of the same
and q are equally natural properties.

this suggestion to Phillip Bricker.

Markosian discusses the inverse of this,

specifically, the possibility that a

simple become a composite in Markosian (1998a): 221. Admittedly,

it

is

controversial

whether these alleged possibilities are genuine. For example, mereological
will deny that these possibilities are genuine.

essentialists

ro
I

assume here a modal

59

worthwhile

It is

Independence

to see a

second attempt

according to which an object

**,

possible world

logic at least as strong as S4.

w

at

which

(1)

x

is

P at the actual world
me by Ben Caplan.)

to

to salvage

is

if

and only ifx instantiates

Since the concept of a perfectly natural property

Independence**

is

Independence. Consider

a simple if and only if there

is

a

the only existing material object and (2) x instantiates

a perfectly natural

was suggested

jc

not circular. However,

I

think

we

is

P at w.

(This version

not a mereological concept,

can construct a possible

counterexample to Independence**. Consider a possible world w in which a composite
object o does not instantiate any perfectly natural properties. Suppose that o could have
been a simple such that for any property p it instantiates, there is a property q such
In such a world, o does not instantiate a perfectly natural
is more natural than p.
case is possible, then Independence** implies that o is
such
a
If
property either.
actually a simple,
60

which

that

is false.

Markosian also discusses an unrevised version of MIV; since

argument he makes against

it is

sound,

I

will not discuss

122

it

here.

I

believe the

q

61

Perhaps

we

could appeal to the concept of matter when
giving an account of
divisibility. (Markosian argues that the MaxConist
needs to appeal to the persistence of
matter in order to account for the qualitative heterogeneity
of extended simples in
Markosian (1998a): 223-226. Perhaps the advocate of the
indivisibility accounts should
as well.) Consider the following account of divisibility:

M such

(DM): x is divisible if and only if there is some matter
up” x and it is possible that
occupies a discontinuous

M

I

reject

DM because

I

hold that talk about matter

McDaniel (2003a) and the

Introduction.

DM

that

M “makes

region.

reducible to talk about things; see
either collapses to D1 or D2, or
is
is

DM

incoherent.
62

and only
63

64

This example also shows that
if

it

is

extended

it

is

not the case that something

is

divisible if

in space.

See Hawley (forthcoming).

Suppose

that, necessarily,

every object

is

a simple.

Then

there

is

a finitely

and non-trivial answer to the Simple Question: necessarily, x is a simple iff x
Suppose that, necessarily, no object is a simple. Then there is a finitely stateble

stateable
exists.

and non-trivial answer to the Simple Question: necessarily, x is a simple iff x is not selfidentical. The Brutal View of Simples says that there is no finitely stateable and nontrivial answer to the Simple Question, and hence implies that some possible objects are
simples and
65

some

possible objects are not simples.

See Rosen (2003) for a defense of compositional nihilism.

123

CHAPTER 3
A DEFENSE OF EXTENDED SIMPLES
An

extended simple

is

an object that occupies a larger than point-sized

connected region of space (or spacetime) and yet has no proper

we

1

Here

parts.

I

argue that

should take the possibility of extended simples seriously,
identify three challenges

advocate of extended simples faces, and present a solution that
dissolves each

that the

of the three challenges.

The
object

three challenges are as follows. First, there

must have

parts.

Second, there

is

is

the worry that any extended

the worry that, if extended and yet simple

material objects are possible, then extended and yet simple regions of space are
also
possible. Finally, there

is

the worry that, if extended simples are possible, then a

plausible principle of recombination

is

subject to counter-examples.

I

discuss in detail

these challenges in section 3.2.

Although these challenges are

distinct,

I

believe they can be met by a single

solution. Briefly, the solution involves distinguishing

intrinsic

and extrinsic shapes. The solution

simples are extrinsic.

I

is

two kinds of shape

properties:

to hold that the shapes of extended

present this solution in section 3.3 and apply

it

in sections 3.4-

3.6.

3.1

Extended Simples

Why

worry about the possibility of extended simples?

about the possibility of extended simples

article,

Mark

is

First,

speculation

not confined to philosophy. In a recent

Scala presents some evidence that Isaac

124

Newton

believed that the

fundamental objects of this world are extended simples.
Here

Newton’s Opticks

is

the quotation from

that Scala discusses:

to me that God in the Beginning formed
Matter in solid
massy, hard, impenetrable moveable Particles, of such
Sizes and Figures, and
with such other Properties; and in proportion to space,
as most conduced to the
end for which he formed them; and as these primitive Particles
being Solids, are
incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded
out of them; even so
very hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary
Power being able to
divide what God himself made in one first creation. [Scala
(2002):
It

seems probable

394],

And, more

recently, in a popular

book on

string theory, the physicist Brian

Greene

seriously entertains this hypothesis as well:

What

are strings

made

First, strings are truly

of? There are two possible answers to this question.
fundamental — they are atoms,” uncuttable constituents,

in the truest sense of the ancient Greeks. As the absolute smallest
constituents
of everything, they represent the end of the line.... From this perspective, even
though strings have spatial extent, the question of their composition is without

any content. Were strings

to be made of something smaller, they would not be
fundamental. [Greene (1999): 141].

So extended simples have played a
might once again play such a

role.

role in a

fundamental physical theory and

Surely, if something plays a role in a fundamental

physical theory, that provides a (possibly defeasible) reason to think that

metaphysically possible. Although

world

is

Newtonian, the

we no

it

is

longer believe that the spacetime of the actual

fact that absolute simultaneity

played a key role in previous

physics certainly provides us with evidence that there are possible worlds in which
absolute simultaneity

actual world

is

really

is

well defined.

Even

if

we were

to discover

tomorrow

that the

governed by causally deterministic laws, we would not relinquish

the claim that an indeterministic world

is

a real metaphysical possibility.

The

fact that

extended simples have been taken seriously by the theories of fundamental physics
likewise provides a (possibly defeasible) reason to believe that they are possible.
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Second, certain philosophical theories about the nature
of simples imply the
possibility of extended simples, and other theories about
the nature of simples at least

do not eliminate

An example of the

this possibility.

first

kind of theory

Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon), according
simple

if

and only

if

it fills

a continuous region of space that

of a larger continuous matter-filled region of space.

to

is

MaxCon

is

the

which an object

is

a

not a proper sub-region

implies that extended

simples are possible, since continuous matter-filled regions of space (that
are not
subregions of some larger continuous matter-filled region of space) are clearly
possible.

An example
which there

of the second kind of theory
is

no non-mereological

is

the Brutal View

of Simples, according

criterion for being a simple.

not entail that extended simples are possible, but

it

to

The Brutal View does

does not eliminate

this possibility

either.

Third, embracing the possibility of extended simples allows the advocate of

endurantism to save the analogy between space and time. [Parsons (2000)]. The
endurantist thinks that objects persist through time by being wholly present

moment
space

they occupy. However, the endurantist also holds that objects

(at

If objects

each

regions of

a time) by having parts that occupy (at a time) the subregions of those regions.

can be wholly present

wholly present

and time

fill

at

is

at different

at different times,

spaces

greatly weakened.

(at the

The way

same

but

it

is

not possible for them to be

time), then the analogy between space

objects can occupy space

from the way objects can occupy time.
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is

radically different

One conception of extended

simples - the Parsonian Conception - holds
that

extended simples are objects that are wholly present across
different regions of space

Here

is

a formal definition of a Parsonian Simple:

x

On this

is

a Parsonian extended simple =df.

R such

that for

and

x has no proper

(ii)

some

R

rs,

(i) there is an extended continuous
region
the fusion of the rs and x occupies each of the
rs,

is

parts.

conception of extended simples, the analogy between space and time holds.

extended simples are possible, then

it is

If

possible that objects be wholly present across

space as well as time. Parsonian extended simples
series

2
.

fill

extended regions by occupying a

of subregions of those regions.

There

is

another reason that endurantists should be sympathetic towards

extended simples: some enduring objects are spatiotemporally extended simples.

Consider an enduring point-particle

3
.

It

cuts a path through spacetime. This path

extended. Since the particle occupies an extended region of spacetime,
simple. Admittedly, this region

endurantist grants that

is

composed of timelike separated

some simples

it is

is

an extended

points. But, once the

are extended in spacetime, she will have a hard

time arguing against the possibility of extended simples that occupy regions composed

of spacelike separated points.

One reason

is

that granting the possibility of extended simples that occupy one

kind of spacetime region, namely, those that are composed of spacetime points

that are

timelike separated, but denying that extended simples can occupy spacetime regions

that are

composed of spacelike separated

restriction

why

points involves accepting an unmotivated

of a very attractive principle of recombination.

this is so.
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I

will

now briefly explain

Material occupants and regions are

members of different

ontological categories,

but they can bear one important and special relation to each other: the
occupation

This relation

relation.

categories.

It is

is

an irreducible relation

endurantism

also, if

is true,

a

that links objects

one-many

relation:

of distinct ontological

one object can

occupy many regions of spacetime.
a plausible hypothesis that spacetime points have the same intrinsic

It is

character.

4

In that case,

any two regions of spacetime

properties (such as size and shape) have the

world

in

which enduring objects

Suppose a point-sized object o
region these points

compose

is

is

same

persist through a

wholly present

that

have the same

intrinsic character.

structural

Consider

homogenous Newtonian

at

spacetime points rl through

a continuous region of spacetime, which

is

region R. Consider

now

a region

R

’

that is intrinsically just like

extended in one of the spatial dimensions and unextended
Since

(i)

R and

o can be wholly present

(iii)

’,

the occupation relation

conclude that
parts of

R

6
’.

at the

(iv)

it is

is

various parts of R,

in the

(ii)

R

R

but

The

r2.

extended
5

is

in

Let us call

instead

temporal dimension.

is intrinsically just like

a fundamental external relation,

we

metaphysically possible for o to be wholly present

But then Parsonian extended simples

a

spacetime.

the “temporal” dimension but unextended in the three “spatial” dimensions.

this

now

should

at the various

are possible.

A third reason to believe in the possibility of Parsonian extended simples stems
from considerations involving time
persists

by enduring from

tl to t2.

travel.

At

t2,

Consider a time-traveling point-particle

o enters a time-machine, which returns o

but in a different spatial location, o time-travels in this fashion

tl,

the union of the spatial regions occupied by o
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is

continuous.

“many times”
7

o.

o

to tl

so that, at

Let us call this

.

continuous region R. At

o

tl,

is

a Parsonian extended simple. So, if the endurantist

accepts the possibility of time-travel, then she should accept the possibility
of Parsonian

extended simples.

I

do not think that the only kind of extended simples

Parsonian ones.

I

also wish to defend the possibility of extended simples that are spread

out in space without enjoying multi-location.

the regions they occupy.

that singleton sets

that are possible are

David Lewis

might be

this sort

8

Such extended simples would dominate

entertains (but does not endorse) the hypothesis

of extended simple.

Perhaps, indeed, every singleton

is

just

He

writes:

where

member

its

is.

Since

members of singletons occupy extended

spatiotemporal regions, and

singletons are atoms, that would have to

mean

that

something can

occupy an extended spatiotemporal region otherwise than by having
parts that occupy different parts of the region, and that would certainly
be peculiar. But not more peculiar, I think, than being nowhere at all.

.

[Lewis (1991): 32].

And

later in the

same book, Lewis

writes:

Finally, if something occupies a region,

mereology per se does not

demand that each part of the occupied region must be occupied by some
part - proper or improper - of the occupying thing. If not, that’s a
second way for a singleton atom to be where its extended member is.
[Lewis (1991): 76],

I

will call simples

of this type toughies, and offer the following definition of them:

x dominates

R just

in case

(i)

x occupies R,

some proper sub-region of R, and

(iii)

(ii) it is

not the case that x occupies

no proper part of x occupies a proper

part

of R.
x

is

toughie =df. There

is

an extended continuous region

R

such that x dominates

R.

I

think the arguments

I

advance

in this paper provide a defense

extended simples.
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of both kinds of

12

Three Puzzles Involving Extended Simp les

There are good reasons

to believe that

extended simples are possible

Nonetheless, there are three challenges that the advocate of
extended simples must face.
3.2.1

First

The

Puzzle
history of philosophy has not been kind to extended
simples.

argument, or something very similar to

it,

that leads

many philosophers

It is

this

to reject the

possibility of extended simples:

(

1

If there

)

If

(2)

it

were an extended simple, then

it

would have two

had two halves, then the simple would have proper

halves.

parts.

Hence, there can’t be any extended simples. 9
Let us understand (2) so that

halves in such a

way

it

is

analytically true. That

is, let

us understand talk about

that a half of an object is literally a part of that object. If we

understand (2) in this fashion, the main premise in the argument
said in

its

What can be

defense?

Let us note that (1)

Moreover, (1)
set

is (1).

is

is

neither an

not analytic.

It is

no contradiction

to

axiom of standard mereology, nor does

of axioms of standard mereology.

A

deny premise

it

(1).

follow from any

defense of (1) must appeal to principles that go

beyond the province of pure mereology.

One way of arguing
entails (1).

The

for (1) is via an appeal to a

principle that

I

have in mind

is

more general

the Doctrine

principle that

ofArbitrary Undetached

Parts (DAUP):

(DAUP):

Necessarily, for every material object

occupied by M, and

if

sub-R

is

exists a material object that occupies the region

M

M,

if

R is the region of space

any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there

10
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sub-R and which

is

a part of

But simply appealing to
possibility of

DAUP will not settle the issue.

extended simples will simply

reject

For the defender of the

DAUP. And then we

will

have

reached an argumentative stalemate. In order to prevent this from happening,
important to

first

determine what can be said

order to prevent argumentative gridlock,

is

in

defense of DAUP.

to figure out if the

3.3.3

is

the

first

step, in

advocate of extended

DAUP without begging the

simples can reasonably reject some part of the case for
question. This

The next

it is

challenge facing the defended of extended simples.

Second Puzzle

The second puzzle facing
possibility

the advocate of extended simples concerns the

of simple yet extended regions of space. In order to see that

worry for the advocate of extended simples, we need

to first see

this

what the

a genuine

possibility of

extended simples implies about the nature of space.

I

believe that an advocate of extended simples ought to embrace a view about

space called substantivalism. Substantivalism

is

the conjunction of the following

theses:

(1)

There exist

spatial points

and

11

spatial regions.
i 'y

(2) Points are particulars, not properties.

Points are simples, not

mereologically complex wholes.
(3) Points or regions are not reducible to constructions

made

out of their actual

or possible occupants. So, for example, points or regions are not
propositions, sets, ordered tuples, or possibilities of location. (Forbes 1987).

(4)

Regions are mereological fusions of points.

(5)

The

structural features of a region, such as
•

13

the region.
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its

shape, are intrinsic features of

I

assume

that the advocate of extended simples will

points, lines, or surfaces lying

want

to talk

about the

on or within extended simples. Moreover,

the advocate

of extended simples will want to provide an account of continuity,
spatial
connectedness, and other geometrical or topological features that extended
simples can
have. If the advocate of extended simples has a sufficient
in her ontology, she

number of point-sized

can provide the standard accounts of these concepts. For example,

the advocate of extended simples can say that an extended simple

only

if

it

objects

is

continuous

if

and

occupies a continuous region of space, where the concept of a continuous

region of space

is

for the advocate

cashed out in the standard way

of extended simples

Given substantivalism, what

to

is

14
.

This provides an excellent reason

embrace substantivalism

15
.

the status of the material contents of spatial

regions? There are two possible answers. Either material objects are identical to the
regions that they occupy or material objects are distinct from the regions of space they

occupy. Let us call the

latter

view the container view. Worlds

extended simples must be worlds

assume

that there exists

occupied by Big

Ed

at

which the container view

an extended simple, which

has proper parts, since

regions are fusions of points. But Big

be identical to the region

at

space that they occupy

is

Ed does

which Big Ed

extended simples are possible, then

it

we

I

which

is true.

there exist

To

see this,

let

us

dub “Big Ed.” The region

an extended region and extended
not have proper parts, so Big

exists.

An interesting conclusion!

Ed cannot
If

cannot identify these simples with the regions of

16
.

So the advocate of extended simples has a reason
and a reason

at

to believe that regions

to believe in regions

of space and occupants of regions form
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of space

distinct

ontological categories. But then the question facing the advocate
of extended simples
pressing:

why

is

not also endorse the possibility of extended yet simple
regions of space?

This challenge

is

especially worrying, since the advocate of extended
simples could

undercut the argument just given by accepting that extended yet simple
regions of space
are possible.

seems

It

that

that

extended yet simple regions of space are absurd. But

extended yet simple material objects are strange. Once

entity

- extended

yet simple material objects

require us to let in the other kind

is

- extended

-

we

let

it

also

seems

one kind of crazy

in our ontology, doesn’t consistency

-

yet simple regions of space

as well? This

the second challenge facing advocates of extended simples.

3.2.3

Third Puzzle
Material occupants and regions are

members of different

ontological categories,

but they can bear one important and special relation to each other: the occupation

relation.

it

is

The occupation

relation has

external. Natural properties

two

interesting features:

it

is

perfectly natural and

and relations are ontologically basic

in this sense: the

pattern of instantiation of the perfectly natural properties and relations determines the

pattern of instantiation of every other qualitative property and relation.

The notion of

naturalness can be used to define other interesting concepts: objects are intrinsic

duplicates if and only if there

is

a one-to-one correspondence between their parts that

preserves perfectly natural properties and relations; a property

it

never differs between duplicates.

intrinsic.)

17

(A property

is

is

intrinsic if and only if

extrinsic just in case

it is

not

External relations do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the things
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they relate; however, they do supervene on the intrinsic properties of the whole

composed of the things they
The occupation
relata.

the

relate.

relation does not supervene

Consider an occupant

on the

intrinsic properties

O and the region R that O occupies.

same shape; but so do many other regions besides

and topologically and metrically homogenous, then there will be
that are duplicates

of R and hence have the same

O and R have

Both

R. If space

is

of its

extended

infinitely

infinitely

intrinsic properties as R.

many
But

regions

O does

not occupy those regions as well as R.

However, although the occupation
properties of

its relata, it is

its relata.

simple to occupy a single point of space,

is,

point.

it

necessarily, if something

Given

is

i.e.,

For
to

it is

intrinsic

relata,

impossible for an extended

be completely there and nowhere

an extended simple, then

it

else.

does not occupy a single

that the occupation relation is a fundamental external relation,

be constrained by the intrinsic properties of its relata in

The

on the

constrained by some of the properties of its

specifically the shape properties of

That

relation does not supervene

how

could

this fashion?

principle that any material simple can occupy any simple region of space

extremely compelling. If extended simples are not possible, then this principle

from counter-example. However,
this principle

must be

it

appears that,

if

plausible recombination principle seems to be false. This
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free

extended simples are possible, then

restricted. So, if extended simples are possible, then

advocate of extended simples.

is

is

is

an intuitively

the third puzzle facing the

M

A

Solution to the Puzzles: the Extrinsic Theory of Shap p

Although these challenges

are distinct,

I

believe that a single solution suffices
to

defeat each of them. Briefly, the solution involves distinguishing
two kinds of shape
properties: intrinsic

and extrinsic shapes. The solution requires saying the shapes
of

extended simples are extrinsic.

Allow

to

me

to clarify

what

I

mean by

‘shape’.

I

of those features of an object that are determined by

its

metrical features. Accordingly, the size of an object

is

use ‘shape’ to refer to the sum

topological, geometrical, and

a part of

its

shape. Given this

admittedly somewhat non-standard definition of ‘shape’, two cubical regions of

Euclidean space that differ only with respect to their volumes have different shapes.

However, given

this definition

symmetrical

and right hands, have the same shape. Whether an object

right

hand

left

of ‘shape’, incongruent counterparts, such as perfectly

is

a

left

or

not determined solely by the topological, geometrical, or metrical

is

properties of that object, but
i

rather determined

is

by those properties and the

relations

it

o

bears to other things.

The

intrinsic

shape of an object

independently of any relations

of the object.

it

the theory that

Intrinsic

Theory

The
is so.

all

What

it

an

Its

shape

intrinsic shape, then its

bears to a region of space that

shape properties of material objects are

is

an

intrinsic property

shape

it

itself,

is

metaphysically

occupies. Let us call

intrinsic properties the

(IT).

Intrinsic

is

the shape that an object has in

bears to other things.

If a material object has

independent of the relation that

is

Theory seems obvious

obvious

is

to

that material objects
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many

19
.

But

it

is

not clear to

me why this

have shape properties. But why believe

that the

shape properties of material objects are

intrinsic properties?

Perhaps instead

material objects inherit their shapes from the regions of
space that they occupy. Let us
call the

hypothesis that the shape of a region of space

an intrinsic property of that

is

region, whereas the shape of a material occupant of that region

is

an extrinsic property

the Extrinsic Theory (ET). According to the Extrinsic Theory, a
material object has

shape in virtue of the fact that
shape.

bears the occupation relation to a region with that

it

The shape of a material

is

on

object,

of the relations the object bears to other
has a shape

entities.

constituted by the fact that

For the sake of completeness,
theory, according to

I

what follows. There

and regions.

Rather, the fact that material object

no material object has a shape.

mention a third option, the superimposition

is

I

an even more outlandish option: shape

may seem

intrinsic,

whereas the

do not discuss the superimposition theory

But then whence comes shape?

is

not metaphysically independent

which the shape properties of an occupant are

Extrinsic Theory

material object

is

bears a relation to a region of space that has

it

shape properties of a region are extrinsic.

The

view,

this

In a world without substantival space,

that shape.

I

is

in

extrinsic to occupants

will ignore this theory as well.

strange since

it

implies that the shape of a

actually an extrinsic, derivative feature of that object. However, there

are precedents for this position. Ignore worries about extended simples for a

and consider the various distance relations
objects.

its

Graham Nerlich has

that obtain

between point-sized material

recently argued that the spatial relations that obtain

between material objects obtain

in virtue

of the spatial relations that obtain between the

regions they occupy. [Nerlich (1994): 19-43]. If this

relations obtaining

moment

is

between these material objects are
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the case, then the distance

extrinsic,

i.e.,

they depend on the

properties of objects other than the relata of the relation. 23
This in turn entails that the

shape of the fusion of the point-sized occupants

an extrinsic property of that fusion. 24

is

This does not yet give us the extrinsic theory, since

it is

position that the property of being point-sized

intrinsic property

objects.

But

an

certainly takes us a large step closer to ET, since,

it

of any composite material object
Similarly,

accommodate

is

consistent with Nerlich’s

is

on

of material

this view, the

shape

an extrinsic property.

Theodore Sider has claimed

that in order for the endurantist to

special relativity, “the endurantist should say that spatiotemporal

relations hold primarily

between points of spacetime. Fundamental

in spatiotemporal relations derivatively

particles then stand

by occupying points of spacetime

those relations.” [Sider (2001): 81]. This

is

Finally, if we adopt the Parsonian

that stand in

a version of the Extrinsic Theory. 25

Conception of extended simples, we might be

required to endorse ET. Recall that, according to the Parsonian Conception, extended

simples are objects that are wholly present

at multiple spatial regions.

In short,

extended simples enjoy multi-location. But any advocate of multiply located objects
should embrace something like the extrinsic theory. For the friends of multi-located
objects face the

something

Paradox of Multi-Location, which

is

best solved by appealing to

like the Extrinsic Theory.

In a recent paper, Stephen Barker and Phil

impossible.

26

Dowe

argue that multi-location

An object enjoys multi-location just in case

than one (distinct) space-time region.

located objects

is

endurautism, which

it is

One popular view that
is

wholly present

is

committed

at

is

more

to multi-

the doctrine that objects persist through time by
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being wholly present

endurantism

Here

is in

at

27

So, if Barker and

.

Dowe

are right,

big trouble.

a brief

is

each time they are located

summary of Barker and Dowe

s

argument. Endurantists say that

enduring objects are not extended in time, which suggests that they are three-

dimensional entities

28
.

Consider an enduring object

O that is wholly present at each

three-dimensional spacelike hyperplane of spacetime region R. So, for each such

occupies

for

any

r

r.

c

So
R,

O completely fills a four-dimensional region of spacetime.

O has a part at r.

But then

O is actually a four-dimensional entity.

geometrical, and metrical properties.

object’s shape. Barker and

is

the

sum of that

An object’s

O

Moreover,

nothing can be both three-dimensional and four-dimensional. So endurantism
Recall that the shape of an object

r,

But

is false.

object’s topological,

dimensionality

is

Dowe’s argument can be thought of as

one

part

of an

instance of a

more

general problem, the problem of determining what the shape of a multi-located object

is.

For example, Barker and

Dowe

physical contact with himself.

enjoys spatial bi-location?

The

What

consider an enduring time-traveler

is

the shape of this person at that

endurantist should respond to Barker and

First,

an object can have an

Second, an object can have an extrinsic shape.

it

has that shape in virtue of the

spacetime. Arguably, standard endurantism

and

to

is

moment?

Dowe’s paradox by

object has a shape intrinsically if it has that shape in virtue of the

extrinsically if

in

How big is this person at the moment at which he

between two kinds of shape properties.

itself.

who comes

intrinsic shape.

way

An object has

way that

it

committed

distinguishing

that object

is in

a shape

relates to regions of

to spacetime substantivalism,

claiming that enduring objects are not identical to the regions of spacetime
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An

that

s

they occupy.

30

So standard endurantism

categories: spatiotemporal regions

committed

is

two ontological

to at least

and enduring objects

occupy those

that

Objects and regions are brought together by the occupation relation.

have a shape extrinsically

in virtue

Suppose
intrinsic

shape

that

the intrinsic shape of the region

is

it fills.

that

is

object can

of occupying a region of spacetime that has

shape intrinsically. The extrinsic shape of an object

of spacetime that

An

regions.

O is an enduring solid ball.

spherical.

What shape

What shape

O extrinsically ?

is

is

O intrinsically ?

Since

O occupies a

successive series of spherical regions of spacetime, the region of spacetime that
is

not spherical. Instead, the shape of the region of spacetime filled by

dimensional analogue of a cylinder. This

is

not spherical. But no contradiction

differs

is

O’

O fills

O is the four-

O’s extrinsic shape. So O’ s extrinsic shape

is

entailed by the fact that O’s intrinsic shape

from O’s extrinsic shape. Nothing can have two

different intrinsic shapes, but

O

does not have two different intrinsic shapes.

Consider two persisting solid balls 01 and
exist,

01 and 02

same

properties at any time that

01

it

persists

is

present,

from

There

is

02’ s

02

i.e.

tl to t3,

enjoys a longer lifespan than 01, but given

duplicates;

such

differs intrinsically

that, at

assume

are qualitatively indiscernible. Let us

change. Suppose that

should think that

02

each time

that

that they

each object has the

neither object undergoes qualitative

whereas

how I have

02

set

from 01. Ol and

persists

up the

02

from

case,

tl to t4.

02

no endurantist

are qualitative

lasting longer than 07is an extrinsic difference, not an intrinsic one.

a sense in

which Ol and 02 have a

different shape; this
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is

because they differ

with respect to their extrinsic shapes. But
the

same

intrinsic shape; both

Ol and 02

we can

still

say, if

we

wish, that they have

are intrinsically three-dimensional spheres.

Since claiming that the shapes of extended simples are extrinsic
properties

unprecedented or unreasonable,
simples to

make

if

it

this is

an acceptable

move

not

is

for the advocate of extended

helps solve the puzzles confronting the advocate of extended

simples.

How the

3.4

Extrinsic Theory Solves the First Puzzle

Recall that, in order to avoid an argumentative deadlock,

DAUP.

to believe

argument for
call the

I

think an interesting argument for

DAUP has two premises.

The

first

DAUP can be made.

premise

is

reason

The

a general principle that

I

Principle of Qualitative Variation (PQV):

(PQV):For any object x, regions R+, Rl, and R2, and
F2, if (i) x occupies R+,

subregions of R+,

Rl and
,

(v)

such that

x

(a)

(iii)

xl

is

Informally,

PQV

its

FI

it

(c)

are non-overlapping proper

F2

at R2, then there are

two objects xl and x2

xl instantiates FI and x2 instantiates F2.

whenever an object has

Here

colors are genuine properties of objects.

is

and

not identical to F2, (iv) x instantiates FI at

is

occupies,

qualities are distributed.

the sphere

intrinsic properties FI

not identical to x2, (b) xl and x2 are non-overlapping

states that,

distributed within the region

Rl and R2

(ii)

instantiates

proper parts of x, and

where

we need some

it

is

31

intrinsic properties

has parts corresponding to the locations

an example of PQV in action. Assume

that

Now consider a sphere such that the top half of

blue and the bottom half of the sphere
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is

yellow. Given

PQV,

the sphere

must have proper

which

parts corresponding to the region at

The adverbial phrase

R” does

at

a region R.

One could

it is

blue and the region

at

yellow.

it is

“x has F

which

"at

R” modifies

the copula, not the predicate.

The phrase

not indicate that x bears a relation, specifically,
the F-at relation, to

Instead, the phrase indicates that x has-relative-to-F
the property Fness.
reject

PQV and instead accept spatial adverbalism

,

according to which the

instantiation relation that links objects to their properties is really
a three-place relation

between an object, a property, and a region of space. The strategy

is

analogous to

adopting temporal adverbalism in order to avoid the problem of intrinsic
change over
time.

(On

this issue, see

PQV
form x

is

Johnston (1987) and McDaniel (2003a).)

implies that, in cases in which

F is

a genuine property, propositions of the

F at location R have the same truth-values as propositions of the form y is F. 32
which

In cases in

F really is a property, and not a disguised relation that an object bears

to a region, this implication is plausible.

no deep metaphysical significance. The
properties

is

It is

Given PQV, indexing properties

to regions has

instantiation relation that links objects to their

a two-place relation.

important to distinguish the following two situations: (1) the situation

which x has-relative-to-region-F the property Fness and
Gness, where Gness

is

region of space. In the

(2) the situation in

which x has

an extrinsic property that x has in virtue of bearing a
first situation,

x has a property

Here

suppose x

from a region of space R. Then x has the

five feet

relative to

a concrete example of the second sort of situation:

any region of space.
is

relation to a

relative to a region. In the

second situation, x just plain instantiates Gness; x does not instantiate Gness

is

in
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extrinsic property being

five feet

from R. But x does not have

plain has the property.

In this case,

A case can be made
denying

it.

Suppose

PQV

for

PQV

is false.

this property relative to

PQV does not

at a distinct

is

strictly

have proper

speaking

then

And even the

parts.

occupies

(call this

region ‘Bluefilled’) and

it

does not have a top-half that

is

is

an

blue, even

33

we abandon PQV,

object has parts.

it

that is

blue at Bluefilled. But what just plain instantiates the property of

being blue? Nothing does!

If

at R.

Consider a sphere-shaped extended simple

sub-region (call this region ‘Yellowfilled’). If this sphere

extended simple, then

though the sphere

imply that x has a property

simply by attending to the consequences of

blue at one proper sub-region of the region

yellow

any region of space; x just

it is

very hard to see

why we

should believe that any

advocate of extended simples believes that some objects

In his recent book, Four-Dimensionalism,

Theodore Sider discusses

three reasons to posit proper spatial parts. [Sider (2001): 87-92], First,

some

objects are

extended. Obviously, the advocate of extended simples cannot agree that extension
implies the possession of proper parthood. So this reason to posit proper parts

is

unavailable to the advocate of extended simples.

Second, some objects are qualitatively heterogeneous, that

is,

they have

properties at various sub-regions of the regions that they occupy. If we accept that

should posit parts whenever an object

PQV. Accordingly,
that

I

do grant

is

qualitatively heterogeneous, then

accept

that the defender of extended simples should not claim

heterogeneous extended simples are possible. So, as

homogenous extended simples

we

we

I

see things, only qualitatively

are possible.

Sider also discusses a third reason to posit spatial parts:
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Call the

half of the region of space occupied by the desk
‘R\ R and
material contents might have been, intrinsically, exactly as
they
actually are even if the rest of the world had been eliminated.
left

its

In that

R would have existed.

case an object occupying

But then we should
postulate an object in actuality that occupies R. For surely the
elimination of the rest of the world outside of R would not bring a new
object into existence; but what other actual object could this object be.
other than a part of the desk that actually occupies the region R? [Sider
(2001): 89-90],

Suppose we have before us a putative extended simple
occupies. Let us

assume

that the object

left-hand region of space that

is

is

qualitatively

O and the region R that

homogenous. Let us

call the

a proper part of region occupied by O, Lefty. Lefty

could have been the only region of space that exists. Moreover, according to Sider,

of the intrinsic properties that are instantiated by

by something

at

it

Lefty even if Lefty and what

existence. In this case, Sider suggests that

it

we

all

O at Lefty could have been instantiated

contains were the only things in

should posit a part of

O that exists

exactly at Lefty.

Sider’ s

argument

for the existence of spatial parts

shape properties of material objects are
simples can deny. (This

one material object
does deny

this.

because

world

to presuppose that the

which the advocate of extended

this presupposition is

at the counterfactual

we

needed

to rule out

are considering.)

O being the

Suppose

that she

In this case, the advocate of extended simples should say that (1) in the

counterfactual world

set

is

intrinsic,

seems

w that

Sider considers,

of intrinsic properties instantiated

at

O exists, (2) O occupies Lefty at w, (3) the

Lefty in world

w is identical

intrinsic properties instantiated at Lefty in the actual world,

properties instantiated

by our extended simple

intrinsic properties instantiated

in

world

by our extended simple
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w is

and

to the set

(4) the set

of

of intrinsic

identical to the set of

in the actual world.

Sider’s

Assume

modal argument

that an object has

Given PQV,
variation,

it

it

has a part

an

is

very similar to the argument from

intrinsic property at a sub-region

at that subregion.

has proper parts. Sider

a world in which

it

and

its

tells

So wherever an object enjoys

is

So wherever an object enjoys

intrinsic

new

a proper part of the
intrinsic variation,

I

will focus

it

on the

PQV to DAUP.

does not by

imply

itself

DAUP. We

conjunction of PQV and the Extrinsic Theory

(More on

occupies.

Since nothing

has proper parts. Given the similarities between the two arguments,

PQV

it

us to focus on this subregion and then
consider

has been created by subtracting the rest of reality, there
actually

argument from

DAUP

to

of the region

contents are the only things there are.

object that occupies this subregion.

PQV

this in a

is

can see

this if we consider that the

consistent with the denial of DAUP.

moment.) However, the conjunction of PQV and the claim

shape properties of material objects are
object o occupies a cubical

will be instantiated

by o

intrinsic entails

volume of space

at the

R.

bottom half of R

Then

DAUP. Suppose

that a material

the property of being a

(call this

that the

region Bottom ) and

column
at the

top

half of R (call this region Top). If shape properties are intrinsic properties, then being a

column

is

an intrinsic property.

Bottom and a

And

so,

given

there

is

a part of o that occupies

part of o that occupies Top.

Suppose space contains point-sized
will be instantiated

infinitely

PQV,

many

by o

at

parts.

On

every point of space in R.

this supposition,

And

so,

given

being point-sized

PQV, o

point-sized parts. If shapes are intrinsic properties, there

pressure to claim that o has parts at every sub-region of R as there
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is

is

will

as

have

much

to claim that the

sphere has a part where

is true,

then

is

it

blue. If the shape of a material object is intrinsic
and

DAUP is true.

Another example may be

Suppose
see,

you

PQV

that

Suppose you are

helpful.

in a

room with an open

door.

workers are moving a large statue through the door. From what you can

are inclined to say to that

you see something shaped

like a

human

arm.

(Because of the angle from which you are viewing the statue and the wall between you

and the hallway, you can’t see the statue
that the statue currently occupies R.

are in;

is

R

R

in

Theory

intrinsically.

is true,

Let us call the region of space

by the hallway. R

is

shaped

The

then being arm-shaped

PQV

But, then, given

and the

statue

is

is

arm-shaped

room you

like a statue.

does have an arm-shaped sub-region R-. Let us

it

shape of this subregion being arm-shaped.

Intrinsic

entirety.)

overlaps the region occupied by the

also overlaps the region occupied

a region of space, and

its

R

call the

at R-.

If the

a property that material objects have

Intrinsic

Theory, the statue has an arm-

shaped part that occupies the arm-shaped region.

It

makes sense

But, given

PQV,

to talk

this sort

instantiation,” parthood,

If the Extrinsic

about the properties that an object has

of claim must be analyzable in terms of talk of “just plain

and occupation.

Theory

is true,
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then the shapes of material objects are really

derivative features. Talk about shapes had by an object at a region

terms of shapes had by the region
object o

is

shaped or

and

R

is

5-shaped

(ii)

at

at a particular place.

R just

itself

and the occupation

in case either

(i)

when we

R+

such that

say that an object
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relation.

We can say that an

o or a part of o occupies

o or a part of o occupies some region

5-shaped. Given ET,

analyzable in

is

is

R

is

R and R

is

5-

a subregion of R+

5-shaped

at

a region,

we do

not ascribe a particular quality to that object. Instead,

region that the object occupies. This

imply

DAUP,

No
rl

is

why

we

say something about the

the conjunction of

even though the conjunction of PQV and the

one should be tempted by the following

and a different relation

PQV

Intrinsic

and

were

true,

not

Theory does.

principle: if o bears a relation

G to r2, then o has a proper part located at rl

part located at r2. If this principle

ET does

F to

and a proper

then extended simples would be

impossible. Given the Extrinsic Theory, having a shape at a region consists in
bearing a
relation to a region with that shape.

So extended simples would have

corresponding to the regions of space that they occupy. But
strong. For

and five

mere

it

feet

also implies that a point-sized simple that

away from r2 has

fact that

parts at rl

and

r2.

is

parts

this principle is far too

four feet

away from region

The moral we should draw

an object bears different relations to different regions of space

reason for holding that the object has proper parts
Extrinsic Theory

is true,

having a shape

at a

at

is this:

is

rl

the

not a

those regions of space. And,

if

the

region simply consists in bearing a relation

to a region.

ET provides the

resources to undermine the argument for

is

simply because

extended

accordance with

PQV

If the

shape of

not intrinsic, then the pressure to split up an extended simple

an extended simple

it is

DAUP.

PQV,

is

entirely eliminated.

We are justified in positing parts in

but if the shape properties of material objects are not

intrinsic,

simply does not apply. Since the advocate of extended simples can justifiably

endorse ET, the argumentative stalemate

can reject

is

broken. The advocate of extended simples

DAUP without begging the question.
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The

first

challenge has been met.

How the Extrinsic

Theory Solves the Second Puzzle

There are two sorts of worries one might have
about the notion of an extended
yet simple thing. First, there

thing

is

incoherent.

is

the worry that the notion of an extended
yet simple

One might have

this

worry

if

one thought that the notion of the

shape of an entity must be analyzed in terms of the distance
relations obtaining between
proper parts. The Extrinsic Theory shows that this worry

this entity’s

misguided,

we

-

somewhat

can make sense of a material object having a shape without
appealing

the distance relations obtaining

other entity

is

between

a region of spacetime

that the region’s

- that

shape can be analyzed

between the region

's

its

in

proper parts provided that there

it

occupies, has the

same shape

is

as,

to

some

and

is

such

terms of the distance relations obtaining

proper parts.

There may, however, be an analytic connection between having a shape
intrinsically

and having proper parts

that bear distance relations to each other. If this

is

the case, then the friend of extended yet simple regions of spacetime has a conceptually

impossible position. For the friend of extended yet simple regions of spacetime needs
to

assume

that

it

makes sense

to talk about the shape

of a region of spacetime

independently of our ability to analyze these notions in terms of parts of the region. She

needs to be able to say, for example, that a particular region of space
has a cubic volume of 30 meters even

It is

this

if that

region of space

is

is

box-shaped and

an extended simple.

actually to the advantage of the advocate of extended material simples if

assumption

is false.

For, without this assumption,

how a region of spacetime

we have no way to

could have extension even though

have a way, via the Extrinsic Theory, of accounting for
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how

it is

account for

simple. But

we

still

an extended material object

could be a simple. So

we would

lose the reason to hold that
if extended material

simples are possible, then extended yet
simple regions of spacetime are
possible. The
alleged parallel between these
that the

two putative

possibilities

would not

concept of an extended yet simple region
of spacetime

concept of an extended yet simple material
object

is

is

So

hold.

then

it

worry

in section 3.4

was centered on

has proper parts. In section 3.4,

extended thing

some or

all

However,

is

1

intrinsically extended.

this inference is

However, according

similar to

is

Recall

extended,

good only

if the

to the Extrinsic Theory,

of the shape properties of extended material simples
are

all

is

in section 3.4.

the claim that if something

argued that

be

not incoherent.

worry about extended yet simple material objects
discussed

that the

may

incoherent, even if the

My second worry about extended yet simple regions of spacetime
the

it

of the shape properties of regions of spacetime are

extrinsic.

intrinsic.

Shapes are

genuine qualities of regions, qualities that these regions have
independently of the
relations they bear to other (non-overlapping) regions.

It is

this difference that

grounds

the fact that extended yet simple regions of spacetime are not
possible even if extended
yet simple material objects are possible.

The

strategy to break the alleged parallel between extended yet simple regions

and extended yet simple material objects
of regions of spacetime are

intrinsic,

is clear:

show

that, since the

a principle similar to

shape properties

DAUP, which

has been

formulated so as to apply to regions of spacetime instead of material objects,

However,

it

(DAUP):

Necessarily, for every material object

is

hard to see what the principle should look

occupied by M, and
material object that

M,

if

like.

Recall

is true.

DAUP:

R is the region of space

any occupiable sub-region of R, there exists
occupies the region sub-R and which is a part of M.
if

sub-R

is
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a

We want a principle analogous to DAUP, but which applies to
instead of material objects.

spacetime regions

DAUP appeals to the notion of an occupiable region, which

does not have a clear analogue to the case of regions
of spacetime.
In order to formulate an analogous principle,

abstract

model of spacetime, < U, D>, where

we

will

U is an infinite

can think of as representations of points of spacetime, and
defined on

D

need to appeal
set

is

to

an

of elements, which we

the distance function

U 35 Any non-empty subset of U accordingly is a representation of a region
.

whose shape

is

fixed by the distance relations obtaining between

we need

Next,

to

be able

to say that

some

of a region and the

elements.

representations of regions in our

model represent the shape of real regions of spacetime. When
that the representation

its

real region

this

happens,

let

us say

of spacetime represented have the

same shape.

How does this representation work?

If there are

no extended yet simple regions

of spacetime, the representation works by structural isomorphism: the
relations

between points of spacetime are mirrored by the

that are defined

on U.

If there are

it

works. This problem

is

relations determined

extended yet simple regions of spacetime,

say that the representation works this way. In

how

fact,

it is

closely related to the

that there is

I

we

D

cannot

first

worry about the conceptual
at the

beginning of

suspect that the friend of extended yet simple regions will want to say

simply an additional

to real regions

by

unclear if we can account for

incoherence of extended yet simple regions of spacetime discussed
this section.

real distance

fact about

which subsets of U represent or correspond

of spacetime.

We now formulate our principle as follows:
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y

D AUP- R: L et R be a region

of spacetime. Let S be a non-empty
subset of U
as R. Then for any non-empty
subset of S Sthere is a region of spacetime R- such
that S- and R- have the same
shape
F and Ris a part of R.
sue

that

S has

the

same shape

Now that we have properly formulated the conclusion, we need
the proper formulation

of the premises. The

premise

first

is

to attend to

an even more general

version of PQV:

(PQV

)•

F° r any

x

instantiates FI at

entities x,

y and

z and distinct intrinsic properties FI and F2,
if
instantiates F2 at z, then there are two entities

and x

xl and x2 such that (a) xl is not identical to x2, (b)
xl and x2 are nonoverlapping proper parts of x, and (c) xl instantiates FI
and x2
instantiates x2.

Intuitively,

PQV*

tells

us that entities can have properties indexed to or at other
entities

only derivatively, in virtue of proper parts that have those properties
in a non-indexed,
non-derivative manner. There

Instantiation

is

is

no irreducible indexing on the having of

properties.

fundamentally non-relative. Presumably, the intuitions that supported

PQV provide the

same support

Our second premise

for

PQV*.

is this:

(POS-OCC): For any region of spacetime R, there is a possible world w in which
R has the same intrinsic properties in w as it has at the actual world, (ii) R is

(i)

occupied by a material object
37
undetached parts.
In other words,

M such that M

parts.

occupy

same shape

metaphysically possible for that object (or

that region

of spacetime. Suppose

necessarily, any material object that

that is

What motivates POS-OCC? The motivation

straightforward: in general, if an object has the

it is

composed of arbitrary

any region of spacetime could be occupied by a material object

made of arbitrary undetached

then

is

is

that

shaped
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R

is

like

is

as a region of spacetime,

at least a duplicate

of that object)

to

a region of spacetime. Then,

R could occupy

R. Moreover, this

is

true regardless

of any qualitative

intrinsic properties

than the shape of the object or region.

How could the

object (other than shape) necessarily
prevent

same shape? And how could
objects of the

of the object or the region other

it

intrinsic properties

of a material

from merely occupying a region of the

the intrinsic properties of the region
necessarily repel

same shape?

Since the other intrinsic properties of a material
object and the intrinsic
properties of a region are no barrier to the object
occupying the region if they are the

same shape,

the mereological structure of the object or the
region are not barriers to the

object occupyrng the regron.

So, for example, a mereological complex material
object

could occupy a mereologically simple region provided that
the two regions have the

same shape.
Consider an empty region R. Suppose

R

object o shaped like

Suppose

that

R

Suppose
intuitively

want

Where does R have
occupies. But

What we can

suppositions

that

we

say,

is

to say that, in w,

however,

material object that

is

is

shaped

Likewise, the rest of o

R

This part

can’t say that this

there

is

a material

parts that occupies R.

w as it actually has.

Given POS-

legitimate.

o has a proper part that

this part?

some world w,

composed of arbitrary undetached

has the same intrinsic properties in

OCC, each of these

we

that is

that at

is

is

shaped

like a cube.

has a proper part that

is,

is

In a case like this,

shaped

like a cube.

intuitively, the region that the proper part

the case without conceding that

that the region

R

is

R

is

not a simple.

cube-shaped at the part of the

like a cube.

is

cube-bit shaped at the part that

S-minus-a-cube-bit shaped.

is

the rest of o.
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And

so

R

is

of o

S-minus-a-

Our
is

third

premise

is that

regions have their shapes intrinsically.
(Recall that this

one conjunct of the Extrinsic View.) Since regions have

being cubical

their shapes intrinsically,

a property that regions of space have intrinsically.

is

And

so

is

being S-

minus-a-cube-bit shaped.

So now
bit

PQV* comes

shaped are both

of o,

PQV*

into play.

Since being cubical and being S-minus-a-cube-

intrinsic properties that are

implies that

R

has proper parts

had at

entities, specifically

at this possible

world. At w,

R

proper parts

is

not an

extended simple.

But R has the same
being a simple

is

an

an extended simple

intrinsic properties at

intrinsic property,

at the actual

R

is

w

as

R

has

at the actual

an extended simple

world. So, since

R

is

at

w

if

world. Since

and only

not an extended simple

R

is

w,

R

if

at

is

not an extended simple.

Since our examples were chosen
region of spacetime that

undetached parts

itself is

is

arbitrarily,

possibly filled by an object

In other words,

are allowed to conclude that any

composed of arbitrary

composed of arbitrary undetached

regions of spacetime are possibly filled by objects

parts, all regions

we

parts.

And, since

all

composed of arbitrary undetached

of spacetime are themselves composed of arbitrary undetached

parts.

DAUP-R is true.

Because regions of spacetime have

their shapes intrinsically,

DAUP-R is true.

Since the advocate of extended simples can say that material objects have their shapes

extrinsically, they

can reject

DAUP. So

the

symmetry

is

broken.

The

possibility of

extended yet simple material objects does not imply the possibility of extended yet
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simple regions of space. In

fact,

the very theory that undercuts the

first

challenge facing

the advocate of extended simples also undercuts the second
challenge.

M

How the Extrinsic Theory
The

Solves the Third Pnyvlp

third challenge is generated

by the worry

violate an intuitive principle of recombination. Let

relation; let

this: if

Cl and C2 be

ontological categories.

some simples of category Cl can bear R

any simple from category Cl can bear R
their intrinsic properties.

If the Intrinsic

to

to

that

R

extended simples seem

to

be a perfectly natural external

The

intuitively plausible principle is

some simples

in category

C2, then

any simple in category C2, regardless of

38

Theory

is

true

and extended simples are possible, then we do

have a counter-example to the principle of recombination.

It is

extended simple occupies a point-sized region of space. 39 The
material extended simple prevent

it

a necessary truth that no

intrinsic properties

from bearing a perfectly natural relation

of a

to a simple

region of space that other material simples (with different intrinsic properties) could

bear to that region.

The Extrinsic Theory dissolves
that

this

worry. Given the extrinsic theory, the fact

an object cannot occupy a region with a different shape

the fact that siblings

must have

object in a cubical region

regions.

And

is

the

same

no more mysterious than

The reason you cannot put

that objects are spherical in virtue of

a spherical

occupying spherical

so on for other shapes.

Consider an extended simple

a region that

parents.

is

is

o.

Given ET, o

extended. Being extended

is

extended

in virtue

of occupying

not an intrinsic property of o. So o could

have occupied a point-sized region of space without
intrinsic properties,

is

this necessitating a

o’s intrinsic properties do not prevent
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it

change

in o’s

from occupying a point-

sized region.

Given ET, there are possible worlds wl and w2 according

wl, o

is

extended, (2)

wl

if

and only

at

examples

H

if

o has

is

F at w2.

far

I

No

Are

me

F

of recombination. The third challenge has been met.

Actual Temporally Extended Simples

have concentrated on the relationship

that the conclusions

(1) at

Given ET, extended simples do not generate counter-

have neglected the relationship that occupants bear
to

which

point-sized, but (3) for any intrinsic property
F, o has

to the plausible principle

Why There
So

w2, o

at

to

that occupants bear to space.

to time (or to space-time.)

of the previous sections have some relevance

how objects

through time. But, in order to see whether this

first

the case,

we

seems

to the current

debate between so-called endurantists and perdurantists about

is

It

I

persist

must readdress two

fundamental questions.

The

first

question

we need

to readdress

is:

what

is

(or are) the fundamental

mereological relation (or relations) that obtains (or obtain) between objects.
in

Chapter One,

many

As I noted

endurantists take the fundamental parthood relation to be a three-

place relation between two objects and a time: x

is

a part of y at

On the

t.

other hand,

every perdurantist takes the fundamental parthood relation to be a two-place relation

between two objects: x

is

a part of y simpliciter.

fundamental instantiation relation

is.

Many endurantists

instantiation relation to be a three-place relation

time: x instantiates

F at

t,

A related issue concerns what the
take the fundamental property

between an object, a property, and

at

while every perdurantist takes the fundamental instantiation

relation to be a two-place relation: x instantiates

adverbalism rejected in the Introduction.

On

F simpliciter. 40

This

both of these issues,

perdurantist.
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I

is

the kind of

side with the

Consider

now

the following account of Four Dimensionalism
presented by

Ted

Sider in his paper “Four Dimensionalism.” [Sider
(1997)].

Four Dimensionalism is the thesis that for any x, and any
non-empty nonoverlapping sets of times T1 and T2 whose union is the
time span of x, there are
two objects xl and x2 such that the time span of xl is Tl, the
time span of x2 is
T2, and x is the fusion of xl and x2.
Although
dimensionalism

I

is

believe that four-dimensionalism

is

actually true,

necessarily true, for two reasons. First,

I

I

deny

accept the possibility of

Parsonian extended simples that are extended in the temporal region.
these objects endurers. Second,

that are

me

I

by Sider

in Sider

We could call

accept the possibility of spanning extended simples

extended in the temporal region. Let us

that both endurers

that four-

call these objects toughies.

It

seems

to

and toughies are possible and four-dimensionalism as formulated

(1997) implies that they

aren’t.

Toughies are four-dimensional

extended simples; they are objects that are extended in both time and space but lack
both spatial and temporal parts

at the

sub-regions and sub-durations at which they

They dominate temporally extended spatiotemporal
Given

that toughies

exist.

regions.

and endurers are possible, why not believe

that they’re

actual? There are three kinds of entity that are candidates for being temporally

extended simples: material objects, singleton

sets,

and immanent universal.

There are could reasons to deny that most or
toughies. Recall a principle that

an object whenever there

is

an

I

Monday and

thin

material objects are endurers or

earlier in this chapter:

intrinsic variation within that object.

can undergo intrinsic change, and
fact that leads to the so-called

employed

all

this

we

ascribe parts to

Material objects

counts as a kind of intrinsic variation.

problem of temporary

4]

intrinsics

on Tuesday morning. Since Monday
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is

Suppose

It’s this

that

Jim

is fat

just as real as Tuesday, “Jim

is

fat at

Monday”

is

not analyzable into the timeless “Jim

intrinsic feature, not

‘Jim

is fat at

However, being

an

fat is

a disguised relation between a thing and a time.
Consequently,

V must be analyzable

Monday’, does not appear,

we have

”

is fat

i.e.,

into a statement in

which the temporal index,

‘at

into a statement of the form, [x is Fat] 42
Accordingly,

excellent reason to think that Jim does have a part

-

a temporal part

-

that is fat

simpliciter.

An
that her

interesting upshot of this discussion

view

is

is

that the perdurantist

can happily admit

only contingently true without giving up arguments for four-

dimensionalism that are primarily conceptual arguments. The perdurantist
could argue
that

worlds

at

which objects enjoy multi-location

at different

times are worlds in which

nothing undergoes intrinsic change. Since some objects do undergo intrinsic
change
this

world, endurantism must be (contingently) false. But since endurantism

contingently false, four-dimensionalism

However,

this sort

is

in

is

contingently true.

of consideration does not eliminate the epistemic possibility

that singleton sets are endurers or toughies, or that

spacetime via enduring or spanning. So for

all

immanent universal occupying

that has

been said here, there could be

enduring or spanning sets or universals.

3.8

Concluding Remarks

As

I

see things, there are

two morals

to draw.

reasons to reject the possibility of extended simples

I

fail

have argued

that the three

main

provided that the advocate of

extended simples adopts the Extrinsic Theory of Shape. Since the Extrinsic Theory
neither unmotivated nor unprecedented, this

is
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a respectable

move

is

for the advocate of

extended simples to make. So the advocate of extended
simples should endorse the
Extrinsic Theory.

The second moral

to

draw

is this:

since the Extrinsic

Theory

case against extended simples has not been made. And, since
there

undefeated evidence for their metaphysical possibility,
possibility of extended simples very seriously.
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we

is

is

a live option, the

some

as of yet

should take the epistemic

Notes
1

x is a disconnected region just in case x is the sum of two regions rl and r2
such that rl and r2 are parts of non-overlapping open regions Rl and R2. x is connected
just in case x is not disconnected.
This

See

is

Parsons’s conception of extended simples, which he calls entended
to hold this conception of extended simples as well.

Dean Zimmerman seems

objects.

Zimmerman

assume

I

4

(2002): 402. See also

On the

Hawley (2001):

28,

49 and Lewis (1991):

76.

that point-sized objects are possible.

assumption of endurantism, the claim that

all spacetime points have the
For given endurantism, material occupants cannot
be identified with the regions they occupy. Since material occupants are distinct from

same

intrinsic character is plausible.

the regions at

which they

are located,

we can always

being the generator of an electromagnetic
that all

field, to

spacetime points are intrinsically alike

is

assign physical properties, such as

material objects. However, the claim

much

less plausible

given typical

perdurantism. For the typical perdurantist can (and perhaps should) identify material
objects with the regions that they occupy. Given this ontology,
will differ

from others

intrinsically, since

spacetime points are

some spacetime

now the

points

bearers of

physical properties.
5

Accordingly, this object would be a one-dimensional extended simple.

6

See Sider (forthcoming) for a similar argument for the possibility of extended

simples.
7

When discussing time-travel,

it is

important to distinguish “personal time”

from “objective time”. Roughly, objective time is the time in which objects are
ordered, whereas personal time is something that plays the same role in the history of
the time-traveler as objective time does in the history of a non-time traveler. Let us
assume that o only occupies tl and t2. On this assumption, o enjoys only two moments
of objective time. However, since o is a time-traveler that returns to visit itself often, o
enjoys more than two moments of personal time. In fact, o enjoys infinitely many units
of personal time, since at tl, o occupies a continuous region of space. From the
perspective of o, o has visited tl many, many (personal) times. See Lewis (1976) for a
discussion of these issues.
8

On this

kind of simple, see Gilmore (forthcoming).

9

p.

Descartes discusses this argument in Descartes (1985), chapter
231. Markosian discusses it in Markosian (1998): 223-224.
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II,

section 20,

8

10

DAUP is discussed

in

van Inwagen( 1983).

(My statement of DAUP is
assume here that all regions of space including pointsized regions - are possibly occupied by
a material object.
slightly different

from

Every point
12

13

This view

his.)

is

I

a zero-dimensional spatial region.

defended

is

in

Broad (1946).

See Nerlich (1994) for a powerful defense of this
claim.

What is the difference between an unoccupied region of space
and one that is
occupied by an extended simple? More generally, how can
we tell whether there is one
there? Presumably, an extended simple would not
be causally inert. So, if an extended
simple is in a region, then, given the existence of appropriate
laws of repulsion and
attraction, other material objects could not enter the
subregions of the region exactly
occupied by an extended simple.
There are other reasons to believe in the existence of regions
of space
of spacetime) that are independent of anything that I say in
what

least regions

(or at

follows.

See Nerlich (1994) for an impressive and sustained argument for
spacetime realism.
16

17

Theodore Sider makes a similar point

in Sider (2001): 110-119.

These definitions come from David Lewis. See Lewis (1986): 59-69.

1

Accordingly,

I count myself as an advocate of extrinsicism
about handedness,
of James van Cleve. See van Cleve (1987) for an interesting
discussion of philosophical problems concerning incongruent counterparts.

to use the terminology

19

For example, David Lewis writes, “If we know what shape

property, not a relation.” [Lewis (1986): 204],
clear that
20

Lewis holds

Note

that

we know that

that the Extrinsic

Theory

necessarily, every object occupies

necessarily every object has
21

•

This means that

shape on an object
into

it.

is

we

is

way

the container.

thank David

But the liquid’s shape

The

Robb

is

a

it

or other (2) and hence,

or other.

way

in

which a region bestows

a container bestows shape on the liquid poured

In a case like this, the shape of the liquid

the container.

it is

compatible with the following claims: (1)

shouldn’t think that the

similar to the

we know

shapes are intrinsic properties.

some region of space

some shape

is,

The context of this sentence makes

is

causally dependent on the shape of

not metaphysically dependent on the shape of

liquid has this shape intrinsically if and only if the container does.
for this helpful example.
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I

know of no philosopher who holds the superimposition theory
However
Adolf Grunbaum appears to hold the more radical fourth
possibility,
I

which seems to be
metrical features are conventional, and accordingly
non-intrinsic features of the regions. [Grunbaum
(1973), chapter 16].
a consequence of his view that

23

all

A relation is

an internal relation iff it supervenes on the intrinsic
properties of
an external relation iff it does not supervene on the
intrinsic
properties of its relata but does supervene on the intrinsic
properties of the fusion of its
relata. A relation is an intrinsic relation iff it is either
an internal or an external relation;
otherwise, that relation is an extrinsic relation. On these definitions,
see Lewis (1986V
its relata,

a relation

is

’

61-63.
24

On

a related issue, see also Bricker (1993): 282-283.

On

this

view, some material objects have intrinsic shapes. Specifically, the
fundamental particles still have their shape intrinsically. However, since the
spatiotemporal relations they stand in are extrinsic, any fusion of these particles has
'

its

shape extrinsically.
26

27

the

view

See Barker (2003) and McDaniel (2003b).

Endurantism is not Barker and Dowe’s sole target; they also intend to refute
universal enjoy multi-location. For the most part, I will restrict my

that

attention to the consequences of Barker and

Dowe’s argument

for endurantism.

On the

multi-location of universal, see Armstrong (1997).
28

Peter van Inwagen discusses a rough characterization of endurantism,

according to which it is the view that “persisting objects are extended in three spatial
dimensions and have no other kind of extent.”. Perdurantism is characterized as the
view that “persisting objects are extended not only in three spatial dimensions, but also

dimension, and persist simply by being temporally extended”.
See van Inwagen (1990b).
in a fourth, temporal,

29

30

See Barker (2003): 109-110.
See Sider (2001): 110-120.

31
I

thank an anonymous referee for

“properties”

I

mean only

circumstances,

it is

this nice

formulation of PQV.

By

one-place properties, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. (In some

convenient to think of relations as 2+-place properties. This

is

not

one of those circumstances.)
32
It

may be

that the objects substituted for

they are not.
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x and y are identical; or

it

may be

that

_____

33

There are two other moves available to the
advocate of extended simples
neither of which invol ves rejecting PQV. First,
one could accept that distributional
properties, such as being red at RJ while being
blue at R2, are ontologically
fundamental and intrinsic. On this strategy, see Parsons
(2000). Second, one could
claim that, while no thing instantiates the property
of being blue, nevertheless some
stuff or matter instantiates the property of being blue. In
general, the denier of PQV
could claim that a property can be exemplified by some
stuff without being exemplified
by any particular thing; see Markosian (1998), 223-224 and
McDaniel (2003a), 269-274
for a discussion of this strategy. There are problems
with both moves.
34

35

See Hinchliff (1996): 121-122.
•

A distance function assigns non-negative real numbers to pairs of points and
i

obeys the following constraints:

(iii)

D
D
D

(iv)

If

(i)
(ii)

assigns exactly one

number

assigns n to <p,
assigns 0 to <p,

if and

D

to

each

pair.

only

if

D assigns n to <q, p>.

if

and only

if

p

assigns n to <p, q>,

m to <q,

q>
q>

r>,

identical to q.

is

and

l

to <p,r>, then n

+ m>l.

36

Similarly, the friend of gunky spacetime will want to say that not every
subset
of U represents or corresponds to a real region of spacetime. Instead, the friend of
gunky spacetime might want to say that only non-empty (infinitely membered)

continuous sets or unions of non-empty (infinitely membered) continuous sets represent
or correspond with real regions. (And, of course, in this case the friend of gunky

spacetime will need to spell out

how representation works

if

not by structural

isomorphism.)

DAUP-R entails

the existence of point-sized regions of space, and hence

eliminates the possibility of gunky space. This might

DAUP-R with a weaker principle.

could replace

eligible just in case

empty continuous

S

is

sets.

seem problematic.

If

need

Let us say that a subset S of U

a non-empty continuous set or S

is

be,

we

is

the union of some non-

Consider the following principle:

DAUP-R2: Let R be a region of space. Let S be an eligible subset of U such that
S has the same shape as R. Then for any eligible subset of S, S-, there is a region
of space R- such that S- and R- have the same shape and R37

In this context, to say that

say that there

same shape

is

as

M

is

is

a part of R.

composed of arbitrary undetached parts is
S of its domain has the

a model of abstract space such that a subset

M and M has parts corresponding
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to the

non-empty subsets of S.

to

38

David Lewis appeals to a principle like this when
ersatzism. See Lewis (1986): 179-183. It is
possible that this

arguing^i^^Z

qualified. Consider the

membership

relation,

principle needs to be

which

relates objects to sets. Some
material simples bear this relation to some
singletons. Singletons may very well
be
simples. (See Lewis (1991) for an interesting
development of this claim.)

So any
bear the membership relation to any singleton?
Some may balk
accepting this claim. See van Inwagen (1986): 207-210.
I am inclined to accept
the
material simple

may

at

unmodified principle.
39

Two points of clarification: first, the claim that necessarily, no extended
simple occupies a point-sized region of space is not analytic.
It would be analytic if this
claim were equivalent in meaning to the claim that necessarily,
no extended simple is
point-sized. These two claims are equivalent in meaning
only if the Extrinsic Theory is
itself analytic. But although I think that the Extrinsic
Theory is true, I don’t
that

it

is

true

by

extended simple

want to say
do not endorse the de re claim that every
essentially extended. In fact, it should be clear that I
reject this

definition!
is

Second,

I

claim.
40

41

42

See Sider (2001), sections

3. 2-3. 3.

See Lewis (1986a): 202-205,210.

Note

that ‘analyzable’ is not to be equated with ‘translatable’.
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CHAPTER 4

MATERIAL ATOMLESS GUNK
4.1

Preliminaries

In the previous chapters,

I

argued that there

no non-mereological

is

being a material simple and that extended material
simples are possible.
the question of whether material atomless

reason to think that

it

is

possible.

Whiteheadian conception -

arguments that

this

Although
spacetime

is

I

iff

possible.

possible.

It is

consistent and conceivable.

is

commonly thought
I

that

will argue that this

simple

I

will argue that there

iff that

is

And

there are no

is

possible,

in case there are

There are three theses

wish

A region of space

region has no proper parts.

call the

maximal fusion of

is that

is

region of

is

simplistic just

the fusion of the xs.

to discuss. First, there is the compatibility thesis

(CT):

(CT): There are possible worlds with simplistic spacetime and there are
possible worlds with gunky spacetime.

Second, there
(OT):

is

gunky

not the case. Let us say that a region

regions, the xs, such that spacetime

I

that

any gunky object must occupy a

other regions as parts. Let us say that spacetime

some simple

a

good

do not hold

I

space (or spacetime) simply space (or spacetime). So spacetime

all

is

to

impossible.

is

every part of that region has proper parts. Let us

spacetime that has

now turn

conception of material atomless gunk - the

hold that material atomless gunk

of space (or spacetime)

gunky

is

kind of material atomless gunk

gunky region of spacetime.

is

is

One

gunk

I

criterion for

the occupation thesis

Necessarily, an object

1

:

is

material atomless

occupies a gunky region of spacetime.
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gunk

if

and only

if

it

Third, there

the

is

gunky

thesis:

(MT): Material atomless gunk

My plan is as follows.

First,

I

is

possible.

will argue that

credence in the claim that simplistic spacetime

gunky spacetime
impossibility of

is

possible,

undercut

4.2

at the

good reasons

possible than

gunky spacetime
that

to reject

against

CT

is

will

do

CT that are

my best to

argument along the way and

The case against

So one argument

fact, there are

not without

some

in sufficient depth to close off the

I

ways of

acknowledge the potential weaknesses of the

CT.

CT can be presented as follows:

is

it is

necessary that the

natural to degree n.

not necessary that

it is

it is

natural to degree n but

natural to degree n.

CT is not true.

The argument

is valid.

begin by discussing premise

I

to

presently have.

CT is true, then there is a property such that (i)

(ii) it is

Instance,

MT

initial plausibility.

try not to overstate the case against

property or relation

So

against

number of ways

a

(1) If a property or relation is natural to degree n, then

(3)

in the claim that

impossible. However, the

is

undercutting this argument would require more space than

(2) If

do

place more

MT is false only if OT is true.

OT as well.

not airtight. In

However, discussing these issues

I

I

I

CT

undercut the argument against

Accordingly,

Since

false.

beginning.

The Case Against
The case

infer that

gunky spacetime implies

Fortunately, there are

is

I

is

CT is

assumed

that

But the premises need a

(1).

some

In chapter 2,

when

lot

of unpacking. Let

discussing the view

I

me

called

properties are perfectly natural. Recall the roles that
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natural properties are

that

employed

to play: the natural properties

account for objective similarity,

if

two things share

and relations

are those

a natural property, then they

objectively resemble each other in that respect; perfect duplicates
are objects such that
there

is

a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly
natural

properties and relations.

It is

or nothing;

important for this argument that naturalness or objective similarity
it

red or green

I

assume

a matter of degree. Being red

is

is

much

less natural,

and

relative naturalness

all

and there are properties

far

more unnatural than

which a

these.

particular property

is

that these absolute facts about naturalness fix the facts about

of various properties

words, the fundamental notion

Q by degree n.

not

a reasonably natural property, being

that there are absolute facts about the degree to

natural at a world

than

is

is

is

P

that are instantiated at a world.

natural to degree n, and not

is

Properties that are natural to the

P

is

maximal degree

In other

more natural
are called

perfectly natural.

Premise

(1) is a

claim about the essential properties of properties. Everything,

For example, the property of being a

including properties, has essential properties.

prime number has the property being such that 2+2=4
that the degree to

which a property

suppose charge

perfectly natural.

is

is

natural

It

is

essentially.

Premise

(1) asserts

an essential feature of that property. So

follows from premise (1) that charge has the

property of being perfectly natural essentially. There

perfectly natural.
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is

no world

at

which

it

fails to

be

)

A Defense of Premise

4.2.1

Premise (1) states

(

1

that, if a

property or relation

necessary that the property or relation

is

is

natural to degree n, then

natural to degree n. Since
(1)

about the essential properties of properties,

it

would

makes

it

is

a claim

aid our evaluation of
(1) if we were

have a theory about the transworld identity conditions
of properties. Let us make our

to

lives easier

by assuming a

exist at multiple

bound,

is

plurality

of possible worlds.

We can now ask:

worlds? Or are properties world-bound? And,

do properties

if properties are

world-

the appropriate semantics for the attribution of modal
properties to properties

a kind of property counterpart theory analogous to counterpart
theory used to give a

semantics for the attribution of modal properties to individuals? The
answers to these
questions will help us decide whether to accept or reject

(1).

There are three main theories of properties. What
are

world-bound

differs importantly

examining

is

instances.

According

world

w

the

view

such that

all

to this view, a property is

of its elements exist
this

one possible world and y

view just

somehow wholly

is

to this

view just

it

at

to say that properties

first

view worth

of their actual and possible

world-bound just

and only

in case

w.

in case there is a

A property enjoys

has elements x and y such that x exists

exists in another possible world.

The second view worth examining
which

at

The

to theory.

that properties are sets or classes

transworld existence on
in

from theory

means

it

present in

in case there

is

its

a world

is

the

view

instances.

w

that a property

it

is

,

wholly present only within w.

A property enjoys transworld identity on this view just in case
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a universal

A property is world-bound according

such that

different possible worlds.

is

it

is

wholly present

at

Third, there

is

the

particularized property.

view

On

that properties are tropes
,

this view, the important notion

applies not to tropes per se but instead
to
class

some

trope in C.

bound just

in

maximal resemblance

world

every trope

one world while different tropes

in

intrinsic aspect

whether a property

is

some

more than one world, then

One

it

is

is

also an aspect of

properties of the very things that

its

aspect of a property’s

a one-place, two-place, etc. property

nature.

make them

tropes

intuitive that

of that property and not a function of its surroundings. The

aspect of a property

world-

C exist in a distinct world.

they carry their natures with them from world to world.
adicity;

C

w such that every element of C exists at and only at

If properties are literally present at

is its

in

C and (ii) no trope not in C perfectly resembles

A maximal resemblance class C enjoys transworld identity just in case

nature

A

classes of tropes.

We now say that a maximal resemblance class of tropes C is

in case there is a

C exist in

a

is

of world-boundedness

C of tropes is a maximal resemblance class just in case (i)

perfectly resembles every other trope in

w.

where a trope

To deny

this

seems

is

an

qualitative

to strip

properties. Finally, the naturalness of a

property also seems to be a function of its nature and not the circumstances in which
the
property finds

itself.

that properties

have the same nature

So, if properties are transworld entities,

at

properties are transworld entities, the

properties

is

every world

way

at

it is

which they

to understand de re

reasonable to think

exist.

And,

if

modal claims about

via the following schema:

Property

at

which

P has property Q essentially just
P

is

in case

P has Q at every world

exemplified.

So, if properties are transworld entities,

it is

reasonable to think that (1)
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is true.

However, those who hold

that properties are

be suspicious of (1). If properties are world-bound
analyze de re possibility claims about properties

Although counterpart theory

theory.

is

typically

possibility claims about individuals there is
,

is

world-bound

entities,

relation (or relations)

As

I

we

of similarity

is

then the natural

employed only

no reason

simply a relation of similarity; in order to understand
to properties,

have reason

way

to

to

via a kind of property counterpart

why

analyze de re possibility claims about properties as well.

work when applied

entities

it

to analyze de re

cannot be employed to

A counterpart relation is

how counterpart theory

might

simply need to determine what the appropriate
(or are).

see things, three factors could reasonably be said to be
relevant to

determining the relevant similarity relation.
a kind of similarity relation.

The

We can think of each factor as determining

appropriate counterpart relation for properties might

be a blend of some of these similarity relations; alternatively, and perhaps

less

plausibly, each similarity relation could be thought as a counterpart relation.

The

factor that determines a similarity relation

first

among

natures. Consider the properties of being red, being orange,

being orange

is

more

properties

and being blue.

similar with respect to degree of naturalness to charge than

feet from

is

more

being ugly. Even

their

Intuitively,

similar with respect to qualitative nature to being red than

being blue. Or consider spin, charge, and being a bachelor. Obviously, spin

Finally, consider

is

it

is to

is

is

it

to

more

being a bachelor.

being ten feet from, being 10 years before, and being ugly. Being ten
similar with respect to adicity to being 10 years before than

if properties are

world wl are similar with respect

world-bound,

it

is

could be that some properties

to their natures to other properties at
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it

world w2.

to

at

Similarity with respect to nature

similarity

would presumably be a blend of these

and might perhaps count as one kind of counterpart

three kinds of

relation that properties

bear to each other:

x

is

a counterpartN of y just in case x and are similar with
respect to
y

their natures.

A second factor that could reasonably be thought to determine a counterpart
relation

among

properties

possible world. Let

proposition

pattern of instantiation. Let

such that

(i)

thing or things and

from

F by first

p

(ii)

is

an

arbitrarily

chosen

an attribution of a fundamental property or relation

p is true

at

w. Let

to

Q be the proposition that is derivable

systematically substituting the propositional equivalent of free variables

each object that appears in

variables.

w be

F be the proposition that is the conjunction of every atomic

some

for

is

F and then existentially generalizing over those

We can think of Q as the qualitative description of w. We can say that two

worlds are qualitatively indiscernible just in case

their qualitative descriptions are

identical.

Let us consider an arbitrarily selected possible world and

S be

the proposition that

is

derivable from

its

F proposition.

Let

F by systematically substituting the

propositional equivalent of second-order free variables for each property that appears in

F and then existentially generalizing over these variables. We can think of S as the
structural description of w. Let us say that

two worlds

just in case their structural descriptions are identical.

world

tells

are structurally indiscernible

The

us the pattern of instantiation of the properties

structural description of a

at that

world without

us the nature of the properties in that world. Structural descriptions
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tell

telling

us the various

roles that properties play in the worlds described;
moreover, there can be important
similarities

between the various

We can use this
x

sort

is

structures described by these structural
propositions.

of similarity

to cash out a kind

of counterpart relation:

a counterparts of y just in case (a) x exists at

the structure of w
in the structure

w

and y

exists at

w*

(b)

similar to the structure of w*, and (c) the role
x plays

is

of w

is

similar to the role that
y plays in the structure of

w*.

There

is

a third sort of similarity relation that the advocate of property

counterpart theory can appeal

laws of nature are,

world w,

let

it is

to: similarity

with respect to nomological

clear that they involve properties in

L(w) = the proposition

some

role.

Whatever

intimate way. For any

that describes the lawful relations

between the

properties that exist at w. Let L*(w) be the proposition derivable from L(w) by

systematically replacing the properties with the positional equivalent of second-order
free variables

and then binding those variables with

quantifiers.

I

will call

L*(w) the

description of the nomological structure of w. Descriptions of nomological structures

tell

us the various roles that properties play in the laws of the worlds described; and,

like structural descriptions, there

can be important similarities between the various

nomological structures described by these propositions. These structures define a
sort

third

of counterpart relation:

x

is

a counterpartL of y just in case (a) x exists at

the nomological structure of w

w*, and

(c) the role

the role that

y plays

is

w and y exists

nomological structure of w*.
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w*,

(b)

similar to the nomological structure of

x plays in the nomological structure of w
in the

at

is

similar to

There

is

no reason

to think that these three similarity
relations

step, for the following scenario is

that are located in

worlds wj and

must march

in

epidemically possible: there are properties/?
and q

w2

respectively. Properties

p and

q are similar with

respect to nomological role and hence bear one kind
of counterpart relation to another.

However, properties and p and q

are not similar with respect to their natures.
(For a

more concrete example, consider two worlds
nomological

roles.)

in

which charge and spin have switched

3

Suppose the advocate of property counterpart theory

identifies the relation

of nomological similarity with the counterpart relation defined on
properties. Then the
advocate of property counterpart theory can deny the
argument. All that
respect to

how

is

needed

natural

it is.

is

that a property can

And

there

is

no reason

first

premise of the incompatibility

have a counterpart
to think that

that differs with

such a case cannot

occur. This kind of property counterpart theorist should probably deny premise

Suppose
relation with

that

we have

relation

that the advocate

some

similarity relation that

discussed. There

marches

of counterpart theory

in step

is

is

no reason

(1).

identifies the counterpart

determined by the three similarity relations
to think that this “average” similarity

with the relation of similarity with respect to nature.

So

perhaps this kind of counterpart theorist should deny premise (1) as well.

Suppose

that the advocate

counterpart relations,

She may then wish

of counterpart theory claims that there are multiple

some of which correspond

to the

to say that, in different contexts,

relations; in context C, a statement

of the form p

every property that bears the counterpart relation
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is

ones that

we invoke

essentially

made

we have

discussed.

different counterpart

F is true just in case

salient in

C to p is F. On this

)

view, there will be

some

contexts in which the salient counterpart
relation

of nomological similarity. So, on

this

is

the relation

view, there will be contexts in which
premise

(1

is false.

So those who hold

that properties are

world-bound and so adopt counterpart

theory have a good reason to be suspicious
of (1) as well.

On

the other hand, those

hold that properties are transworld objects have a
good reason to endorse premise

Although

I

that there

is

can’t

hope

to

show that

properties are transworld entities here, if I can

an intimate connection between

this issue

who

(1).

show

and the possibility of gunky

space, this in itself will be a significant result. Accordingly,

I

will

now turn to

an

examination of the second premise.

A Defense of Premise (2)

4.2.2

One of the background assumptions needed

to ensure the truth

of premise

(2) is

the following:

(PS):

Necessarily, r

is

an atomic region of spacetime

iff r is point-sized.

(PS) rules out the possibility of extended yet simple regions of spacetime. But
that’s fine;

I

argued in chapter 3 that such regions are impossible. (PS) also rules out

the possibility of unextended yet mereologically

also

seems unobjectionable, although

Given (PS), spacetime

is

gunky

if

I

complex regions of spacetime. This

don’t have an argument against this possibility.

and only

if

spacetime has no point-sized proper

The advocate of gunky spacetime may want
even

if

she does not take them with

full

to talk

parts.

about points of spacetime

ontological seriousness. Points of spacetime

can be modeled by sequences of regions of spacetime. Ersatz points
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may

be thought of

as an ordered set of regions

and

such

that, (i) if

m is less than n, then Rn

is

a part of Rm,

the diameter of Rn approaches zero
as n approaches infinity. [Forrest
(1996):

(ii)

128].

Rm

These ersatz points aren’t real points, since they
do not belong

to the

same

ontological category as regions.

This point about ersatz points not being real
points

we might
run like

think that

this, if

we have

spacetime

is

a quick argument for premise
simplistic, then

it

is

important. If we ignore

(2).

it,

This argument would

decomposes without remainder

into

point-sized parts. These point-sized parts are real parts
of spacetime. Presumably, the

geometrical properties of a region of spacetime are fixed
by the intrinsic character of

and the relations instantiated by the parts of that region. But
being point-sized

is

this

seems

to

it

doesn

that

a perfectly natural property, since the geometrical
properties of a

point are not fixed by the intrinsic character of or relations
instantiated by
parts, since

mean

t

have any. So,

if

spacetime

is

its

proper

simplistic, then being point-sized

is

a perfectly natural property.

So

far,

so good. But the argument proceeds:

being point-sized

to

is

is

gunky spacetime

is

possible, then

not perfectly natural, since to be point-sized in a gunky spacetime

be a certain kind of defined sequence.

The mistake

if

It is

here that

we must abandon

this

is

argument.

straightforward but instructive: in a gunky spacetime, just as there are no

spacetime points, strictly speaking nothing instantiates the property of being point-sized
either.

In a

gunky spacetime,

the property of being point-sized

is

not had by certain

sequences of regions. Instead, certain sequences of regions have properties that allow

them

(

to

“model” or “simulate”

points.

So the quick argument

2 ).
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fails to

support premise

Nonetheless, the mistake
to support

in a

premise

we

(2),

is

instructive, for

it

tells

us what to look

should find some property or relation
that

is

for.

In order

perfectly natural

world with one kind of spacetime but not
perfectly natural in a world with a

different kind

of spacetime.

The kinds of properties we

will look at

when defending premise

features of worlds with simplistic spacetime
and worlds with

(2) are metrical

gunky spacetime. Perhaps

similar examples that support premise
(2) could be enumerated by attending to the
abstract projective or topological features of such
spaces.

there are possible worlds at

I

am

inclined to think that

which spacetime has topological and projective

but lacks metrical structure. At such worlds, there are
no facts about
objects are from each other. Perhaps there are also worlds in

topological structure but no richer structure. Perhaps
in

It

which spacetime

may

(2).

be

is

Regardless,

I

how

structure

distant

which spacetime has

some of those worlds

gunky, while others are worlds in which spacetime

that, in these

more

is

are worlds

simplistic.

worlds, there are properties that could serve to motivate premise

will concentrate

on worlds

in

which spacetime has metrical

features as

well.

Plausible candidates for motivating premise (2) are diameter and distance. If

spacetime

is

of the form x

The

is

n units fromy. (Sometimes

this relation is called

spacetime interval.)

things that instantiate these relations are spacetime points. In simplistic spacetime,

all facts

in

simplistic, then the fundamental distance relations are two-place relations

about the geometry of spacetime follow from the facts about which points stand

which distance

which regions.

relations to each other and the facts about

We can,

which points

for example, determine the diameter of an
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are parts of

open sphere once we

know

the facts about

which points

bear to each other. The procedure
parts of the

smallest

open sphere

number such

are parts of the sphere and the distances
these points
is

straightforward:

assume

that the set of point-sized

The diameter of our open sphere

is S.

that, for

where n

is n,

number such

distance between

that, for

them

is less

the

any two members of S, the distance between them

than n. Similarly for closed spheres: the diameter of a
closed sphere
smallest

is

is n,

is less

where n

the

is

any two point-sized parts of the closed sphere, the

than or equal to

n.

So, in a simplistic spacetime, the various determinate properties
of the

determinable being a sphere with a diameter of n units are not perfectly
natural

They

properties.

are less than fully natural, since they can be defined in terms
of

parthood and the distance relations obtaining between points.

What about

the distance relations obtaining between non-overlapping regions?

There are two sorts of distance relations between regions that
both of which can be defined in a straightforward way
there

is

the

maximal distance

relation.

maximally distant by n units just

some

point-sized part of r2, and

if

spacetime

For closed regions, regions

by n units just

instantiated

rl

has no point-sized part that

by n units just
of r2, and

rl

is simplistic.

rl

and

rl

r2.

Second,

First,

r2 are

from

further than n units

and r2 are maximally

we might be

relation. For closed regions, regions rl

is

interested in the

and r2 are minimally

in case rl has a point-sized part that is n units

has no point-sized part that

is

in,

upper bound of the distance relations

in case n is the least

by point-sized parts of rl and

minimal distance

be interested

in case rl has a point-sized part that is n units

from any point-sized part of r2. For open regions, regions
distant

we might

distant

from some point-sized

part

closer than n units to any point-sized part of

175

2

For open regions,

r2.

greatest lower

r2.

and r2 are minimally distant by n units
just

rl

bound of the distance

relations instantiated

in case n is the

by point-sized parts of rl and

(Obviously, other similar distance relations between
regions can be defined.)

(What
that

if the

regions in question overlap? If we

like, in

those cases,

both the minimal and the maximal distances between
those regions
Neither the determinates of rl

determinates of rl

spacetime

is

maximally distant by n units

What

if

between

spacetime

We can even,

if

we

zero.)

nor the

and the distance

points.

is

gunky? The standard construction of ersatz points

earlier appeals to the notion

that spherical regions

to r

say

minimally distant by n units to r2 are perfectly natural
given that

simplistic, since both are definable in terms of parthood

relations obtaining

mentioned

is

is

is

we may

of diameter. [Forrest (1996)]. Once we assume

have diameters of various lengths, we can construct ersatz

like,

points.

assign ersatz distances to the ersatz points, for there are

functions that take ordered pairs of points to real numbers that satisfy the constraints
on

being a distance function. But
that ersatz points bear to

parts

shouldn’t think that these ersatz distance relations

each other are genuine distance relations. Ersatz points are not

of space, nor are they related via
In fact,

to

we

it

is

real spatial relations to real parts

a kind of a category mistake to suggest that ersatz points are related

each other via real distance relations.

particularly vivid

of space.

manner

if

we

I

think that

we can

attend to the fact that

see that this

we can

is

“construct” ersatz points

that are equally suitable for our purposes without appealing to set theory.

instead of identifying points with certain ordered sets,

with certain propositions.

we

On this way of “constructing”
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so in a

For example,

could identify ersatz points
“points” from regions, points

may be thought of as

propositions that state that there are concentric
spheres of ever-

shrinking diameter that are parts of each other. Each
point could,
“identified” with a proposition that states of

some

series

if

of regions

we

like,

be

that they are

concentric, have their predecessors as parts, and are such
that the limit of the diameters

of these regions

which

is zero.

No

one would take seriously the claim

really are propositions about regions

from one another or located

in space.

No

their properties, are actually distant

proposition does or can bear any distance

any other. The distance relations

relation to

and

that these “points,”,

that link points to

each other

in a simplistic

spacetime are not instantiated by ersatz points in a gunky spacetime.
So,

when

what

reveals

is

defining minimal and maximal distance between regions in a

metaphysically significant about gunky spacetime,

we

way

shouldn’t

that

make

use of the notion of distance between points. Doing so will not provide us with a

perspicuous account of which metrical features are basic.

It

seems

that the

fundamental metrical

diameters of certain spherical regions. This

is

facts in

gunky spacetime

are about the

not surprising. Just as in a simplistic

spacetime every region of spacetime decomposes without remainder into points,

gunky spacetime every region of spacetime decomposes without remainder

in a

into non-

overlapping spherical regions. The various determinables of having a diameter of n
units

seem

to

be basic in worlds with gunky spacetime,

What about

the distances between regions?

i.e.,

perfectly natural.

We might hope that we could

account for the various distance relations between regions in terms of the diameters of
larger spherical regions that

account

is

encompass them. Let us explore whether

satisfactory for the

two

sorts

this sort

of distance relations between regions
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of

that

we

have discussed, minimal and maximal distance. 4
the minimal distance relation in a

gunky space. As

question do not overlap. (If they do overlap,

maximal distances between them

We will

is

before,

by trying

we assume

we can assume

We will

zero.)

start

that the

to characterize

the regions in

minimal and

need the following notion and

definitions:

Notation:

D(x) = n

the diameter of x

x<y
xoy

x

is

is

n

a proper part of y

x overlaps y

Definitions:

x and y are concentric
Either:

(i)

=df.:

x<y and,

Let n be the diameter of some sphere S such that S<y but
there is no sphere S’ such that D(S’)>D(S) and S’<y
and -S’ ox. Then there are at least two spheres such that the
(ii)

-Sox and

diameter of these spheres

is n,

both spheres are a part of y, and

neither sphere overlaps x.

(i)><xand,

Or:

Let n be the diameter of some sphere S such that S<x but
-Soy and there is no sphere S’ such that D(S’)>D(S) and S’<x
(ii)

and -S’oy. Then there are at least two spheres such that the
diameter of these spheres is n, both spheres are a part of x, and
neither sphere overlaps y.

Informally, concentric spheres are centered around the

same point

in spacetime.

A spherical region o barely avoids region r =df.
and

(ii)

(i) r does not overlap o
any sphere larger than, but concentric with, o overlaps r.

Informally, regions that barely avoid each other are touching.

avoidance

is

The notion of bare

accordingly a topological notion.

We can now define minimal distance in a gunky space as follows:
(MinDG): The minimal

distance between rl and r2

is n,

where n

diameter of the smallest sphere that barely avoids both rl and
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r2.

is

the

In order to define

maximal distance

in a

gunky spacetime, we need

the following

additional definition:

A spherical region S barely contains regions rl
proper part of 5, (ii) r2 is a proper part of
5,
region S2 such that S2 is concentric with S,

and r2 =df. (i) rl is a
there is no spherical
D(S2)<D(S), and rl and r2
(iii)

are proper parts of S2.

Informally, if a spherical region barely contains
a region, then that region
against the inside surface of the sphere.
forth

Were

that region

any

larger,

it

is

pressed

would

burst

from the sphere.

Now that we
maximal distance

have the notion bare containment,

we can

introduce the notion of

as follows:

(MaxDG): The maximal distance between rl and r2 is n, where n
diameter of the largest spherical region that barely contains rl and

When

formulating the definitions of minimal and maximal distance,

to appeal to facts

is

the fundamental metrical notion in a

a worry about these definitions that

is

genuine,

it

may be

that the

gunky

is

we have

we needed

gunky spacetime. However,

worth discussing. For,

if this

worry

is

theorist needs to take the facts about relations

minimal and maximal distances as basic metrical

The

the

only about parthood and diameter. This provides further reason to

think that diameter

there

is

r2.

definitions of minimal and

facts as well.

maximal distance

are acceptable provided that

a guarantee that, for any two non-overlapping regions, there

is

some

larger

spherical region that barely contains both. If this

is

always the case, facts about

minimal and maximal distance can be cashed out

in

terms of facts about diameter and

parthood in the manner

we just

explored. But

the case?
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why

should

we assume

that this

is

always

Elsewhere,

I

have argued

that there are certain discrete
spaces at

which objects

bear directly various distance relations to
each other even though there are no
intervening regions of space. [McDaniel
(forthcoming)]. For example, there
are
possible worlds in which there are exactly
two spatial points pi and p2 that are 10
feet

from each other, despite the lack of intervening
space.

gunky spaces

at

which various gunky regions of space

relations to each other?

Why not then also

allow for

directly bear various distance

At such a world, two gunky spheres might
have a minimal

distance of 10 feet from each other and a

even though there are no larger spheres

maximal distance of 15

that

feet

from each other

have both of them as proper

parts.

They

simply directly bear these distance relations to each other.
If this is possible,

then the definitions of minimal and maximal distance
are not

adequate. There are worlds at which they give incorrect
results. And,
definitions are not adequate, then

it

seems

to

me

that the

gunky

if these

theorist

must take

the

notions of minimal and maximal distances as additional primitive
notions. But then the

gunky

theorist

relations.

must say

gunky space, these notions pick out

that, in

perfectly natural

For the relations that they pick out are not instantiated in virtue of any deeper

metrical facts.

I

facts

have argued that

facts

about the diameters and distances between regions are

about perfectly natural properties and relations in worlds with gunky spacetime but

are not facts about perfectly natural properties and relations in worlds with simplistic

spacetime. So

it

seems

that the distance relations

and the diameter properties

in

worlds

with simplistic spacetime have a degree of naturalness that they do not have in worlds
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with gunky spacetime. If this

is

the case, then premise
(2)

possible rejoinders to the argument for premise

Rejoinder one:

it

is

also true that the properties had

It is

I

will

now

look

at

(2).

true that the properties

that are instances of the determinable

is true.

had by regions of gunky spacetime

having a diameter of n units are perfectly

by regions of simplistic spacetime

natural.

that are

instances of the determinable having a diameter
of n units are not perfectly natural. But
these are not the

same determinate

properties.

In

gunky spacetimes, regions enjoy one

kind of diameter property; in simplistic spacetimes, regions
enjoy a different kind of
diameter-property. For example, there are exactly two determinate
properties that go by
the

name having a diameter of 1 0 feet. One of those

worlds with simplistic space, the other

And

so your argument for premise (2)

Response

is

properties

is

instantiated only in

instantiated only in worlds with

gunky space

fails.

to rejoinder one: this rejoinder violates a necessary truth about

determinates and determinables. Properties p and
q are determinates of the same

determinable only

properties.

Each

if

is

p is

equally as natural as

as natural as the others.

natural determinates of charge.

Rejoinder two:

that

we

natural.

call

call

it

is

So

q.

Compare

Or consider

the various determinate

the various and yet equally

this rejoinder fails.

true that the properties had

by regions of gunky spacetime

having a diameter of 10 feet, having a diameter of 11 feet,

It is

also true that the properties had

But these are not the same properties.

The answer

is

etc. are perfectly

by regions of simplistic spacetime

having a diameter of 10 feet, having a diameter of 11 feet,

natural.

mass

Why do we

etc. are

call

that

we

not perfectly

them by

similar

names?

straightforward: because they behave in similar-sounding ways. They are
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similar with respect to their structural role, and
this similarity
call

them by similar names. Note

that this rejoinder

is

why

it

makes sense

to

does not require adopting

counterpart theory for properties.

Response
to their structure.

But

I

to rejoinder two:

Then

I

Suppose

am happy to

would have been happy

to let

let

you

that the properties are similar with respect

you

call these properties

call these properties

by similar names.

by similar names even

if

they hadn’t been similar with respect to their structure. What’s
in a name, after all?

But structural similarity comes cheap.

I

assume

that there are

worlds in which mass

similar with respect to structure to “gunky diameter.” In such a world,

continuous quantities. Whenever an object enjoys n units of mass,
that enjoys

distance,” etc., if we like.

has a proper part

we

can define “mass concentricity,” “minimal mass

But our doing

And, more importantly,

it

this

does not make mass-distance into genuine

does not make the things that

it

relates regions

spacetime, although of course you can call these things “regions” if you
spherical regions

have

real diameters, not fake diameters that

like.

of

Real

behave similarly with

respect to their structural role. This rejoinder requires us to say that a

is

in

fewer than n units of mass. Using the mereological notions of parthood and

overlap and the concept of mass,

distance.

it

mass comes

is

gunky spacetime

not a genuine spacetime.

Rejoinder

(3):

The various

properties of having a diameter of n units are

functional or multiply realizable properties. Functional properties are always realized

by other properties. For example, many philosophers take the property thinking about
blue skies to be a functional property. According to these philosophers, objects of all

sorts

can have this property, provided that their parts bear the right
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sort

of functional

relations to each other. Robots, ectoplasmic spirits,
and

human

property, although the relational structure that underwrites

it

beings

all

can have

differs in each case

this

Call

the various properties of having these relational or
functional properties the realizing

properties.

The

realizing properties can differ with respect to

how natural

nonetheless realize the same property. Perhaps being an ectoplasmic
a perfectly natural property, whereas being a
less

than perfectly natural property.

blue skies

is

more

spirits in state

C

It

natural in worlds in

human being enjoying

B

spirit in state

B

brain state

is

C is
a

does not follow that the property thinking about

which the property

than in worlds in which the property

enjoying brain states

they are and

is

is

realized by ectoplasmic

human

realized by

beings

.

Similarly, there are various properties that underwrite having a diameter
of 10

feet in a

gunky spacetime. And there

are various properties that underwrite having a

diameter of 10 feet in a simplistic spacetime. These properties differ with respect

how

to

natural they are. But the functional property having a diameter of 10 feet which
,

instantiated in both worlds, does not differ with respect to

Response
property, then

to rejoinder (3):

it is

If

how natural

having a diameter of 10 feet

realized in a world in

which mass

(or

some

is

is

a world in

relations to each other. Perhaps there are

a functional

which things stand

(2).
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But there

is

no

in various distance

no genuine spatiotemporal

world.

it is.

other property) plays “the

diameter role” in the fashion described in the response to rejoinder
reason to assume that such a world

is

relations in that

Second, spatiotemporal properties are not functional
properties.

them

in this

way

to ignore their qualitative aspects.

To

think of

Following Galen Strawson,

I

want

to say:

I

am

tempted

consider, not

to hold

my hands,

up

my hands,

but the space

like

G. E. Moore, and

— by which

I

mean

to

only the spatial

— between them, and to say: ‘This is space (spatial
extension),
and it is real, and I know its nature, in some very fundamental
respect,
whatever else I do not know about it or anything else (e.g. the fact
that it
extension

an aspect of spacetime) On this view the ordinary concept
of space,
or indeed the concept of spacetime, in which (I claim) a
fundamental
is

.

feature of our ordinary conception of space survives, has
correct nonstructural descriptive content. It does not relate only to
‘what

we may

call the causal skeleton

of the world’,

if to

say this

is to

say that

it does
not capture any aspect of the non-structural nature of the world. It
has
non- structural content, and can transmit this content to our more general

conception of the non-mental. [Strawson (2003): 57],
It is

the spatiotemporal properties themselves that have the qualitative aspect

and not some deeper properties
Rejoinder

that “realize them.”

Why not simply say that the various

(4):

perfectly natural in both worlds with

gunky spacetime and

diameter properties are
in

worlds with simplistic

spacetime? That undercuts the argument as well.

Response

to rejoinder (4):

One worry about

this

response

is

that

it

seems

to

require necessary connections between certain perfectly natural properties and relations

instantiated in worlds with simplistic spacetime.

feet

is

Suppose

that

having a diameter of 10

perfectly natural in worlds with simplistic spacetime. Presumably, the various

distance relations instantiated by points in simplistic spacetimes are also perfectly

natural.

But then there

natural properties

something

is

and

is

a necessary connection between two distinct sets of perfectly

relations.

For suppose there

a (point-sized) part of it

if

and only
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if

is

a continuous region such that

it is

(a point-sized region) less than

1

0 feet from

some

point

x.

(That

is,

suppose that

certain perfectly natural relations to each other.)
this

this region

It

has parts that stand in

follows as a matter of necessity that

region instantiates having a diameter
of 10 feet. Suppose that a region decomposes

without remainder into points and instantiates having
a diameter of 10
as a matter

of necessity,

relations to

each other.

a

Humean
I

will

relations.

look

Should
If

(CT)

spacetime

follows,

But

this sort

connections between perfectly

of necessary connection

is

unacceptable to

like myself.

conclude that premise

now

4.3

and

It

that this region has parts that stand in certain
perfectly natural

If rejoinder (4) is correct, then there are necessary

natural properties

feet.

is

at

(2) stands.

This completes

my argument

against (CT).

I

some of the consequences of rejecting (CT).

We Reject Simplistic
is false,

Spacetimes?

then either gunky spacetime

impossible.

It

seems

to

the claim that simplistic spacetime

is

me that we

is

impossible or simplistic

have reason to give more credence

possible. But perhaps this

is

simply a prejudice.

Perhaps instead there are good reasons to have the opposite preferences.

examine one argument

for the claim that

In a recent article titled

we

to

We will now

should prefer gunky spacetime.

“From Ontology

to

Topology

in the

Theory of

Regions,”, Peter Forrest argues for gunky space. [Forrest (1996)]. Forrest’s case for

gunky space
article.

we

The

is

based on two assumptions that he discusses

first

assumption

is

that space is continuous.

at the

beginning of the

The second assumption

is

that

are to adopt realism about regions of space, points of space, or both. [Forrest (1996):

34].

I

will argue later that, if continuous

gunky space
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is

possible, then something like

gunky space

discrete

dropped.

(We

is

also possible.

So the

first

assumption could possibly be

will return to this issue later.) Since

I

accept spacetime realism,

1

won’t

challenge the second assumption.
Forrest discusses three possible versions of spacetime
realism. First, there

is

the

points only ontology (POO), according to which there are
spacetime points but no
spatial regions.

(We
aren

Instead, there are “substitute regions,”

which

are sets of points of space.

can think of any set of spacetime points as a substitute for a
region of space.) These
t

genuine regions of space, since they belong to a different ontological
category

than the spacetime points.

Second, there

is

the regions only ontology

regions but no spatial points. Instead, there are

(ROO), according

substitute points,”

according to

ROO,

not explicitly say

there are

no

lines or planes

of space

either,

I

which there

which

of successively smaller spherical regions nested around the “points”.
these sequences as representing the limits of regions of space.)

to

(We

assume

are

are sequences

can think of

that,

although Forrest does

this.

Third, there

is

the

view

I

favor, the points

and regions ontology (PRO),

according to which there are spatial points and spatial regions. Spatial regions are

simply sums of points of space.

It is

hard to see

why anyone would

seriously favor

POO over PRO.

Once we have

regions as well.

Although the universal summation principle of classical mereology

controversial,

application to points of space

Here,

it

its

points of space, given classical mereology

is

the

is

not the source of its controversy.

seems harmless. And, once we have sums of points,
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we have

is

there any reason not to

think that these are regions?

I

can think of none.

will henceforth ignore

I

POO in

what

follows.

Accordingly, the choice facing us
to Forrest’s

argument for

is

between

ROO and PRO.

ROO (and hence against PRO).

has two premises. Forrest calls the

first

now

Let us

Forrest’s argument for

premise the Probability Premise.

He

attend

ROO

writes:

The Probability Premiss

states that in the best scientific theory we would
not assign point locations (or momenta) to particles, or consider
values
of fields at point locations. We would instead assign probabilities
to

regions. [Forrest (1996): 34-35],

Forrest’s basic idea

seems

to

be

this.

Given

that

we

are scientific realists,

we

should accept the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories. The
best
scientific theory is

made.

It is

one

in

which an ontological commitment

to regions

of spacetime

is

not clear, however, that the regions that our best scientific theory speaks of

need to be construed as other than

sets

of points.

On this

possibility, Forrest writes:

My objection is based on a rather general principle concerning setnamely that when assessing a theory we must not
be beguiled by the apparent simplicity conferred by the mathematical
technique of nested definitions. That is, we should unpack the
theoretic constructions,

definitions to arrive at the full description according to the theory

Applying

this general principle to the case in hand,

we

should be

reluctant to treat regions as sets of points if in the formulation of our

theory

we

are considering assignments of probabilities to regions. For

assignments of probabilities to

sets

of points,

if points are

considered

fundamental, are more complicated than assignments to regions,

if these

same reason, if the statement of our
require assignments of numbers to points, then we should
endorse a regions-only ontology, for on that ontology

are considered fundamental. For the

theory were to

be reluctant to

points are constructed as sets of regions. [Forrest (1996): 36].

I

have reproduced almost the

especially opaque.

I

am

entire passage since the

guessing that the main thrust here

should not be assigned to mathematical objects. So,
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if

is

argument here

is

that physical properties

we have

a theory that appears to

assign physical properties to mathematical objects, such as
sets or sequences, what the

theory

is

really

doing

the sets or sequences.

is

assigning complicated relational structures to the elements
of

And these

than the simpler properties that
point, then

I

complicated relational structures are more complicated

we

thought the theory was assigning. If this

think that something like this

is right.

is

Mathematical objects, such as

or sequences, simply are not the right sort of thing to bear physical quantities.
if

we

like,

located

speak as

where

its

if they

have them, for example, when we say that a

members

are.

But

we

Forrest’s

set

sets

We can,

of things

is

shouldn’t take this sort of talk to be asserting

fundamental facts about the world.

However, as

more than a

guess.

that he says

some

I

mentioned,

my

And one problem

interpretation of Forrest’s

argument here

is little

with this interpretation of Forrest’s argument

is

things that suggest that he does not take the assignment of

probabilities to regions to be analogous to the assignment of other fundamental

quantities.

For example, he writes that the probabilities being assigned need not be

genuine probabilities. They could instead be measures of degrees of truth or analyzable
as idealized relative frequencies. [Forrest (1996): 35].

why

an assignment

of, e.g.,

Given

an idealized relative frequency

this fact,

to a set

it is

hard to see

of points

is

any more

complicated than an assignment of an idealized relative frequency to a region composed

of the same points.
Forrest provides a second argument against taking the regions that are assigned

probabilities to be sets of points:

we have an ad hoc restriction on which regions are assigned
probabilities or we have an ad hoc restriction on which sets of points
regions. For we can assign probabilities only to measurable sets of
either

points...

[

Forrest (1996): 37].
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are

This argument also seems weak.
that

some non-empty

sets

First,

given

there

is

of points don’t count as regions. But the

measurable sets can have probabilities assigned

hoc reason for not assigning probabilities
Forrest’s

POO,

argument against

POO

no reason

to claim

fact that only

them provides a completely non-ad-

to

to them.

seems unsuccessful. Nonetheless,

it

may

be

that our best scientific theory requires either real regions or regions taken as sets of

points. In the

case,

we have

former case,

we have

a choice between

reason to prefer

POO to PRO

a

POO

commitment

and PRO. But, as

and some reason

to

of space. In the

to real regions

I

argued

earlier, there is

latter

no

have the opposite preference. So

our best scientific theory requires regions of some

sort,

we might

as well take

them

if

to

be real regions.
Let us

now turn

to Forrest’s second premise in his

argument for gunky space.

Forrest describes his argument against points as an Ockhamist argument:

most straightforward Ockhamist argument against [PRO] concerns
the number of entities being posited. We should show some preferences
for smaller infinite numbers over larger ones.
One of the attractions
of a regions-only ontology, even apart from the Probability Premiss, is
that we might in fact propose that there are only beth-zero regions, an
economy achievable on rival theories only if space is discrete. On more
the

.

.

.

conservative versions of the regions-only ontology

we

shall

have beth-

one many regions, represented by countable unions of spherical sets
which have rational coordinates for the centers and have rational radii.
On the rival points-and-regions ontology, there are, however, beth-two
regions obtained by summation from the beth-one

many

points.

[Forrest

1996 ): 37 38 ],
-

(

Since

PRO commits us to more things than ROO, and these additional things are

not part of the explicit ontological

prefer

commitment of our

ROO.
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best scientific theory,

we

should

Of course,

it

s

not clear that

could argue that Ockham’s razor
necessity, but

it

of points,

PRO

tells

does not require us

points belong to the

Ockham’s

razor has a real application here.

us not to multiply types of things beyond

to not multiply tokens

same ontological category

as regions

razor as a

maxim

clear that

we need

For

some

entity,

And, since

necessity.

and regions are simply sums

Even

if

we

understand Ockham’s

against postulating unnecessary tokens of things as well as types,
to understand

seems reasonable

it

beyond

does not violate Ockham’s razor. 5

A second worry about Ockham’s razor is this.

things.

One

it

it is

as telling us not to postulate unnecessary distinct

to hold that, if we

make an

ontological

commitment

to

our belief in the entity’s parts does not constitute a further ontological

commitment. And these points are simply

parts of the regions to

which we

are already

committed.

I

4,4

conclude that Forrest’s argument for gunky spacetime

What about
I

Material Atomless

is at

best inconclusive.

Gunk?

have argued against (CT) and argued

possibility of spacetime points is not genuine.

that

I

an alleged reason to disbelieve

have indicated (but not justified)

preference for the necessity of simplistic spacetime over the necessity of gunky

spacetime. Accordingly,

(NP):

I

will

(OT):

I

am committed to:

Necessarily, every spacetime

now

is

simplistic.

discuss the occupation thesis, which, recall,

Necessarily, an object

is

material atomless

occupies a gunky region of spacetime.
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is

gunk

the following:

if

and only

if

it

in the

my

(NP) and (OT) jointly imply the impossibility of material
atomless gunk.

However,

I

will argue that

atomless gunk

is

The case
fact that

that

for material atomless

case can be

made
I

4.4.

1

is

is

impossible.

The weak case

my case

is

it

is

not non-existent. The

some reason
is

to think

defeasible.

Hud Hudson

impossible, but

gunk

we have

for the claim

Hudson’s argument

fails.

not yet seen a reason to

as if yet undefeated. This will

against (OT).

In chapter 2

we examined

the Occupation Thesis

various answers to the Simple Question.

discuss what these answers imply about OT.

OT is

to

will argue that

I

for atomless

The Simple Question and

imply that

not strong but

examine an argument due

Perhaps material atomless gunk

complete

gunk

against material atomless gunk, then the evidence will be

will

atomless gunk

it is.

does not imply that material

object meets this conception. However, this evidence

trumped. Accordingly,

think that

itself

a coherent conception of atomless gunk provides

some possible

that material

(NP) by

is false.

impossible.

we have

If a strong

(OT)

I

will begin

I

will

by discussing views

now

that

false.

We start with the Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon). MaxCon
implies that

OT is

false, for, if

MaxCon

is true,

occupies a gunky region of space and yet

object

is

a simple just in case

it

is

then there could be an object that

a simple. Recall that

also

maximal

is

then a region

states that

occupies a maximally continuous region of space.

region of gunky space could be continuous and filled with matter.

is

MaxCon

filled

with a simple, given
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Any such

MaxCon.

an

A

region that

Let us consider the Instance of a Fundamental Property
Instance also seems to imply that

(Instance).

OT is false.

View of Simples

Consider an object that

exactly occupies an extended region of gunky space. There

is

no principled reason why

such an object could not instantiate a perfectly natural property, But then, given
Instance, this object

would be a simple.

Let us consider the Physical Indivisibility

if

gunk

reside.

is

possible, there are

some gunky worlds

These objects are counter-examples

to

View of Simples
in

which physically

show

However,

views

is itself false.

to the

Simple Question do have

I

OT is false,

that

hope

indivisible objects

OT, given PIV.

Three of the seven views discussed in chapter 2 imply that
Unfortunately, this doesn’t

(PIV). Presumably,

since

I

OT is false.

argued that each of these three

that the recognition that several plausible answers

this implication helps to loosen

OT’s

grip

on our

intuitions.

What about
Simples, which

also

seems

but in fact

I

4.4.2

I

favor,

to offer

is

the other answers to the Simple Question?

is silent

no help on

on the question of whether

this question.

we

Zimmerman

(1996),

possible. Strictly speaking,

that material atomless

OT is true.

We will

View of

Independence
to

imply OT,

return to this issue later.

should be very cautious before endorsing OT.

Zimmerman’s Argument For
In

Brutal

The Pointy View might seem

consistent with the denial of OT.

conclude that

The

gunk

Material Atomless

Dean Zimmerman argues

Zimmerman’s conclusion
is

is

Gunk
that material atomless

gunk

stronger than the mere claim

possible: he argues that, necessarily, any continuous
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is

must have some gunky

material object

continuous material objects,

it

that are less than

p

is

about p

some

that there are

worlds with

follows that material atomless gunk

Zimmerman, following Richard

R is an open sphere

Given

part.

=

is

possible.

Cartwright, employs the following definitions:

df.

the

members of R

are all and only those points

fixed distance from p.

R =df. every open sphere about p has a non-null
R and the complement of R.

a boundary point of

intersection with both

R

is

a closed region =df.

R contains all of its boundary points.

R

is

an open region =df.

R contains none of its boundary points.

R

is

a partially open region =df.

points.

Zimmerman
(Dl):

R contains some but not

all

of its boundary

6

then introduces the following definitions:

Object x

is

points in

common

adjacent to region

R

=df. the region exactly filled

with R, and the union of the two regions

is

by x has no
a

connected region.
(In a parenthetical

remark immediately following the statement of Dl, Zimmerman

notes that disconnected regions are those separated by at least a point that

is

included in

neither region, while connected regions must not be even that far apart.)

(D2):

x

is

a closed object =df x

such thaty

of x, there

is
is

is

a spatially located object; and, for every y

a part of x adjacent to a region

a set

which

is

not filled by a part

A of simple parts of y such that each member of A is

adjacent both to regions filled by parts of x and by regions not

filled

by

any part of x.
(D3):

an open object =df x is a spatially located object; x has proper
parts; and there is no set of simple parts of x such that each member
adjacent both to regions filled by parts of x and regions not filled by

x

is

any part of x.
(D4):

x

is

=df x is a spatially located object; x has
neither open nor closed. [Zimmerman (1996):6-7j.

a partially open object

proper parts; x

is
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is

Definitions (D2)-(D4) employ both mereological and
topological concepts, and
the concept of occupation.

Simples,

it

Zimmerman

follows that an object

Zimmerman

region of space.

is

notes that, if we assume the Pointy

closed

and only

if

also notes that, if we

if

it

View of

exactly occupies a closed

assume

that, necessarily, all

continuous material objects decompose without remainder into point-sized
simples,
follows that an object

is

open

if

and only

However, as Zimmerman points
gunk,

it

is

not true that an object

is

open

if

it

exactly occupies an open region of space. 7

out, if we

if

it

allow for the possibility of atomless

and only

if

it

exactly occupies an open region

of space. Specifically, given Zimmerman’s definitions, a gunky object could occupy a
closed region of space.

Zimmerman’s view

leaves open the possibility, which

was

also

discussed in chapter 3, that an object could occupy a region and yet have a different

mereological structure than the region

it

occupies.

simple parts; a gunky object that occupies

What happens
point-sized?

It

was

if

this

we

it

need

A closed region of space contains
not.

drop the assumption that

all

and only material simples are

assumption that grounded the equivalence between being a

closed object and exactly occupying a closed region.

If we

allow for extended simples,

what changes?
It is

clear that

no extended simple can be an open

of open object that open objects have proper

object.

For

it

is

However,

part of the

it

is

not part of

the definition of closed object that closed objects have proper parts. (This

is

important,

definition

since

all

point-sized objects are closed given

extended simple

Zimmerman’s

O exactly occupies region R.

located object. And, since

parts.

It

definition.)

follows then that

O

is

Suppose an
a spatially

O has no proper parts, the set of simple parts of O contains
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only O. (The set of proper parts of O

O

a closed object since
,

then

O

O will

is

is

such

is

that, if

empty

the

O

set.)

Given

this,

it

adjacent to a region that

is

O

adjacent both to regions filled by

and by regions not

is

filled

count as a closed object given Zimmerman’s definitions even

occupies an open region of space. This
objects, given

Zimmerman

is

s definitions,

emerges

that

O is

not filled by O,

by O. Note

if

that

O exactly

strange: all extended simples are closed

even

if

they exactly occupy an open region of

space.

Zimmerman’s

definitions of closed and

open objects obscure another question:

what are the topological properties of the objects

that

occupy regions of space?

Material objects can have shapes, just as regions of space can have shapes.

of a region’s shape

is its

topological structure, e.g., whether

Likewise, one aspect of a material object’s shape

Zimmerman’s view, do

is its

it

is

One

aspect

continuous, open,

topological structure.

etc.

On

material objects inherit the shapes of the regions they exactly

occupy? Or can these two kinds of shape properties come apart?

Given the Extrinsic Theory, which
topologically closed just in case

material object

is

clear that

is

yet

argued for in chapter

Zimmerman holds
e.g.,

the

3,

a material object

is

occupies a closed region of space. Likewise, a

topologically open]us\. in case

regions they occupy,

But,

it

I

that

some shape

it

occupies an open region of space.

properties of objects

volume of an object

is

It

match those of the

equal to the volume of its region.

on Zimmerman’s view, can a material object be closed in Zimmerman’s sense and

still

be topologically open, because

open region of space?

it is

an extended simple that exactly occupies an

On Zimmerman’s view,

Zimmerman’s sense because

it

is

can a material object be open

material atomless
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gunk and

in

yet be topologically

closed because

it

exactly occupies a closed region of space?

We are

left

without clear

guidelines of how to answer these questions.

There are other strange features of Zimmerman’s
definitions of open object and
closed object. For example, given these definitions, there
are possible worlds that
contain an object that

partially open.)

there

is

object

Consider a possible world

is

O

is

The reason why

satisfied.

no y

O that is

that is a part of

Similarly,

O

is

adjacent to

O that do

such that each

the second condition

is finitely

open

is

member

O

vacuously

not contain

is

is

vacuously

is spatially

satisfied.

The reason why

vacuously satisfied

O or a part of O.

by any part of O. Note that

by

maximal region of space

object that

in

is

is

O

this result

is

O

or a part of

So there

the third

is

no

set

no regions

of simple parts of

was achieved without assuming whether

a topologically

is

open region or a topologically
is finite

and

in

which

topologically closed and exactly occupied by a material

which the maximal region of space
is

is

satisfied is that

that there are

both open and closed. Similarly, there are worlds

a material object that

is

located, has proper parts, and the

closed region. So, presumably, there are worlds in which space

and

is,

adjacent both to regions filled by parts of O and regions not

is

the region exactly occupied

the

extended, that

adjacent to a region not occupied by

an open object, since

condition for being an open object

filled

which space

and the second condition for being closed

spatially located

third condition for being

O

in

O that has proper parts and exactly occupies this maximal region of space. O

vacuously

O.

both open and closed. (These objects, accordingly, are
not

a maximally large region of space, which has finite extent.
Consider a material

closed since

there

is

is

in

which space

is finite

topologically open and exactly occupied by

both open and closed.
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This

is

a strange result.

Zimmerman’s claim

that,

Simples and the rejection of atomless gunk, an object
exactly occupies a closed (open) region of space,
filled space, these

case,

and

is

given the Pointy

closed (open) if and only

if

it

In worlds with finite matter-

is false.

equivalences do not hold. However, this

this feature

View of

of Zimmerman’s view does not seem

is

an admittedly unusual

to play a crucial role in

anything in the argument that follows.

Let us

(1 )

now turn to Zimmerman’s argument
If

for the possibility of atomless gunk:

extended objects could be entirely composed of simples, then

either

(i)

necessarily, every extended object is closed,

necessarily, every extended object

extended object
metaphysics”

(2)

Alternatives

(3)

If

(ii)

were

is partially

is

open, or

open,

(iv)

(iii)

(ii)

necessarily, every

some “mixed bag

is true.

(iii)

true,

and

(iv) are impossible.

then extended objects could not be composed

entirely of simples.

(4)

If

(i)

were

true,

then extended objects could not be composed

entirely of simples.

(5)

So, if extended objects could be

composed

entirely of simples,

then they could not be composed entirely of simples.
Therefore, extended objects could not be composed entirely of

simples.
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By

a

“mixed bag metaphysics,” Zimmerman means a metaphysics

compossibihty of some of the following:

partially

open

objects,

that allows for the

open

objects, and

closed objects.

Zimmerman assumes

the following propositions:

(Matter): Necessarily, if x and
y are material objects, then

and y

to exactly

[Zimmerman

occupy the same region of space

(at

the

it is

same

not possible for x
time).

(1996): 2-4],

(A) The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts. [Zimmerman (1996):
(B) If two objects are in contact, then

it is

8].

impossible for two distinct non-

overlapping objects to be closer together than the two objects in question.

[Zimmerman

(1996): 9].

(C) For any two possible shapes of a part of the surface of an extended object,

possible for there to be extended objects having surfaces with those shapes

is

that are in contact.

[Zimmerman

(D) For every extended object x that

y and

(B) and (D)

I

seem

will focus

role that each

fills

a connected region,

then y and z are in contact.

relatively harmless,

have already discussed and criticized

criticisms.

(1996): 10].

if

extended objects

z are discrete proper parts of z such that every part of x

sum of y and z,

I

it

and

DAUP

(1996): 10],

and

will not revisit those

(Matter) and (C) before examining the

of Zimmerman’s assumptions plays
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a part of the

have nothing to say against them.

in chapter 3

my critical comments on

argument.

I

[Zimmerman

is

in motivating the premises

of his

Let’s begin with a discussion of (Matter).
There are

We

(Matter).

to understand

can take (Matter) to be a synthetic metaphysical
claim about the nature of

material objects. Alternatively,

we

can understand (Matter) as a stipulative

one that imposes a constraint on what
former route,

two ways

we

chapter 2, where

it

is

to called a material object

can directly argue against
I

this principle.

argued that there are good reasons

This

is

8

If

,

definition,

we

adopt the

the route that

I

took in

to believe that co-located material

objects are possible.

On the
false.

other hand, if we adopt the

latter route,

we cannot

claim that (Matter)

is

We can, however, argue that nothing satisfies the definition of “material object”

that (Matter) partially fixes.

In fact,

I

think a stronger claim

nothing satisfies this stipulative definition. Given
object,” there could be

no material

correct: necessarily,

this partial definition

objects. Accordingly,

reason to introduce this definition to begin with.

is

of “material

one would have no good

You can

say

it

if

you want

to,

but

why

would you want to?

We need to distinguish the following two claims:
(

1

)

Necessarily, no

two material

objects

occupy the same space

at the

same

time.

(2)

If x is a material object

and y

is

a material object, then

x andy do not occupy the same space
If

we

understand (Matter) to be equivalent to

acceptable stipulation in the sense that

objects.

Compare
(3)

(1)

it is

at the

(1),

same

it

is

necessary that

time.

then (Matter)

is

an

possible for objects to count as material

and (2) with the following:

Necessarily, no two bachelors are married to each other.
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If x is

(4)

a bachelor and y

is

a bachelor, then

it is

necessary that x and y do

not marry each other.

Since

it

is

part of the

meaning of the word “bachelor”

that bachelors are

unmarried, but not part of the meaning of the word “bachelor” that
bachelors are
essentially unmarried, something can be a bachelor.
(3)

however,

is

unacceptable

if

(4),

is

an acceptable stipulation.

clearly false, if understood not as a stipulative definition, and
clearly

understood as a stipulation, for nothing could have an essence

that is

impossible to have. There are no objects that are essentially bachelors. And, moreover,
there couldn’t be.

The important thing

to note

interpreted as (2), not as (1).

acceptable

(3).

And

is

that

(2) is

Zimmerman

intends that (Matter) be

analogous to the unacceptable

Since nothing can have an essence that

is

make

possibility of there being material objects. This

now turn

to (C),

which

the surface of an extended object,

it is

an unacceptable stipulation.

we

if

we

require that objects

in effect eliminate the

would be a strange thing

states that, for

to do.

9

any two possible shapes of a part of

possible for there to be extended objects having

surfaces with those shapes that are in contact.

that

(2)

impossible to have,

be essentially impenetrable to count as material objects,

is

not the

Finally, the considerations discussed in chapter 2 for the claim that

material objects can interpenetrate also suffice to

Let us

(4),

Zimmerman’s informal statement of (C)

extended objects are not kept from touching one another simply because of their

shapes.

[Zimmerman

(1996): 9].
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There are a few technical issues that need to be addressed before we proceed
with a

(C).

critical

discussion of (C).

It is

not clear that

has properly formulated

There are two problems with Zimmerman’s formulation of (C).

The

first

problem with Zimmerman’s formulation of (C)

that objects that are

boot)!

I

say that

it

“seems to” instead of “does” because
“surface.”

On one

seems

it

composed of the simples

that

I

am

to

imply

in contact to

not certain what

straightforward understanding of this term,

(C) does have this implication. Intuitively,

the region

is that

extended are nevertheless point-sized (and can stand

Zimmerman means by

is

Zimmerman

we can think of the

surface of an object as

occupy the boundary points of the

object.

Here

an example: consider an open sphere S of radius n around point p. Then the surface of

S is

the

object.

sum of points

that are exactly n distance

from p.

The sphere

is

an extended

There are parts of its surface that are point-sized. So (C) implies

that

it

is

possible for there to be extended objects that have a point-sized surface. But the

surface of an object just

surface, this

means

that

is

the

it is

sum of its boundary

points. If an object has a point-sized

in fact a point-sized object.

So (C) implies

that

it is

possible for there to be extended objects that nonetheless are point-sized. Surely this

is

unacceptable.

A similar worry about (C) is that
objects are possible.

that every

seems

to

is

Given

to the thesis

open. The proof is similar to the previous one. Consider

Now consider two of the curved

surface of the sphere.

imply that one-dimensional closed

Such objects would presumably be counter-examples

extended object

our open sphere.

it

(C),

it is

lines

L and

M that are parts of the

possible that there are extended objects x and y

shape of M, and x
such that x has a surface with the shape of L, y has a surface with the
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and y are

way
x

is

that

in contact.

If x

and y are embedded

x and y can have surfaces

shaped

like

L and y

shaped

is

in a three-dimensional space, the
only

that are the

M

like

same shapes

as

L and

M respectively

is if

But then x and y are one-dimensional closed

objects (that nevertheless are in contact). This sort of result seems
unfortunate.
I

suspect that

Zimmerman

(C*): For any

intended something

two extended material

objects,

much

it is

simpler, such as:

possible for those two

objects to be in perfect contact.

Or perhaps:
(C**) For any two extended material objects with shapes SI and S2,
possible for there to be

two material

x2 has S2, and xl and x2 stand
I

will concentrate

plausible of the two.

It is

on (C**)
not clear

objects xl and x2 such that xl has SI,

in perfect contact.

10

what follows, since

in

it is

why one would

it

seems

to

me

to

be the most

hold (C**) and not also hold a more

general claim:

(C***): For any possible material objects x and >>,
are shaped like

Admittedly,

could

come

it is

clear that

x and y

(C***)

into perfect contact.

is

absurd, since

coming

it

implies that two point-sized objects

the continuity of space, this

But, if this provides a reason to doubt (C***),

why

is

impossible.

doesn’t the impossibility of two

into perfect contact also provide evidence

against (C**)?

When examining Zimmerman’s reasons

we

make

should also

possible for objects that

to be in perfect contact.

And, given

topologically closed material objects

it is

for thinking that (C**)

is true,

sure to see whether they also are reasons for thinking that (C***)
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is true.

If Zimmerman’s rationale for

(C*‘) also supports (C***), then we shouldn’t

trust his rationale.

Zimmerman’s
ascribe repulsive

rationale for (C**)

powers

If

some

—

i.e., if

is

based on the claim that

to objects simply because they

we

should not

have a certain shape:

configuration of the parts of the surface of an object
were such
that no objects having those configurations could
be brought

(C) were false,

we would

--

into contact
find ourselves forced to posit

repulsive powers which must be possessed by all substances
having
those shapes
Thus (C) would seem to be at least a methodologically
sensible working assumption, to be given up only as a last
resort.

[Zimmerman

Zimmerman

(1996): 12-13],

asks us to consider a case in which a topologically open cube and
a

topologically closed cube approach each other, starting at 10 feet apart and
sufficient force to

come

into contact after

two seconds. Suppose,

example there had been two closed cubes. Zimmerman asks us
related after

two seconds and notes

that,

instead, that in this

how they

Zimmerman

Was

still

be some

finite

writes:

their progress

pair, or did

are spatially

given standard topological assumptions and the

assumption that material objects cannot interpenetrate, they must
distance apart.

moving with

it

towards one another slower than that of the other

stop sooner? In either case,

we seem

repulsive powers of some kind to the cubes
“let the other

know”

that

it

- an

forced to attribute

ability

has a skin of simples so

each cube has

that, if

to

both the

approaching surfaces are closed, the bodies can make sure to slow down
or stop. Unless we ascribe repulsive forces to closed surfaces, Bolzano’s

world becomes one
deferential to

other’s

in

which a

certain class of objects are unaccountably

one another - always just managing to step out of each
they bang heedlessly into the members of another

way - while

class of objects. Surely repulsive forces

explain such behavior.

In chapter 2,

where

I

[Zimmerman

would have

to be posited to

(1996): 12],

argued that co-located point-sized objects are possible,

wrote:
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I

Suppose two

point-particles are approaching each other
at a rapid clip. If
co-located material objects are impossible, then
they must swerve out of
each other’s way. Or they must stop dead in their
tracks. Or one of them
must spontaneously disintegrate. Some event must occur
in each world

them from

that prohibits

occupying the same space. There is a de re
necessary repulsion between these two objects. The
price of denying the
possibility of co-located objects is accepting brute
de re modal facts like
these. The price is too high.

So

I

agree with

object simply because

Zimmerman
it

that

we

shouldn’t ascribe repulsive powers to an

has a certain shape. But the case of point-sized objects

approaching each other seems perfectly analogous to the case of two closed
objects
approaching each other.

can avoid

this

Zimmerman

worry by arguing

Zimmerman endorses

argues that the friend of extended closed objects

that they are not

the Pointy

wholly composed of simples. Since

View of Simples,

it

is

clear that

he cannot avoid the

analogous problem that arises when considering point-sized objects by arguing
these objects are not wholly

composed of simples.

Because Zimmerman

is

loathe to surrender (Matter) and accepts (C**) in order

to avoid postulating repulsive powers, he rejects the possibility

composed
sort

entirely of point-sized simples.

of case

is

that

to reject the possibility

of closed objects

The analogous move

to

of point-sized objects. But

make

in the

that are

second

this is surely overkill.

A more conservative move would be to give up (C**) and avoid postulating repulsive
forces by denying Matter. This

is

the course

Both (C**) and Matter are employed

So Zimmerman’s defense
argument

is

for (2) has

fails to establish that, if

I

recommend

in

following.

Zimmerman’s defense of premise

(2).

been undercut. Consequently, Zimmerman’s

continuous extended material objects

material atomless gunk.
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exist, then there

4A3

—A Coherent Conception

of Material Atomless

Gunk

However, although Zimmerman’s argument does not
atomless gunk, Zimmerman’s project

Zimmerman aimed

is

establish the possibility of

not necessarily doomed. The conclusion
that

to establish is very strong:

any possible world that contains

continuous extended objects contains material atomless
gunk. But Zimmerman’s

purposes would be equally served

if

he could establish the weaker claim that some

possible worlds that contain continuous extended material
objects also contain atomless

gunk.

Zimmerman
which he

calls the

describes two different metaphysics of continuous material
objects,

“Whiteheadian Metaphysics” and the “Brentanian Metaphysics.”

Both of these theories about the nature of continuous material objects postulate
atomless
gunk. If at least one of these metaphysics
world, then atomless gunk
see whether

I

tenable.

we have

is

possible.

is

exemplified by objects

at

some

So we should examine these two

reason to think they are true of objects

at

some

theories and

possible world.

will argue that the Brentanian conception of material atomless

gunk

However, the Whiteheadian conception of material atomless gunk

Let us

now turn to

(i)

is

Zimmerman

not

tenable.

states the view, the Brentanian

a conjunction of five theses:

All continuous extended objects are closed and hence have a skin

composed of point-sized simple
(ii)

is

is

a discussion of the Brentanian theory of the nature of

extended continuous material objects. As
metaphysics

possible

parts.

All continuous extended objects are partially gunky.
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(iii)

x and y are in contact just

in case

x has a point-sized part pl,y has a

point-sized part p2, and pi and p2 are co-located.
(iv)

All point-sized parts of material objects are ontologically
dependent on
the existence of the extended wholes that they are part
of. That

is, if

x

is

a point-sized part of^, then, necessarily, x exists only if
y
exists. [Zimmerman (1996): 34],

(v)

The existence of point-sized

entities is entailed

extended material objects. That

is,

by the existence of

necessarily, if an extended material

object exists, then point-sized objects located at the boundary points of
this object exists.

[Zimmerman

My first worry concerns (iv).
part of the object p.

11

Consider an extended object

E and

a point-sized

Now consider the object that is mereological remainder of E minus

p. Let us call this object E-.

common. Given

(1996): 28],

p and

E- are entirely

distinct;

they have no parts in

that these objects are entirely distinct, there should be

no necessary

connections between them. But then there should be a possible world in which p exists

and E- does not

exist.

well (because E-

contrary to

I

by

is

Presumably there

almost

all

a world like this in

is

of E). But then p

is

which

E does not exist as

not ontologically dependent on E,

(iv).

suspect that most advocates of Brentanian extended objects will be

this sort

of Humean consideration. So, although

don’t doubt that

it

I

find this

argument worrisome,

won’t convince the advocate of Brentanian extended

us attend to other concerns about the view.
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unmoved

objects.

So

I

let

My second worry is

about

(i).

The Brentanian

grants that objects have point-

sized parts. In fact, they have point-sized parts
located at each point-sized sub-region
of
the region exactly occupied

by the extended

object. This is

because the Brentanian

DAUP and maintains that each arbitrary undetached part of an object is in

accepts

contact with the remainder of that object, and, given

(iii),

contact can occur only

when

there are spatially coincident point-sized parts of the objects
in contact. Let us attend to

the set of simples

S that

collectively exactly occupy an

open sub-region R of the region

of space exactly occupied by an extended continuous material object. R
three-dimensional region of space. If there
fusion

is

an open object that

is

is

is

a continuous

a fusion of the elements of S, then that

nonetheless both continuous and extended. So the

Brentanian

is

committed

to

denying that there

Brentanian

is

committed

to

denying the principle of unrestricted composition, which

have embraced. This constitutes
i

my

is

such an object. But then the

I

second, and more serious, worry about the

'y

Brentanian picture.

I

conclude that the Brentanian metaphysics

Let us

According to
dimensions.

now

is

not viable.

attend to the Whiteheadian conception of material atomless gunk.

this conception,

[Zimmerman

every material object

(1996): 17-19].

On the

is

continuously extended in three

Whiteheadian

picture, material

objects do not have point-sized, one-dimensional, or two-dimensional parts. Finally, on

the Whiteheadian picture, every material object

set

of atomic point-sized

is

gunky since

it

is

not

composed of a

parts.

Most advocates of Whiteheadian

material objects hold that they are located in

Whiteheadian spacetime, where a spacetime

is
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Whiteheadian just

in case

it

has no parts

13
that are not three-dimensional continuous
regions.

is

However, we should ask whether

it

possible for there to be Whiteheadian material objects
in a classical simplistic

spacetime. If we can develop a clear picture of the
metaphysics of Whiteheadian
material objects in a simplistic spacetime, then

example
I

to

will

now

have conceived of a counter-

turn to a discussion of a recent argument against
atomless gunk,
in a

book by Hud Hudson,

Person. [Hudson (2001)].

believe

I

will

OT.

which can be found

Human

we

it is

titled

A

Materialistic Metaphysics of the

intend to use Hudson’s argument as a

I

unsound, a careful examination of why

it

fails will

foil;

although

provide us with a clear

and distinct conception of the metaphysics of Whiteheadian material objects.
4.4,4

Hudson’s Argument Against Material Atomless Gunk
Hudson’s argument

is

intriguing for several reasons. First,

appeals to specific answers to the Simple Question, which

we

Hudson

directly

discussed in chapter

2, in

order to settle the dispute concerning the possibility of atomless gunk. Second, Hudson

appeals to claims about the nature of spacetime. The overall structure of his argument

is

as follows:

MaxCon or the Pointy View is true.
MaxCon is true, then atomless gunk is impossible.

(a)

Either

(b)

If

(c)

If the Pointy

(d)

So atomless gunk

In chapter 2,

I

won’t

revisit

1

View

is true,

is

argued that both

my criticisms here.

then atomless gunk

is

impossible.

impossible. [Hudson (2001): 84-90].

I

MaxCon and

the Pointy

View

are false.

will not challenge premise (b). Instead,

on Hudson’s defense of (c).
Hudson’s defense of premise
(1)

(c) consists

of the following argument:

The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached
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Parts.

I

will focus

.

(2)

Necessarily, no

(3)

Necessarily, any hunk of material atomless
gunk exactly occupies
some region or other.

(4)

Necessarily, any region has at least one
point-sized subregion.
Necessarily, any point-sized region is exactly
occupiable
[Hudson (2001): 88-89],

hunk of material atomless
a point-sized region of space.

(5)

Hudson claims
to the Pointy

that premises (2), (4),

View of Simples.

atomless gunk,

we have

and

(5) are

gunk exactly occupies

each supported by an appeal

Since (l)-(5) jointly imply the impossibility
of material

an argument from the Pointy View to the impossibility
of

atomless gunk. Hudson writes:

From

(1) through (5)

we

can get the conclusion that material atomless
impossible. Suppose (toward reductio) that there is some
hunk
of material atomless gunk, H. So, by (2) and
exactly occupies
(3),
some non-point-sized region-hereby named ‘R\ So, by
and

gunk

is

H

(4)

has

—

occupies
itself

P.

So, by (2),

gunk. So,

(5),

—hereby
—

one exactly-occupiable, point-sized subregion
named ‘P\ So, by (1), H has a part hereby named ‘A’
at least

A fails to be gunk.

R

that exactly

But
every part of gunk
Reductio complete. [Hudson

H fails to be gunk, too.

.

.

is

.

(2001): 89].

Let us turn

now to Hudson’s

We begin with premise (1).
Undetached Parts

(DAUP):

rationales for premises (l)-(5).

Let us

first recall

what the Doctrine of Arbitrary

says:

M, if R is the region of space
any occupiable sub-region of R whatever there
occupies the region sub-R and which is a part of

Necessarily, for every material object

occupied by M, and

if

sub-R

is

,

exists a material object that

M

14

Hudson claims

that:

Many

are inclined to admit the possibility of material atomless

because they are attracted

to a principle

Arbitrary Undetached Parts...

from

known

gunk

as the Doctrine of

A historically popular argument to gunk

DAUP and a denial of point-sized objects observes that any

extended thing will have a right half and a

left

half (given

some

orientation or other), and that the halves in question will each have a
right half

and a

left half,

and

that the process continues without end.
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.

.

It is

hard to see

how to motivate
DAUP, and thus

the possibility of

gunk without
think the gunk theorists should be
inclined to leave premise
(1) alone. [Hudson (2001): 88-89],
something

Let us note that

gunk
that

is

possible.

gunk

is

I

like

it is

reject

possible for

I

someone

DAUP

to reject

and yet believe

DAUP for the reasons discussed in chapter 3.

possible, because

I

believe that

gunky worlds

But

believe

are conceivable and that their

conceivability provides as of yet undefeated evidence
of their possibility.
things, both extended simples

I

that

and material atomless gunk are possible.

As

I

see

We have

similar reasons to believe that both are possible,
specifically, that they are both

conceivable. If you accept the possibility of extended
simples, you must reject

DAUP.

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily undercut any motivation
for accepting the
possibility of material atomless gunk.

DAUP

seems

to play a

major role

in

Hudson’s argument, since

it is

DAUP that

guarantees that, whenever a material object occupies a region of space, the
mereological
structure of the material object will be isomorphic to the mereological structure
of the

region.

15

If we reject

DAUP,

then

we

reject this necessary

isomorphism. This

anyone who accepts the possibility of extended simples must

we might wonder whether

reject

DAUP.

is

why

Similarly,

an advocate of gunk could hold that a gunky object could

exactly occupy an extended region of space without having parts that correspond to the
point-sized subregions of that region. Such an object

extended subregion of the region that
point-sized subregion.

Pointy

One

View of Simples and

it

would have a

part at every

exactly occupies and yet have no part at any

could even hold that this

is

possible while accepting the

the remaining premises of the argument. So, without
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1

DAUP, Hudson’s argument
material atomless

If

gunk

one adopts

DAUP that grounds
Let us

View of Simples

this strategy,

then one must reject

premise

So

it

seems

(2),

which

states that, necessarily,

on

space.

Given the Pointy View,

this issue.

that

is

clearly true.

Hudson

is

points

definitely

For suppose an object exactly occupied a point-sized
region of
this object is a simple.

So, given the Pointy View, this

not material atomless gunk.

We might think that, even if we reject the Pointy View, we still
reason to accept premise

For example,

(2).

being point-sized implies being a simple,
the reasons that

I

if

we have independent

we ought to

gave for rejecting the Pointy View

could have good

reasons to think that

endorse premise
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(2).

However,

in chapter 2 are also reasons for

rejecting the claim that being point-sized suffices for being a simple.

In chapter 2,

argued that there can be complex objects made out of co-located point-sized objects.
these arguments are sound, being point-sized

Once we accept

that

I

proposed

However,

I

not sufficient for being a simple.

in chapter 2 all involved point-sized

think that

I

we might

complex objects

I

that

are not counter-examples to this

can produce a counter-example

In order to generate the counter-example,

If

implies being non-gunky. The counter-

at least

composed of point-sized simples and hence
claim.

is

being point-sized does not imply simplicity,

wonder whether being point-sized
examples

it is

no hunk of

gunk exactly occupies a point-sized region of space.
Hudson

correct

is

OT as well.

OT.

out that, given the Pointy View, this premise

object

implies the impossibility of

fails.

now turn to

material atomless

that the Pointy

to

were

weaker

even the weaker claim.

must make use of the Extrinsic Theory,
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which

employed

I

earlier in chapter 3

when defending

the possibility of extended

simples. Recall that, according to the Extrinsic
Theory, a material object has
in virtue

of the fact that

it

shape of a material object

its

shape

bears the occupation relation to a region
with that shape. The
is

fixed by the fact that

it

bears a relation to a region of space

that has that shape.

Let us consider a world
material object,

assume

M,

w

in

which spacetime

it

occupies in w. So, in w,

Now the

M

M

is

isomorphic to the mereological structure

is itself

gunky.

mereological structure of an object

is

shape of a material object, given the extrinsic theory,
there

to the

is

no reason why they should be necessarily

argument

gunky. Let us consider a

that exactly occupies a region of spacetime at
this world. Let us

that the mereological structure of

of the region

is

that undercut

is

no reason

to

an object must always match that of the region
there to stop an intrinsic duplicate of

is

an extrinsic feature.

correlated.

DAUP in chapter 3.

of a thing can come apart, there

an intrinsic feature, whereas the

Once we

It

was

And

so

this insight that led

see that these two aspects

hold that the mereological structure of

it

exactly occupies.

Given

this,

what

is

M from exactly occupying a point-sized region of

space?
In chapter 3,

Now the

1

claimed that the occupation relation

is

a perfectly natural relation.

instantiation of a perfectly natural relation should not be constrained by the

intrinsic properties

of its

relata.

structure should not prevent

it

So the

fact that

an object has a particular mereological

from occupying a region of spacetime with a

particular

shape, just as the fact that an object has a particular charge does not limit the regions of

spacetime

it

can occupy. So a duplicate of

M should be able to occupy a point-sized
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region of spacetime.

So

there

mereological structure as
that contains a

(4),

subregion.

I

M occupies a point-sized region of spacetime.

counter-example to premise

As Hudson
premise

a possible world in which an object
with the same

is

which

This

is

a world

(2).

points out, premise (3) seems uncontroversial.
Let us attend to
states that, necessarily,

suspect that here

any region has

the place that

is

at least

one point-sized

most advocates of gunk

will balk. In

defense of (4), Hudson writes:

—

Recent and intriguing defenses of a Whiteheadian theory of space
a
that may deserve the description “gunky space”
are available in

—

view

The central idea is that one may be a realist about space
while taking points to be constructed out of those regions. But, strictly
speaking, questions about the occupiability of point-sized regions could
the literature.

not even arise, for there would be no point-sized regions to have
questions about. Accordingly, by invoking [the Pointy View] together
with DAUP one might reject premise (4) and mount a defense of the
possibility of material atomless

gunk by appealing to the possibility of an
extended material object in gunky space. The problem, as I see it, is that
the defense is too strong. The mathematical project of constructing
points out of sets of infinitely many, converging, nested, extended
regions does not guarantee the metaphysical possibility of gunky space

any more than the formal consistency of geometries of arbitrarily many
dimensions establishes the metaphysical possibility of four-dimensional
space.

At most

the mathematics helps

the relevant proposals.

More

remove one kind of objection to
it seems to me that the

pressing, however,

claim that “space

is gunky” must have its truth-value as a matter of
But then, if we ground our belief in the possibility of material
atomless gunk with an appeal to gunky space, we will effectively rule

necessity.

out the possibility of material simples, given [the Pointy View],
that consequence,

I

submit,

is

theory of space

is

possibility than

consistent,

relational structure that

we have

behaves

that the consistency

in

And

too high to pay. [Hudson (2001): 90],

think that the fact that the Whiteheadian theory of space

more about metaphysical

Hudson

I

Hudson

is

consistent tells us

allows. For, since the Whiteheadian

excellent reason to believe that there

accordance with

this theory.

However,

is

I

a possible

agree with

of the Whiteheadian theory of space does not show
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that

sp aC e

is

a relational structure such that

accordance with the theory. In
claim that, necessarily, space

is

it is

metaphysically possible that

fact, in section 4.2,

1

it

behaves

in

presented an argument for the

not Whiteheadian. The argument presented

-

if

sound -

provides evidence that trumps our intuition that space could
exhibit the structural
features dictated

by the Whiteheadian theory.

However,

it is

important that the reason

Whiteheadian spacetime

is

I

gave in section 4.2 for denying

that

possible are not also reasons for denying that material

objects could be Whiteheadian. In section 4.2,

1

argued that

if

both simplistic

spacetimes and gunky spacetimes are possible, then the degree to which some
properties are natural

is

contingent.

No

such argument can be generated

the Extrinsic Theory, for the geometrical properties of both

gunky and

if

we

accept

simplistic

material objects are inherited from the regions of spacetime that they occupy.

So our

intuition that material objects could

Whiteheadian theory

is

not undercut. So

we have

behave

in

accordance with

defeasible reasons to believe that

possible material objects are structured as the Whiteheadian theory dictates. But then

we have

reason to believe that material atomless gunk

214

is

possible.

1

Notes

Some

philosophers also endorse the stronger claim that
there are possible
**** ( ° F s P acetime ) » s partially gunky. (See, for example,

at

^nnn\
(2000a).)
xs

Sider

Space

a simple,

is

partially

gunky just

in case (i) there are

some

xj such that each of the

there are some ys such that each of the ys is
a gunky region of space,
the fusion of the xs and the ys. Presumably,
one believes in this
alleged possibility only if one also believes that CT
is true. So I will not provide a
separate discussion of this intriguing possibility.
is

and

space

(iii)

( 11 )

is

2

1 am assuming that propositions
have something analogous to 1 st and 2 nd order
syntactic structure. Perhaps these propositions are really
sentences in a Lagadonian

language. See Lewis (1986a): 145-146.
3

See Armstrong (1989): 44, Armstrong (1997): 166-169, Black
(2000) Heller

(1998), and Sider (2002).
4

What

follows could probably be fairly described as doing a poor job of
reinventing the wheel. I developed these definitions on my own (with Jake
Bridge

watching over
(1

996), Gerla
5

(

my shoulder),
1

although similar ideas have been developed in Forrest

990) and Roeper

(

1

997).

See Lewis (1986): 120-123 for further development of this response.

6

See Cartwright (1975) and Zimmerman (1996):

7

5.

Strictly speaking, this is not quite right, for reasons that will

emerge

momentarily.
8

9

See Sider (2000a).

See Sider (2000a).

10

Zimmerman has

indicated to

captures his intentions than
1

Note

that this

is

C

in a personal

communication

that

C**

better

did.

a de dicto necessity. The thesis

wholes are ontologically dependent on
12

me

their

is

not the claim that extended

boundary points.

See Sider (2000a) for a similar worry.
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F 0 eS 1996) Whkh WC discussed earlier
Provides a lengthy explanation of
in, + 7
what a ,Whiteheadian
spacetime would be like.
,

^

.

14

DAUP

slightly different

Hudson

’

>

is discussed in van Inwagen
(1983). My statement of DAUP is
from van Inwagen’ s, but agrees with Hudson’s
formulation See

(2001): 88.

Strictly speaking, this holds only if every region
is a receptacle
,

where a
a receptacle just in case it is possible for a material
object to exactly
occupy this region. If certain regions are not receptacles -for
example, point-sized
regions - then
does not imply that the mereological structure of a
material object
region of space

is

DAUP

will

always be isomorphic to the mereological structure of the
region

it

exactly

occupies.
16

For example,

Ned Markosian

argues that

MaxCon

sized implies being a simple. See Markosian (1998a).
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entails that being point-
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